The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations: Difference between revisions

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{{A|book review|}}
{{A|book review|}}
Of a piece with {{author|Charles Perrow}}’s {{br|Normal Accidents}}, {{author|Sidney Dekker}}’s book is compelling in rooting the cause of accidents in poor system design and unnecessary complexity, overlaying safety features and compliance measures which only make the problem worse — that is, at the door of management and not poor benighted [[subject matter expert]]s who are expected to make sense of the {{author|}} [[Rube Goldberg machine]] that management expect them to operate.
Of a piece with {{author|Charles Perrow}}’s {{br|Normal Accidents}}, {{author|Sidney Dekker}}’s book is compelling in rooting the cause of accidents in poor system design and unnecessary complexity, overlaying safety features and compliance measures which only make the problem worse — that is, at the door of management and not poor benighted [[subject matter expert]]s who are expected to make sense of the [[Rube Goldberg machine]] that management expect them to operate.


There are two ways of looking at system accidents:
There are two ways of looking at system accidents: