Stakeholder capitalism: Difference between revisions

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{{a|devil|[[File:Stakeholder.png|450px|thumb|center|A stakeholder yesterday. Well, it was this or a picture of Peter Cushing, folks.]]}}Once upon a time, not terribly long ago, the [[shareholder]] was an opaque yet sacred being, somewhat divine, to whose improving ends everyone engaged in the company’s operation twitched their every fibre.
{{a|devil|[[File:Stakeholder.png|450px|thumb|center|A stakeholder yesterday. Well, it was this or a picture of Peter Cushing, folks.]]}}Once upon a time, not terribly long ago, the [[shareholder]] was an opaque yet sacred being, somewhat divine, to whose improving ends everyone engaged in the company’s operation twitched their every fibre.  


This ''[[Shareholder capitalism|will to shareholder return]]'' sprang from the brow of {{author|Adam Smith}} and his [[invisible hand]]:  
This ''[[Shareholder capitalism|will to shareholder return]]'' sprang from the brow of {{author|Adam Smith}} and his [[invisible hand]]:  
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That interest, in turn, can also be measured along a single dimension: ''profit''. Nothing else matters. This puts a tidy gate the [[agency problem]], which otherwise afflicts the company’s directors, officers, servants and agents: it is hard to hide from after-tax profit.
That interest, in turn, can also be measured along a single dimension: ''profit''. Nothing else matters. This puts a tidy gate the [[agency problem]], which otherwise afflicts the company’s directors, officers, servants and agents: it is hard to hide from after-tax profit.


But we live in a post-millennial world. Given their founding ethos, it is hard to deny that [[corporation]]s are venal, selfish things, riven with [[unconscious bias|biases]], whose unseemly stampede for profit demonstrates an abject want of care for unseen victims. As long ago as 2003 it was Joel Bakan’s thrust in ''The Corporation:''<ref>[https://www.amazon.com/Corporation-Pathological-Pursuit-Profit-Power/dp/0743247469 ''The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power'']</ref> a legal personality whose soul  motive is the short-term enrichment of its shareholders has the character traits to earn a clinical diagnosis as a ''psychopath''.  
But we live in a post-millennial world. Given their founding ethos, it is hard to deny that [[corporation]]s are venal, selfish things, riven with [[unconscious bias|biases]], whose unseemly stampede for profit demonstrates an abject want of care for unseen victims. As long ago as 2003 it was Joel Bakan’s thrust in ''The Corporation'':<ref>[https://www.amazon.com/Corporation-Pathological-Pursuit-Profit-Power/dp/0743247469 ''The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power'']</ref> a legal person whose sole motive is the short-term enrichment of its investors has the clinical characteristics of a ''psychopath''.  


To date, Bakan is on the right side of history. Unalloyed selfishness has become, to the modern conscience, intolerable. We are redrawing the world: let us redraw our corporate aspirations too. [[Wall Street|Gordon Gekko]] is out. {{plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arif_Naqvi|Arif Naqvi}} is in.<ref>Until his arrest.</ref>
Unalloyed selfishness has become, to the modern conscience, intolerable. We are redrawing the world: let us redraw our corporate aspirations too. [[Wall Street|Gordon Gekko]] is out. {{plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arif_Naqvi|Arif Naqvi}} is in.<ref>Until his arrest.</ref>


And so it has come to pass: “[[stakeholder capitalism]]” has displaced [[shareholder capitalism]]. We, the planet, ask our corporations to orient themselves not just toward their shareholders, but ''all'' their “stakeholders” — customers, [[creditor]]<nowiki/>s, suppliers, [[employee]]<nowiki/>s, the surrounding community, the [[Environmental, social and corporate governance|environment]], the marginalised multitude that suffers invisibly under the awful [[Externality|externalities]] of industry ''and'' — last but not least! — their shareholders.
And so it has come to pass: “[[stakeholder capitalism]]” has displaced [[shareholder capitalism]]. We, the planet, ask our corporations to orient themselves not just toward their shareholders, but ''all'' their “stakeholders” — customers, [[creditor]]<nowiki/>s, suppliers, [[employee]]<nowiki/>s, the surrounding community, the [[Environmental, social and corporate governance|environment]], the marginalised multitude that suffers invisibly under the awful [[Externality|externalities]] of industry ''and'' — last but not least! — their shareholders.


Under this new, enlightened purpose every corporation is duty-bound to increase long-term value for all who are impacted by its operation. ''It must not profit at the expense of the wider world''.
Under this new, enlightened purpose every corporation is duty-bound to increase long-term value for all who are impacted by its operation. ''Corporations must not profit at the expense of the wider world''.


This view seems so modern, so compassionate and so intuitively ''right'' — so ''fit for [[Twitter]]'' — that it is hard to see how anyone can ever have thought otherwise. Yet, think otherwise they did — consistently — from the publication of Smith’s ''The Theory of Moral Sentiments'' onward, down the centuries, through the titans of American commerce, Chicago economics and Hollywood villainy:  right down until the collective failure of nerve we face today.  
This view seems so modern, so compassionate and so intuitively ''right'' — so ''fit for [[Twitter]]'' — that it is hard to see how anyone can ever have thought otherwise. Yet, think otherwise they did — consistently — from the publication of Smith’s ''The Theory of Moral Sentiments'' onward, down the centuries, through the titans of American commerce, Chicago economics and Hollywood villainy.  


However obvious our enlightened new direction seems, it is still a striking reversal; one that has passed with barely a shot fired. Even that trade union for unreconciled boomer gammons, the {{plainlink|https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans|Business Roundtable}} has joined in: last year, it “redefined the purpose of a corporation” away from the outright pursuit of profit to instead promote “an economy that serves all Americans”. “It affirms the essential role corporations can play in improving our society,” said Alex Gorsky, Chairman and CEO of Johnson & Johnson and Chair of the Roundtable’s Corporate Governance Committee,<ref>Now I don’t want to intrude here, but is being Chairman ''and'' CEO really the best example for the chair of a corporate governance committee to set? [https://hbr.org/2020/03/why-the-ceo-shouldnt-also-be-the-board-chair Here] is the Harvard Business Review on the subject.</ref> “when [[CEO]]s are truly committed to meeting the needs of all stakeholders.”
However obvious our enlightened new direction seems, it is still a striking reversal, yet it has passed with barely a shot fired. Even that trade union for unreconciled boomer gammons, the {{plainlink|https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans|Business Roundtable}} has joined in: last year, it “redefined the purpose of a corporation” away from the “outright pursuit of profit” to instead promote “an economy that serves all Americans”.  


We are not sure who asked the Business Roundtable, but in any case we find ourselves taking a different view. This not an “a[[woke]]ning” so much as ''a collective concussion of the sort occasioned by a stout blow on the head''. These people are either outrageously talking their own book, or we have all gone mad.
“It affirms the essential role corporations can play in improving our society,” said Alex Gorsky, Chairman and CEO of Johnson & Johnson and Chair of the Roundtable’s Corporate Governance Committee,<ref>Now I don’t want to intrude here, but is being Chairman ''and'' CEO really the best example for the chair of a corporate governance committee to set? [https://hbr.org/2020/03/why-the-ceo-shouldnt-also-be-the-board-chair Here] is the Harvard Business Review on the subject.</ref> “when [[CEO]]s are truly committed to meeting the needs of all stakeholders.”
 
We are not sure who asked the Business Roundtable, but in any case we find ourselves taking a different view. This not an “a[[woke]]ning” so much as ''a collective concussion of the sort occasioned by a stout blow on the head''. These people are either outrageously talking their own book, or we have all gone mad.  


Skeptics of the mass delusion conspiracy theories can relax: it is almost certainly the former. For “stakeholder capitalism” ''codifies'' the [[agency problem]]. It diffuses the executive’s accountability for anything the corporation does, putting the executive beyond the reproach of the one constituent stakeholder group with the necessary means, justification and consensus to call the executives out: their [[Shareholder|shareholders]].  
Skeptics of the mass delusion conspiracy theories can relax: it is almost certainly the former. For “stakeholder capitalism” ''codifies'' the [[agency problem]]. It diffuses the executive’s accountability for anything the corporation does, putting the executive beyond the reproach of the one constituent stakeholder group with the necessary means, justification and consensus to call the executives out: their [[Shareholder|shareholders]].  


Stakeholder capitalism, folks, is a ''swizz''.
Stakeholder capitalism, folks, is a ''swizz''.
=== About those shareholders===
===About those shareholders===
Under Joel Bakan’s theory, it is not the ''shareholders'' who are psychopaths,<ref>Shareholders ''who themselves are corporations'' probably count as psychopaths, come to think of it, but the point remains valid. Shareholders are not necessarily corporates, and at some point all shareholdings must (right? ''Right''?) resolve back to some living, breathing individual.</ref> but the [[corporation]] as a distinct [[legal personality]] ''itself''. The shareholders are only the ''motivation'' for its pathology. In a well-balanced polity, they will represent all walks of life. The latter-day power and pervasiveness of [[pension fund]]<nowiki/>s in the equity markets means that, as far as makes any difference, they do. Indeed, shareholders are [[diverse]] in every conceivable dimension ''bar one''. They can be young or old; rich or poor; left-leaning or right; tall or short; male or female; gay or straight; black or white or, in each case, any gradation in between. They don’t have to ''know'' each other, ''like'' each other or ''care less'' about each other.
Under Joel Bakan’s theory, it is not the ''shareholders'' who are psychopaths,<ref>Shareholders ''who themselves are corporations'' probably count as psychopaths, come to think of it, but the point remains valid. Shareholders are not necessarily corporates, and at some point all shareholdings must (right? ''Right''?) resolve back to some living, breathing individual.</ref> but the [[corporation]] as a distinct [[legal personality]] ''itself''. The shareholders are only the ''motivation'' for its pathology. In a well-balanced polity, they will represent all walks of life. The latter-day pervasiveness of [[pension fund]]s in the equity markets means that, as far as makes any difference, they do. Indeed, shareholders are [[diverse]] in every conceivable dimension ''bar one''. They can be young or old; rich or poor; left-leaning or right; tall or short; male or female; gay or straight; black or white or, in each case, any gradation in between. They don’t have to ''know'' each other, ''like'' each other or ''care less'' about each other.  


''Beyond their shareholding'', shareholders, as a class, have no common characteristics at all. On any other topic, their respective interests, aspirations and priorities will jar, clatter and conflict. If you put them in a room to discuss any topic ''but'' their shareholding, you should not be surprised if a fight breaks out.
''Beyond their shareholding'', shareholders, as a class, have nothing in common at all. On any other topic, their interests, aspirations and priorities will jar, clatter and conflict. If you put them in a room to discuss anything ''but'' their shareholding, you should not be surprised if a fight breaks out.


But on that one subject, they are totally, magically, necessarily aligned: each among them will say, “whatever else I care about in my life, members of the board, know this: ''I expect you to maximise my return''.”
But on that one subject, they are totally, magically, ''necessarily'' aligned: each will say, “whatever else I care about in my life, members of the board, know this: ''I expect you to maximise my return''.”
===About that “return”===
===About that “return”===
Now you might argue that, as we are all shareholders in one way or another, stakeholder capitalism is really no more than “paying attention to shareholders’ ''wider'' interests, not just their pecuniary ones.” This way, polar bears only get a look in to the extent it is in the collected shareholders’ wider interests that they be protected.
Now you might argue that, as we are all shareholders in one way or another, stakeholder capitalism is really no more than “paying attention to shareholders’ ''wider'' interests, not just their pecuniary ones.” This way, polar bears get a look in if and only if their welfare is in the shareholders’ wider interest.


But, that isn’t ''stakeholder'' capitalism: that’s just a stupider version of ''shareholder'' capitalism. It is stupid because it displaces the shareholders’ moral judgment for that of the [[CEO]]. That is not the deal, readers. The [[CEO]] is the shareholders’ ''servant'': the steward of their capital. The CEO doesn’t get to moralise on the shareholders’ behalf. And — see below — if you had the pick the ''last'' bunch of humans on Earth to whom you would delegate the collected moral imperative, it would surely be the professional managerial class.
But that isn’t ''stakeholder'' capitalism: that’s just a stupider version of ''shareholder'' capitalism. It is stupid because it displaces the shareholders’ moral judgment the [[CEO]]’s. ''That is not the deal'', readers. The [[CEO]] is the shareholders’ ''servant''. The CEO doesn’t get to moralise on their behalf. And anyway — see below — if you had the pick the ''last'' bunch of humans on Earth to whom you would delegate the collected moral imperative, it would surely be the professional managerial class.


In any case, to substitute the shareholders’ putative wider interests — who knows what they are? — for their narrow financial one is to miss the single insight of shareholder capitalism. For, as long as you do not, there can be no dispute about what counts as a shareholder return, or how one should measure it.  
Besides, to substitute the shareholders’ putative wider interests — who knows what they are? — for their narrow financial one is to miss the single clinching insight. ''As long as it is all amount return, there can be no arguments.''


Long ago, our forebears<ref>No, not enlightened, white, male, cis-gendered, colonial oppressors: ancient Babylonians.</ref> figured out how to distil pure, abstract, immaterial ''[[value]]'' from the relativising commodities or perishable [[substrate]]s in which it is usually embedded:<ref>Granted, it is imperfect: until recently much cash did have a substrate (paper send coins), and its value is still coloured by the credit consensus of its issuing central bank, which can control its supply and demand, but the [[substrate]] issues are largely resolved, and consensus in the ''bona fides'' of the [[Federal Reserve]], [[ECB]] and [[Bank of England]] has proven a lot more robust than that of whatever anonymous collective coded the crypto currency do jour. Don’t @ me, [[bitcoin|Satoshi]] freaks.</ref> [[cash|''money'']]. How a given person values of a bushel of sorghum depends on the circumstances. Its value, even at a single moment in time, is relative to its consumer. Not so, cash.
Long ago, our forebears<ref>No, not enlightened, white, male, cis-gendered, colonial oppressors: ancient Mesopotamians.</ref> figured out how to distil pure, abstract, immaterial ''[[value]]'' from the relativising commodities or perishable [[substrate]]s in which it is usually embedded:<ref>Granted, it is imperfect: until recently much cash did have a substrate (paper send coins), and its value is still coloured by the credit consensus of its issuing central bank, which can control its supply and demand, but the [[substrate]] issues are largely resolved, and consensus in the ''bona fides'' of the [[Federal Reserve]], [[ECB]] and [[Bank of England]] has proven a lot more robust than that of whatever anonymous collective coded the crypto currency do jour. Don’t @ me, [[bitcoin|Satoshi]] freaks.</ref> they called that abstracted value “[[cash|''money'']]. How a given person values of a bushel of sorghum depends on the circumstances, her needs and predilections. Its value, even at a single moment in time, is relative. Not so, cash.[[File:CEO compensation.png|thumb|CEO compensation in thousands (blue) mapped against worker compensation in thousands (orange it’s the flat line hugging the ''x'' axis) and performance of the S&P500 (grey). For some reason there seems to be an elephant in the room, too.]]So, in discharging their sacred duty, [[Chief executive officer|those stewarding the affairs of corporation]] could not have clearer instructions: should the return they generate, ''valued in [[Cash|folding green stuff]]'', not pass muster, ''there will be no excuses''.  


[[File:CEO compensation.png|thumb|CEO compensation in thousands (blue) mapped against worker compensation in thousands (orange  it’s the flat line hugging the ''x'' axis) and performance of the S&P500 (grey). For some reason there seems to be an elephant in the room, too.]]So, in discharging their sacred quest, [[Chief executive officer|those stewarding the affairs of corporation]] could not have clearer instructions: should the return they generate, ''valued in [[Cash|folding green stuff]]'', not pass muster, there will be no excuses.  
There is no dog who can eat a [[Chief executive officer|chief executive]]’s homework, no looking on the bright side because employee engagement numbers are up, no consolation to be taken in the popularity of the company’s float in the May Day parade: if the annual return disappoints, members of the executive board, ''expect to get shot''.


There is no dog who can eat a [[Chief executive officer|chief executive]]’s homework, no looking on the bright side because employee engagement numbers are up, no shelter to be taken in the popularity of the company’s float in the May Day parade: if the annual return disappoints, members of the executive board, ''you should expect to get shot''.
Now moral imperatives can certainly be part of that calculation, as a [[second-order derivative]]: it may be that [[Virtue signalling|virtue-signalling]] about the environment, or putting a float in the May Day parade, is a good marketing tactic and generates greater revenues: if so, fill your boots. But this you can measure by that single monetary measure. This is no change to the conceptual framework.


Shareholder return is, in this way, not a device to systematically gouge the environment on behalf of an anonymous capitalist class. It is a device to stop executives systematically gouging [[Shareholder|the people whose money they are in charge of]].
Shareholder return is, in this way, not a device to systematically gouge the environment on behalf of an anonymous capitalist class. It is a device to stop ''executives'' systematically gouging ''[[Shareholder|the people whose investment they are managing]]''.


Now, before you throw up your hands and cry, “but surely, shareholders need no protection from their chief executive officers! It is the disenfranchised underclass at the margins of society who must be protected —” consider the chart to the right, taken from data published by the Economic Policy Institute,<ref>https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-2018/</ref> which, in mapping CEO compensation against worker compensation and the performance of the S&P500 since 1965, gives a pretty good picture of how shareholders, workers and executives are doing relative to each other. It’s hard to see, but worker compensation has improved, by 50%, from $41,900 in 1965 to $56,200 in 2018 — an annualised rate of 2.5% — while those rapacious shareholders gained 445% an an annualised rate of 8.5%.  
Now, before you throw up your hands and cry, “but surely, shareholders need no protection from their chief executive officers! It is the disenfranchised underclass at the margins of society who must be protected —” consider the chart to the right, taken from data published by the Economic Policy Institute,<ref>https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-2018/</ref> which, in mapping CEO compensation against worker compensation and the performance of the S&P500 since 1965, gives a pretty good picture of how shareholders, workers and executives are doing relative to each other. It’s hard to see, but worker compensation has improved, by 50%, from $41,900 in 1965 to $56,200 in 2018 — an annualised rate of 2.5% — while those rapacious shareholders gained 445% an an annualised rate of 8.5%.  


But “Chief Executiving” is the line of work to be in, folks: not even counting the heady days of 2000, the overall return since 1965 is 1,859%, an annualised growth of ''thirty five percent''.
But “Chief Executiving” is the line of work to be in, folks: not even counting the heady days of 2000, the overall return since 1965 is 1,859%, an annualised growth of ''thirty five percent''.


So before we cast the poor shareholders’ interests to the wind, ask this: by switching to stakeholder capitalism, ''[[Cui bono|who benefits]] the most''?
So before we cast the poor shareholders’ interests to the wind, ask this: by switching to stakeholder capitalism, ''[[Cui bono|who benefits]] the most''?
===[[Stakeholder capitalism]] means never having to say you’re sorry===
===[[Stakeholder capitalism]] means never having to say you’re sorry ===
Recall that when shareholders hold the whip hand, an executive’s objective is simple. ''Make money''. All that clarity of purpose evaporates the moment a company expands its remit beyond making ''more'' money for the aligned group who have given ''it'' money.  
When shareholders hold the whip hand, an executive’s objective is simple. ''Make [[money]]''. All that clarity of purpose evaporates the moment a company expands its remit beyond making ''more'' money for the aligned group who have given ''it'' money.  


Multiple stakeholders means multiple interests, and those interests ''must'' [[Conflict of interest|conflict]] with each other. How to arbitrate between ''creditors'' and ''the local community''? Between ''the environment'' and ''customers''?  
Multiple stakeholders means multiple interests, and those interests ''must'' [[Conflict of interest|conflict]] with each other. How to arbitrate between ''creditors'' and ''the local community''? Between ''the environment'' and ''customers''?  


That is before the key question even presents itself: who ''are'' these stakeholders of whose wellbeing I am suddenly guardian? There is no ranked list. Unlike shareholders whose names and stakes, on any given day, are set out on a register, the constituents, interest groups, factions, priorities, narratives and moral imperatives of “the world at large” are utterly indeterminate. Those quailing at this idea are invited to familiarise themselves with the works of Kant, Mill, Hobbes, Hume, Smith, Rawls, Nietzsche, Nozick, and Marx and return with a concise summary.  
That is before the key question even presents itself: who ''are'' these stakeholders of whose wellbeing I am suddenly guardian? There is no ranked list. Unlike shareholders whose names and stakes, on any given day, are set out on a register, the constituents, interest groups, factions, priorities, narratives and moral imperatives of “the world at large” are utterly indeterminate.<ref>Those railing at this idea are invited to familiarise themselves with the works of Kant, Mill, Hobbes, Hume, Smith, Nietzsche, Nozick, Wollstonecraft, Warnock, Butler, Rawls, hooks and Marx and return with a concise summary. </ref>
 
To run a company for the world at large is to run it for no-one.


How do you even know what your stakeholders’ interests — beyond having as much of your soda pop as you can make, as cheap as you can sell it — ''are''?<ref>There is a hand-wavy argument that executives should have in mind the “best interests of the community” and not anyone’s selfish needs and wants. But who knows what that is? How does a moral agenda determined by the corporate executive class — mainly white, ageing, cis-gendered, post colonial men, in case it at slipped anyone’s attention — improve on no moral agenda at all?
How do you even know what your stakeholders’ interests — beyond having as much of your soda pop as you can make, as cheap as you can sell it — ''are''?<ref>There is a hand-wavy argument that executives should have in mind the “best interests of the community” and not anyone’s selfish needs and wants. But who knows what that is? How does a moral agenda determined by the corporate executive class — mainly white, ageing, cis-gendered, post colonial men, in case it at slipped anyone’s attention — improve on no moral agenda at all?
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Which interests have priority? Now a failure to generate a decent cash return can be blamed on — well, ''anything'' — your success in reducing the number of smokers in the accounts department, or your community outreach team spent all your excess cash on beautifying a local park, or you chose a buildings manager who was twice the going rate but had a better anti-modern slavery policy.
Which interests have priority? Now a failure to generate a decent cash return can be blamed on — well, ''anything'' — your success in reducing the number of smokers in the accounts department, or your community outreach team spent all your excess cash on beautifying a local park, or you chose a buildings manager who was twice the going rate but had a better anti-modern slavery policy.


[[Stakeholder capitalism]] means the executive has an excuse. ''Always''. For ''everything''.
[[Stakeholder capitalism]] means the executive has an excuse. ''Always''. For ''everything''. To run a company ''for the world at large'' is to run it ''for no-one''. And when a professional managerial class of agents can’t work out who ''else’s'' interests to put first, what do we expect them to do?


=== Are corporations well placed to look after everyone else’s interests? ===
===Are corporations well placed to look after everyone else’s interests?===


=====Customers can look after themselves=====
====Customers can look after themselves====
Yes, customers are your stakeholders, and they have an interest how you conduct your business, but — at least in a healthy marketplace — they have a means of controlling that a lot more direct, regular and effective than do shareholders: they can buy something else. You can only maximise shareholder return ''by persuading lots of customers to buy your stuff''.  
Yes, customers are your stakeholders, and they have an interest how you conduct your business, but — at least in a healthy marketplace — they have a means of controlling that a lot more direct, regular and effective than do shareholders: they can buy something else. You can only maximise shareholder return ''by persuading lots of customers to buy your stuff''.  


=====Shareholders can’t look after themselves=====
=====Shareholders can’t look after themselves=====
Shareholders are a bit like voters in a representative democracy: their control over the enterprise is a lot less exacting that we like to think. One’s main weapon is the power of sale; beyond that, there’s the AGM, and unless you’re an institutional money manager, don’t expect anyone in the C suite to be massively bothered how you vote.
Shareholders are a bit like voters in a representative democracy: their control over the enterprise is a lot less exacting that we like to think. One’s main weapon is the power of sale; beyond that, there’s the AGM, and unless you’re an institutional money manager, don’t expect anyone in the C suite to be massively bothered how you vote.


=====Employees ''can'' look after themselves=====
=====Employees ''can'' look after themselves=====
Unlike shareholders, employees — especially those in the executive suite — have all the power they need to influence the company.
Unlike shareholders, employees — especially those in the executive suite — have all the power they need to influence the company.
 
===About that disenfranchised underclass at the margins of society===
 
=== About that disenfranchised underclass at the margins of society ===
[[File:Water Scarcity.jpg|300px|thumb|right|Well, if it were up to me I’d spend more time managing the risk in my loan book tbh.]]
[[File:Water Scarcity.jpg|300px|thumb|right|Well, if it were up to me I’d spend more time managing the risk in my loan book tbh.]]
Of course the disenfranchised minorities at the margins of our community need a voice. As we argue [[Critical theory|elsewhere]], an optimal society is pluralistic, tolerant, defends those at the margins and, [[all other things being equal]], prefers their interests when they conflict with the majority that is perfectly able to look after itself.  
Of course the disenfranchised minorities at the margins of our community need a voice. As we argue [[Critical theory|elsewhere]], an optimal society is pluralistic, tolerant, defends those at the margins and, [[all other things being equal]], prefers their interests when they conflict with the majority that is perfectly able to look after itself.  
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*[[Stakeholder]]
*[[Stakeholder]]
*[[Equities]]
*[[Rentier]]
*[[Equity Derivatives]]
*[[Equity Derivatives Anatomy]]
*[[Stock Lending]]
{{Ref}}
{{Ref}}
<references />