Banque Worms v BankAmerica International: Difference between revisions

no edit summary
No edit summary
No edit summary
Line 1: Line 1:
{{a|casenote|}}This case, fonldy known to [[restitution]] fans and other obstreporous rascals of the financial services industry as ''[[Banque Worms]]'' involved a [[revolving credit facility]] between one Spedley and the Banque.  
{{a|casenote|}}This case, fondly known to [[restitution]] fans and other obstreperous rascals of the financial services industry as ''[[Banque Worms]]'' involved a [[revolving credit facility]] between one Spedley and the Banque.  


===Facts===
===Facts===
Line 24: Line 24:
The decision is right — Banque Worms should be able to keep the money — but for the wrong reasons, and these have had a ghastly knock-on effect for poor old Citibank some 30 years later.
The decision is right — Banque Worms should be able to keep the money — but for the wrong reasons, and these have had a ghastly knock-on effect for poor old Citibank some 30 years later.


This case is not about restitution at all: it is about the simple law of ''[[contract]]''. Spedley had an obligation to pay, ''on that day'', and its agent discharged that obligation. Spedley might have a complaint against its agent for exceeding its mandate, but this is hardly Banque Worms’ problem. Unlike a crime or a tort, there is no ''mens rea'' associated with contractual performance. It doesn’t matter whether I intended to perform the contract; if I — or my agent — did, that is the end of it. There is no equity in denying Banque’s right to keep money I paid it, that I was due to pay it, but that I simply didn’t mean to pay. There is no need to resort even to Banque’s right of [[banker’s set-off]] let alone the arcane fiddly area of [[restitution]], albeit that the law does appear to have made an intervention here.
This case is not about restitution at all: it is about the simple law of ''[[contract]]''. Spedley had an obligation to pay, ''on that day'', and its agent discharged that obligation. Spedley might have a complaint against its agent for exceeding its mandate, but this is hardly Banque Worms’ problem. Unlike a crime or a tort, there is no ''[[mens rea]]'' associated with contractual performance.  


But the extension of restitutionary principles to an environment where there is a governing contract — a place where restitutionary angels ''should'' fear to tread —while of no moment in [[Banque Worms]], created a total shitstorm in {{casenote|Citigroup|Brigade Capital Management}}, since in that case the debt purportedly discharged ''was not even due'' at the time of the mistaken payment.
It doesn’t matter whether I ''intended'' to perform the contract; if I — or my [[agent]] — ''did'' perform it, that is the end of the matter. There is no equity in denying the Banque’s right to keep money that I was due to pay, and that (through my stupid agent) I ''did'' pay, but that I simply didn’t ''mean'' to pay. There is no need to resort even to Banque’s right of [[banker’s set-off]] — though surely it was available if need be — let alone the arcane area of [[restitution]].
 
The extension of restitutionary principles to an environment where there is a governing contract — a place where restitutionary angels ''should'' fear to tread —while of little moment in [[Banque Worms]], created a total ''shitstorm'' in {{casenote|Citigroup|Brigade Capital Management}}, since in that case the debt purportedly “discharged for value” ''was not even due'' at the time of the mistaken payment.


{{sa}}
{{sa}}