Seeing Like a State: Difference between revisions

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Exactly ''why'' there is this collective affliction of [[wilful blindness]] to our administrative compulsion is a great, unexplored topic of our age. That so many, great and small, have so much to lose by exploring it may explain the mystery.
Exactly ''why'' there is this collective affliction of [[wilful blindness]] to our administrative compulsion is a great, unexplored topic of our age. That so many, great and small, have so much to lose by exploring it may explain the mystery.


{{br|Seeing Like a State}} takes as its thesis how well-intended patrician government can, in some circumstances, lead to utter disaster. While Scott’s examples are legion, one could — and some do — criticise him for his anecdotal approach: he has curated examples that best fit his thesis, and it therefore suffers from insoluble [[confirmation bias]]. That may be true, but I don’t think it matters, for Scott’s thesis is so ''familiar'', so ''plausible'' and its exhortations so consistent with other theories in adjacent fields,<ref>{{author|Charles Perrow}}’s {{br|Normal Accidents}} theory; [[Systems Theory]] as expounded by {{author|Donella H. Meadows}}, {{author|Thomas Kuhn}}’s {{br|The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}}</ref> that it is hard to be bothered by a lack of empirical rigour. This stuff all stands to reason. Data is not its value: Scott’s ''[[narrative]]'' is its value, as a counter-narrative to modern statist (and corporate) orthodoxy — that some gilded superman, sitting at the top of the heap magically pulls levers for the betterment of all — and that, in itself, is valuable and enlightening.  
{{br|Seeing Like a State}} takes as its thesis how well-intended patrician government can, in some circumstances, lead to utter disaster. While Scott’s examples are legion, one could — and some do — criticise him for his anecdotal approach: he has curated examples that best fit his thesis, and it therefore suffers from insoluble [[confirmation bias]]. That may be true, but I don’t think it matters, for Scott’s thesis is so ''familiar'', so ''plausible'' and its exhortations so consistent with other theories in adjacent fields,<ref>{{author|Charles Perrow}}’s {{br|Normal Accidents}} theory; [[systems theory]] as expounded by {{author|Donella H. Meadows}}, {{author|Thomas Kuhn}}’s {{br|The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}}</ref> that it is hard to be bothered by a lack of empirical rigour. This stuff all stands to reason. Data is not its value: Scott’s ''[[narrative]]'' is its value, as a counter-narrative to modern statist (and corporate) orthodoxy — that some gilded superman, sitting at the top of the heap magically pulls levers for the betterment of all — and that, in itself, is valuable and enlightening.  


In any case, Scott does not say that top-down bureaucratic disaster is inevitable, but notes the same four conditions are present wherever we find it: a will to bend nature — and the polity — to the administrator’s agenda; a [[high modernism|“high modernist” ideology]] that holds that that all problems can be anticipated and solved in time with the necessary organisation, application and empirical rigour; an authoritarian state, with machinery to impose its ideological modernist vision; and a subjugated citizenry (or staff) without the means (or inclination) to resist the machinations of the administrator.
In any case, Scott does not say that top-down bureaucratic disaster is inevitable, but notes the same four conditions are present wherever we find it: a will to bend nature — and the polity — to the administrator’s agenda; a [[high modernism|“high modernist” ideology]] that holds that that all problems can be anticipated and solved in time with the necessary organisation, application and empirical rigour; an authoritarian state, with machinery to impose its ideological modernist vision; and a subjugated citizenry (or staff) without the means (or inclination) to resist the machinations of the administrator.
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*{{br|Thinking in Systems}} — {{author|Donella H. Meadows}}
*{{br|Thinking in Systems}} — {{author|Donella H. Meadows}}
*{{br|Models.Behaving.Badly: Why Confusing Illusion with Reality can be a Disaster, on Wall Street and in Life}}
*{{br|Models.Behaving.Badly: Why Confusing Illusion with Reality can be a Disaster, on Wall Street and in Life}} — {{author|Emanuel Derman}}
*{{br|Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies}}
*{{br|Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies}} — {{author|Charles Perrow}}
*[[Diversity]]
*[[Diversity]]
{{ref}}
{{ref}}