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But over those periods, good employees get ''better''. They learn things, they gain experience. They build networks. They bat themselves in. They may see less able, less loyal coworkers forge ahead with lateral moves. | But over those periods, good employees get ''better''. They learn things, they gain experience. They build networks. They bat themselves in. They may see less able, less loyal coworkers forge ahead with lateral moves. | ||
===Tiny violins? | ===Tiny violins?=== | ||
Now, none of this is to defend, much less justify, city pay levels which, however you look at them, are absurd. | Now, none of this is to defend, much less justify, city pay levels which, however you look at them, are absurd. | ||
So should we shed tears about relative disfavour among a group as systematically overcompensated as city drones? We should not. And we do not. But we should understand the [[systemantic]] forces at play. | So should we shed tears about relative disfavour among a group as systematically overcompensated as city drones? We should not. And we do not. But we should understand the [[systemantic]] forces at play. | ||
Fundamentally, the deployment of capital to investment — this is the sun total of what the financial services machine, at its most basic level, does — is a very risky, important and therefore valuable thing. Historically, markets that have most effectively allocated capital have done best. It is painful to concede but hard to deny: for at least a century, our American friends have been the best. | |||
In any case those who are good at it stand to make a lot of money. This will not change. | In any case those who are good at it stand to make a lot of money. This will not change. Effective capital allocation is worth paying for. | ||
The [[JC’]]s operating premise is that those who do get to do it — and the [[agency problem|remoras, nits and flukeworms]] who accompany them as they go — do ''not'' do nearly as good a job of it as they should. Our [[roll of honour]] refers. | The [[JC’]]s operating premise is that those who do get to do it — and the [[agency problem|remoras, nits and flukeworms]] who accompany them as they go — do ''not'' do nearly as good a job of it as they should. Our [[roll of honour]] refers. | ||
If the system were configured systema(n)tically to reward excellence, not mediocrity, perhaps fewer shitstorms would happen. So — with the caveat that, sure, everyone gets paid too much — we ask here a different question: how do we allocate pay more effectively. This is, after all, what the industry is meant to be best at | |||
===Mediocrity drift=== | |||
The longer good staff stay, the worse, generally, they are treated. Their only | The longer good staff stay, the worse, generally, they are treated. Their only means to correct this — to [[mark-to-market|mark yourself to market]] — is to [[lateral quitter|leave]]. This seems a bit mad. | ||
To be sure, salaries may drift upwards, decade by decade, courtesy of | To be sure, salaries may drift upwards, decade by decade, courtesy of [[HR]]’s finely honed calculus, predicated as it is on abstract, but unshakable logic: a director is worth more than an associate director; a good associate director worth more than a bad one, and so on. All true, and fair, in ''the abstract'', but here is the thing. Employees don’t ''work'' in the abstract. Only [[averagism|averages]] do. | ||
But the [[Modernist|modern]] world ''loves'' its archetypes. Just as the [[common law]] has its [[reasonable person]], economics its rational one, the boxwallahs of [[personnel]] have their average employee. | But the [[Modernist|modern]] world ''loves'' its archetypes. Just as the [[common law]] has its [[reasonable person]], economics its rational one, the boxwallahs of [[personnel]] have their average employee. |