Fourteenth law of worker entropy: Difference between revisions
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The serious point — advanced by Kuhn — is that the boundaries of an intellectual discipline, [[power structure]], [[narrative]], [[paradigm]] — call it what you will — frame and condition the questions you may ask as much as any answers it provides. If you find yourself getting silly answers, the problem may lie in your question. | The serious point — advanced by Kuhn — is that the boundaries of an intellectual discipline, [[power structure]], [[narrative]], [[paradigm]] — call it what you will — frame and condition the questions you may ask as much as any answers it provides. If you find yourself getting silly answers, the problem may lie in your question. | ||
Hence, paradoxes: if your discipline is (as analytical philosophy is) riven with [[paradox]]es, this is not so much a sign that you have hit upon an eternal conundrum, but that you are barking up the wrong tree. | Hence, paradoxes: if your discipline is (as much of analytical philosophy is) riven with [[paradox]]es, this is not so much a sign that you have hit upon an eternal conundrum, but that you are barking up the wrong tree. | ||
{{quote|''A paradox is a silly answer. It means you have asked a silly question.''}} | |||
Hence, a new JC law of worker entropy. Let us call it the fourteenth: | Hence, a new JC law of worker entropy. Let us call it the fourteenth: | ||
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{{Fourteenth law of worker entropy}} | {{Fourteenth law of worker entropy}} | ||
For example, [[Kurt Gödel]]’s [[Undecidability|incompleteness theorem]]s, that it is impossible to prove all axioms in a closed logical system, tells us one useful thing about the world, namely that it was silly to try to prove all the axioms in a closed logical system. From this we can deduce no grand sweeping propositions about the nature of the Cosmos, but simply that even clever people like Bertrand Russell sometimes ask silly questions. | |||
For example, [[Kurt Gödel]]’s [[Undecidability|incompleteness theorem]]s, that it is impossible to prove all axioms in a closed logical system, tells us one useful thing about the world, namely that it | |||
{{sa}} | {{sa}} | ||
*[[Paradox]] | *[[Paradox]] | ||
*[[Lateral hire]] | |||
{{c2|Paradox|Laws of worker entropy}} | {{c2|Paradox|Laws of worker entropy}} | ||
Latest revision as of 14:31, 6 December 2023
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Office anthropology™
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The hoary old chestnut that underpins Thomas Kuhn’s radical, brilliant theory and succinctly describes what pragmatic people find so excruciating about academic philosophy.
Ask a silly question, get a silly answer.
If you read latter-day philosophical whizz-kid William MacAskill’s book What We Owe The Future, a question you will certainly ask yourself, though it isn’t so much silly as rueful, is: “why did I just do that do myself and how will I get those hours of my life back?” It brims full of silly answers, each prompted by a silly question.
The serious point — advanced by Kuhn — is that the boundaries of an intellectual discipline, power structure, narrative, paradigm — call it what you will — frame and condition the questions you may ask as much as any answers it provides. If you find yourself getting silly answers, the problem may lie in your question.
Hence, paradoxes: if your discipline is (as much of analytical philosophy is) riven with paradoxes, this is not so much a sign that you have hit upon an eternal conundrum, but that you are barking up the wrong tree.
A paradox is a silly answer. It means you have asked a silly question.
Hence, a new JC law of worker entropy. Let us call it the fourteenth:
The JC’s fourteenth law of worker entropy, also known as the “paradox paradox”, states that paradoxes are impossible in sensible discussions because they are, necessarily, the product of asking silly questions.
For example, Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, that it is impossible to prove all axioms in a closed logical system, tells us one useful thing about the world, namely that it was silly to try to prove all the axioms in a closed logical system. From this we can deduce no grand sweeping propositions about the nature of the Cosmos, but simply that even clever people like Bertrand Russell sometimes ask silly questions.