Limited recourse: Difference between revisions

no edit summary
No edit summary
No edit summary
Line 36: Line 36:
Probably because the [[principal]] has said, “I don’t trust you flash city types, with your [[Sharpe ratio]]s and your [[intelligent beta]]. If I am not careful you could put on some [[Amaranth Advisors LLC|insanely cavalier spread play on the seasonal convergence of natural gas futures]] and blow up my whole fund. I don’t want you to do that. So I am only prepared to risk the assets I give to you, and that is the end of it.”
Probably because the [[principal]] has said, “I don’t trust you flash city types, with your [[Sharpe ratio]]s and your [[intelligent beta]]. If I am not careful you could put on some [[Amaranth Advisors LLC|insanely cavalier spread play on the seasonal convergence of natural gas futures]] and blow up my whole fund. I don’t want you to do that. So I am only prepared to risk the assets I give to you, and that is the end of it.”


What the [[principal]] is doing here is ''broadly'' of a piece with segregated, ring-fenced [[repackaging]]. She is saying, “swap dudes: you are trading against, and limited in recourse to, ''this'' bucket of assets. Cut your cloth accordingly.”  
What the [[principal]] is doing here is ''broadly'' of a piece with segregated, ring-fenced [[repackaging]]. She is saying, “swap dudes: to stop my agent, against whom you are trading, going properly postal and blowing up my whole operation I am limiting it, and therefore ''you'', to, ''this'' bucket of assets. Cut your cloth accordingly.”  


And that would be fine, if it ''were'' like a ring-fenced repack. But it is not ''quite'': for one thing, poor swap dealer has no [[Security interest|security]] over the pool. It gets no “quid” for its “quo”. It is ''limited'' to that pool of assets, but it has no ''priority'' over them, as against other general creditors of the fund, as it would if it had security. It may find itself not only limited to the pool of assets but ''even then'' only recovering cents in the dollar on them. ''Double whammy''. You could fix that by having the fund represent that ''all'' other creditors are similarly limited to ''other'' pools of assets, so every creditor has its own dedicated bucket — but that is messy and unreliable. Are there really no other creditors? What about people claiming under a tort?<ref>Okay, I know, I am reaching here a bit. But still, the principle.</ref> Granting security is much cleaner and neater — but you’ll never get it. Somehow, asset managers have won this battle. Swap dealers the world over run this structural risk. One day this might come back to nip them on their bottoms, like an angry [[black swan]]. Who can say?  
And that would be fine, if it ''were'' like a ring-fenced repack. But it is not ''quite'': for one thing, poor swap dealer has no [[Security interest|security]] over the pool. It gets no “quid” for its “quo”. It is ''limited'' to that pool of assets, but it has no ''priority'' over them, as against other general creditors of the fund, as it would if it had security. It may find itself not only limited to the pool of assets but ''even then'' only recovering cents in the dollar on them. ''Double whammy''. You could fix that by having the fund represent that ''all'' other creditors are similarly limited to ''other'' pools of assets, so every creditor has its own dedicated bucket — but that is messy and unreliable. Are there really no other creditors? What about people claiming under a tort?<ref>Okay, I know, I am reaching here a bit. But still, the principle.</ref> Granting security is much cleaner and neater — but you’ll never get it. Somehow, asset managers have won this battle. Swap dealers the world over run this structural risk. One day this might come back to nip them on their bottoms, like an angry [[black swan]]. Who can say?