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Well, not quite. But the insistence of big organisations on narrow, stupid compensation models maddens Daniel Pink, giver of said TED talk, who rails at the absurdity and venality of our institutions, whose leaders stick religiously to the traditional bonus structure in the face of overwhelming evidence that it doesn’t work. It doesn’t just madden Pink, it ''baffles'' him. | Well, not quite. But the insistence of big organisations on narrow, stupid compensation models maddens Daniel Pink, giver of said TED talk, who rails at the absurdity and venality of our institutions, whose leaders stick religiously to the traditional bonus structure in the face of overwhelming evidence that it doesn’t work. It doesn’t just madden Pink, it ''baffles'' him. | ||
===What motivates bankers=== | ===What motivates bankers=== | ||
But {{author|Daniel Pink}} is proving wrong point here. The puzzle isn’t | But {{author|Daniel Pink}} is proving the wrong point here. The puzzle isn’t understanding how “autonomy, mastery, and purpose” motivates people more than a bit of cash — who didn’t, instinctively, know that? — but why our corporate overlords who, in their reflective moments, surely must know that as well, ignore this plain, ''[[a priori]]'' fact. | ||
[[File:Influence on incentive structure 1.png|400px|thumb|left|Why the leaders of your organisation like to eat what you kill]] | [[File:Influence on incentive structure 1.png|400px|thumb|left|Why the leaders of your organisation like to eat what you kill]] | ||
As ever, the [[JC]] has a theory: it is all about personal incentives. In the same way that the average wage-slave’s major motivator during | As ever, the [[JC]] has a theory: it is all about ''personal incentives''. In the same way that the average [[Survivor|wage-slave’s]] major motivator during her career is [[fear]] — and her primal instinct is the covering of her own arse (regardless of the clothedness of the organisation’s as a whole), what propels the captains of our industry is ''personal enrichment''. Solving the organisation’s, and its clients’, problems and achieving general commercial goals of the collective in a way that empowers and energises the rank and file is, you know, ''good'', inasmuch as it generates a healthy pay packet, but it is still a second order priority to generating that healthy pay packet. If, by some unfortunate turn of events, the two should conflict, it does not take a clairvoyant to work out whose interests prevail. | ||
Now consider the candle incentives. The CEO is in an excellent position to decide whether to go with the individual incentive or the collective incentive. | Now consider the candle incentives. The CEO is in an excellent position to decide whether to go with the individual incentive or the collective incentive, because he’s the boss. | ||
He is also, should he go with the individual incentive, well placed to influence who among the workforce should get that $25 prize. His management suite, if they think they might get a fiver, are likely to agree with him. The remainder of the group, who are destined for a [[sugary treat with a hole in it]], may have a different view, but they are in no position it advance it, because no-one with any influence is listening to them. The reason | He is also, should he go with the individual incentive, well placed to influence who among the workforce should get that $25 prize. His management suite, if they think they might get a fiver, are likely to agree with him on that. The remainder of the employee group, who are destined for a [[sugary treat with a hole in it]], may have a different view, but they are in no position it advance it, because ''no-one with any influence is listening to them''. The reason for that is because they are all on the phone to their Aston Martin dealers. | ||
If they were minded to rationalise they might look at it this way: in the individual incentive model, to fund the total incentive will cost $150 ($25 for the CEO and 150 between the 25 board members). To fund the collective incentive model, on the other hand, we | If they ''were'' minded to rationalise they might look at it this way: in the individual incentive model, to fund the total incentive will cost $150 ($25 for the CEO and 150 between the 25 board members). To fund the collective incentive model, on the other hand, we would have to give everyone — including ourselves— either ''nothing'', or a fiver, or ''the whole twenty five bucks''. | ||
Now no-one likes the sound of a rolling [[donut]], so that is obviously off the table. But funding the whole organisation would cost $500, and | Now no-one likes the sound of a rolling [[donut]], so that is obviously off the table. But funding the whole organisation a fiver would cost $500, and $25 each would cost ''two and a half grand''. So, unless collaborating would create a ''huge'' increase in productivity, purely in [[cost]] terms, the individual incentive scheme is ''much'' more attractive to our shareholders... | ||
{{sa}} | {{sa}} | ||