Template:Isda 3(d) summ
The fabulous Section {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} representation, giving one’s counterparty the right to close out should any so-designated representations turn out not to be true. This is sure to occupy an inordinate amount of your negotiation time — in that it occupies any time at all — because you are as likely to be hit in the face by a live starfish in the Gobi Desert as you are to close out an ISDA Master Agreement because your counterparty is late in preparing its annual accounts. But that’s a personal view and you may not rely on it.
The {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} representation, in the documents for delivery table in the Schedule, therefore covers only the accuracy and completeness of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}} and not (for example) whether {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}} is delivered at all. For that, see Section {{{{{1}}}|4(a)}} - {{{{{1}}}|Furnish Specified Information}}.
“Covered by the Section {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} Representation”
If one is required to “furnish” {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}} under Section {{{{{1}}}|4}}, two things can go wrong:
- No show: one can fail to provide it, at all, in which case there is a {{{{{1}}}|Breach of Agreement}}, but be warned: the period before one can enforce such a failure, judged by the yardstick of modern financial contracts, is long enough for a whole kingdom of dinosaurs to evolve and be wiped out; or
- It’s cobblers: one can provide the {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}}, on time, but it can be a total pile of horse ordure. Now, here is a trick for young players: if your {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}} is, or turns out to be, false, you have no remedy unless you have designated that it is “subject to the Section {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} representation”. That is the one that promises it is accurate and not misleading.
Now you might ask what good an item of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}} can possibly be, if Section {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} didn’t apply and it could be just made up on the spot without fear of retribution — as a youngster, the JC certainly asked that question, and has repeated it over many years, and is yet to hear a good answer — but all we can presume is that in its tireless quest to cater for the unguessable predilections of the negotiating community, ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ left this preposterous option open just in case. It wouldn’t be the first time.
A trawl through the SEC’s “Edgar” archive[1] reveals that the sorts of things to which “Covered by Section 3(d) Representation” results in a “No.” outcome are rare but not non-existent. It is things like “Legal opinion from counsel concerning due authorization, enforceability and related matters, addressed to the other party and reasonably acceptable to such other party”, or “Credit support documents”.
The other little fiddle — and it is a little fidgety fiddle — is to remark of annual reports that, yes, they are covered by that Section 3(d) representation, but with a proviso:
“Yes; provided that the phrase “is, as of the date of the information, true, accurate and complete in every material respect” in Section {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} shall be deleted and the phrase “fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations as of their respective dates and for the respective periods covered thereby” shall be inserted in lieu thereof.”
These are the only examples we could find before we got bored looking. In each case we are not persuaded these caveats accommodate anyone other than our value-adding learned friends:
Legal opinions
We suppose this is excluded because the Party to the ISDA is not the author of the legal opinion, nor professionally competent to pass on its contents (hence the need for the legal opinion in the first place), so should hardly be expected to be held to account should it turn out to be wrong.
But this, we submit, is to misunderstand in a profound way the point of a legal contract. Unlike criminal or even tort law, the law of contract is not an instrument of moral judgment. It cares only about economics: that one does, or does not, do what one has promised or — as in this case — that what one has represented to you is, or is not, true. The law of contract is broadly incurious about why.
The object of a legal opinion is to confirm the accuracy of a legal representation. Instead of simply representing that, for example, you have the regulatory permission to act as a swap dealer, you have a legal opinion to confirms that fact, from one who should know. If what that that legal opinion says is not true — if that one who should know in fact does not — then regardless of whose fault this is, or how egregious has been her negligence in being at fault, the regulatory permission required does not obtain, and the comfort your counterparty seeks from that legal opinion is misplaced. The representation is false, and the counterparty should be allowed out as a result.