Special pleading: Difference between revisions

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Yet we find a curious dissonance: for however passionately a [[legal eagle]] may agree about this ''in the abstract'', it will be a different story ''in the particular'', especially where the particular in question is ''her own document''. This we call a ''[[paradox]]''. You know how the JC loves a [[paradox]].
Yet we find a curious dissonance: for however passionately a [[legal eagle]] may agree about this ''in the abstract'', it will be a different story ''in the particular'', especially where the particular in question is ''her own document''. This we call a ''[[paradox]]''. You know how the JC loves a [[paradox]].


Now everything in the [[legal eagle]]’s armoury is arranged around the [[analogy]]. This is ''[[stare decisis]]'': the [[doctrine of precedent]]. The common lawyer proceeds exclusively by [[anecdote]]. She treats each case on its merit.  
Now everything in the [[legal eagle]]’s armoury is arranged around the [[analogy]]. This is ''[[stare decisis]]'': the [[doctrine of precedent]]. The common lawyer proceeds exclusively by [[anecdote]]. She treats each case on its merit. Merit, in the eye of our learned friends, lies only in the ''particular''. The general — the emergent value of all contracts across the market, seen and unseen, is an abstraction beyond the possible [[care horizon]] of a legal advisor. It simply isn’t relevant. Obviously, everyone can agree that ''in general'' legal documents should be shorter, clearer and better, but legal eagles don’t deal in generalities. They deal in particular. Managing risk on a “portfolio” basis – which is surely what all [[financial services]] organisations must do – comes very hard to one trained in the [[common law]].
 
 
{{c|paradox}}
{{c|paradox}}

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