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Finite and Infinite Games: Difference between revisions
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Finite games have fixed rules, fixed boundaries in time and space and an agreed objective — usually to beat the other players. Infinite games have no fixed rules, no fixed boundaries, no fixed teams, and players are free to change the rules if that will help play to continue. | Finite games have fixed rules, fixed boundaries in time and space and an agreed objective — usually to beat the other players. Infinite games have no fixed rules, no fixed boundaries, no fixed teams, and players are free to change the rules if that will help play to continue. | ||
It is important, in life, not to confuse the two. The thrust of Sinek’s book is to insist that much of modern life does: that when we carry over [[metaphor]] | It is important, in life, not to confuse the two. The thrust of Sinek’s book is to insist that much of modern life does: that when we carry over [[metaphor]]s from sport and war — the quintessential finite games — and apply them to business and politics we make a profound error: when we take on infinite players in what we take to be a finite game, we bog ourselves down in intractable quagmires: Vladimir Putin, take note. This observation is appealing, and intuitively right, but there is much more to Carse’s original thesis than that. | ||
Carse, who died last year, is wilfully aphoristic in his literary style, and this is off-putting.<ref>Notably, Carse’s speaking style is much ''less'' cryptic and talks he gavve about the infinite game concept are worth checking out. See for example his talk to the Long Now Foundation: [https://longnow.org/seminars/02005/jan/14/religious-war-in-light-of-the-infinite-game/ Religious Wars in Light of the Infinite Game].</ref> He often says things like: | Carse, who died last year, is wilfully aphoristic in his literary style, and this is off-putting.<ref>Notably, Carse’s speaking style is much ''less'' cryptic and talks he gavve about the infinite game concept are worth checking out. See for example his talk to the Long Now Foundation: [https://longnow.org/seminars/02005/jan/14/religious-war-in-light-of-the-infinite-game/ Religious Wars in Light of the Infinite Game].</ref> He often says things like: | ||
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This is the modernist, computerised model of operation: fast, perfect calculation. One does not want variability. The last thing you want is a player using her initiative: that can ruin everything. | This is the modernist, computerised model of operation: fast, perfect calculation. One does not want variability. The last thing you want is a player using her initiative: that can ruin everything. | ||
This strategy works where all parameters are fixed and all possible outcomes at least knowable in theory — [[zero-sum game]] | This strategy works where all parameters are fixed and all possible outcomes at least knowable in theory — [[zero-sum game]]s, [[simple system]]s, football matches — but does not ''always'' work in the dancing landscapes of [[Complex system|complex adaptive system]]s. If you prepared for chess, your work will be for naught if the game morphs into draughts — or, just as likely, cookery, music, or electronics. Here, instead of eliminating surprise, you equip yourself to deal with it: you need not answers but tools, [[heuristic]]s and a facility with [[:Category:Metaphor|metaphor]]. | ||
===Power versus strength=== | ===Power versus strength=== | ||
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===“Society” versus “culture”=== | ===“Society” versus “culture”=== | ||
{{quote|“Society they understand as the sum of those relations that are under some form of public constraint, culture as whatever we do with each other by undirected choice. If society is all that a people fells it must do, culture “is the realm of the variable, free, not necessarily universal, of all that cannot lay claim to compulsive authority”.<ref>{{br|Finite and Infinite Games}} Ch. 2 (citing Carl Jacob Christoph Burckhardt).</ref>”}} | {{quote|“Society they understand as the sum of those relations that are under some form of public constraint, culture as whatever we do with each other by undirected choice. If society is all that a people fells it must do, culture “is the realm of the variable, free, not necessarily universal, of all that cannot lay claim to compulsive authority”.<ref>{{br|Finite and Infinite Games}} Ch. 2 (citing Carl Jacob Christoph Burckhardt).</ref>”}} | ||
Perhaps Carse would describe a power structure as “society” and a strength structure “culture”. The historic, zero-sum nature of finite games contrasts with the prospective, permissive nature of infinite ones. | |||
''Society'' is finite, bounded, and patriotic: functions to establish a hierarchy, bestowing titles, honorifics and awards — the emblems of past victories in combat, and markers of power —to grant certain participants [[formal]] status. One desires the permanence of society because it vouches safe the permanence of one’s titles and prizes. | |||
''Culture'' is infinite, unbounded, endlessly creative and sees its history not as destiny, but tradition: a narrative that has been started but is yet to be completed and that may be adjusted as required. Just as one can can play finite games within the context of an infinite one, so can there be society within culture. | |||
===The “theatrical” versus the “dramatic”=== | ===The “theatrical” versus the “dramatic”=== | ||
{{Quote|{{indent|Inasmuch as a finite game is intended for conclusion, inasmuch as its roles are scripted and performed for an audience, we shall refer to finite play as ''theatrical''. [...]}} | {{Quote|{{indent|Inasmuch as a finite game is intended for conclusion, inasmuch as its roles are scripted and performed for an audience, we shall refer to finite play as ''theatrical''. [...]}} | ||
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Let me throw in some original research here: historically-focused games are ''fine'': there is no harm and much reward to be had from a game of football, as long as everyone understands the “theatricality” of what is going on; but to apply finite, backward-looking techniques to the “resolution” of ''infinite'' scenarios — necessarily forward-looking, indeterminate problems (in that you don’t even know that there is a problem, let alone what it is) is where you will get into bother. | Let me throw in some original research here: historically-focused games are ''fine'': there is no harm and much reward to be had from a game of football, as long as everyone understands the “theatricality” of what is going on; but to apply finite, backward-looking techniques to the “resolution” of ''infinite'' scenarios — necessarily forward-looking, indeterminate problems (in that you don’t even know that there is a problem, let alone what it is) is where you will get into bother. | ||
[[File:Normal vs fat-tailed distribution.png|350px|thumb|right|The ostensible similarity between normal and fat-tailed distributions, yesterday.]]It is deceptive in that finite techniques may work perfectly well much of the time, because even infinite environments largely function by reference to established order, existing rules and what is already known: they look, for the most part, like finite games — it’s just that they don’t have to, and are liable to change without notice. As long as they behave themselves, a finite approach is efficient, effective, centrally controllable and provides consistency and certainty. This is why [[thought leader]] | [[File:Normal vs fat-tailed distribution.png|350px|thumb|right|The ostensible similarity between normal and fat-tailed distributions, yesterday.]]It is deceptive in that finite techniques may work perfectly well much of the time, because even infinite environments largely function by reference to established order, existing rules and what is already known: they look, for the most part, like finite games — it’s just that they don’t have to, and are liable to change without notice. As long as they behave themselves, a finite approach is efficient, effective, centrally controllable and provides consistency and certainty. This is why [[thought leader]]s are so fond of sporting metaphors. | ||
This, we think, is just an other way of noting that the middle of a [[normal distribution]] resembles the middle of a “fat-tailed” distribution and the same approaches will work passably well for both, as long as the events fall within the middle, which for the most part they do. | This, we think, is just an other way of noting that the middle of a [[normal distribution]] resembles the middle of a “fat-tailed” distribution and the same approaches will work passably well for both, as long as the events fall within the middle, which for the most part they do. | ||
=== | === “Formal” versus “substantive” === | ||
We have argued elsewhere that the great curse of [[Modernism|modernity]] is the primacy of [[Substance and form|form over substance]]. In [[Finite game|finite games]] the distinction between the two can be trivial; in an infinite game it is not. | We have argued elsewhere that the great curse of [[Modernism|modernity]] is the primacy of [[Substance and form|form over substance]]. In [[Finite game|finite games]] the distinction between the two can be trivial; in an infinite game it is not. | ||
In a backward-looking, proven, data-complete universe, ''substance is simply a specific articulation of form''. The universe is solved; there is an exclusive optimal move and it can be derived from first principle. Substance follows from — is dependent on — form. Form is an axiom; substance is its articulation with numbers. If you have right equation — that is to say, if you follow the right form — you will get the right answer. Indeed, without the right form you have almost no chance of getting the right answer, and none at all of knowing that you have it. This depends on the universe being bounded, all rules determined, all [[Unknowns|knowns known.]] It depends, therefore, on ''the conditions existing for a [[finite game]]''. | In a backward-looking, proven, data-complete universe, ''substance is simply a specific articulation of form''. The universe is solved; there is an exclusive optimal move and it can be derived from first principle. Substance follows from — is dependent on — form. Form is an axiom; substance is its articulation with numbers. If you have right equation — that is to say, if you follow the right form — you will get the right answer. Indeed, without the right form you have almost no chance of getting the right answer, and none at all of knowing that you have it. This depends on the universe being bounded, all rules determined, all [[Unknowns|knowns known.]] It depends, therefore, on ''the conditions existing for a [[finite game]]''. | ||
Where the universe is not bounded, where rules are unknown or changeable, where unknowns swamp knowns<ref>[[Signal-to-noise ratio|All data is from the past]]. Seeing as there is an infinite amount of data from the future, the portion of the available data we have is, effectively, nil. </ref> — where the [[Infinite game|game is ''infinite'']] — ''substance is not a function of form''. There are no equations, axioms or formulae to follow when interacting with [[Complex system|complex adaptive system]] | Where the universe is not bounded, where rules are unknown or changeable, where unknowns swamp knowns<ref>[[Signal-to-noise ratio|All data is from the past]]. Seeing as there is an infinite amount of data from the future, the portion of the available data we have is, effectively, nil. </ref> — where the [[Infinite game|game is ''infinite'']] — ''substance is not a function of form''. There are no equations, axioms or formulae to follow when interacting with [[Complex system|complex adaptive system]]s. It will be tempting to rely on formulae that tend to work most of the time — the [[Black-Scholes option pricing model|Black Scholes option pricing model]] works most of the time, at least [[Long-Term Capital Management|until it does not]] — but this is a lazy and, at the limit, dangerous, economy. We need a different approach. Instead of the trained — those best equipped to carry out complicated instructions — we need the ''educated'': those best equipped to [[OODA loop|observe, orient, decide and act]]. These people are necessarily skilled, experienced and therefore ''expensive''. | ||
=== Top-down versus bottom-up === | === Top-down versus bottom-up === | ||
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Where [[form]] dominates, we should concentrate our resources at the centre, where we formulate rules, work out [[algorithm]]s and devise [[Playbook|playbooks]], since if we get this right, success is a matter of execution, and failure comes from failure to follow the form. This has a few implications. Firstly, it means the brilliant minds belong to those at the top of the organisation: they do the most inspired thinking. Secondly, there is no more sacred quest than the creation of excellent process. Our most talented personnel are those who can write and maintain formal rules. Thirdly, those at the edges of the organisation whose job is not to formulate policy but to follow it — those who must put the leadership’s plans and algorithms into practice must not think: they must, so far as possible: quickly, flawlessly, cheaply. If you are in a finite game environment, the ''last'' thing you want them to do is make things up as they go along, as that will upset the plan. ''They must act like machines''. The top-down model: God’s eye; the [[self-perpetuating autocracy]]. | Where [[form]] dominates, we should concentrate our resources at the centre, where we formulate rules, work out [[algorithm]]s and devise [[Playbook|playbooks]], since if we get this right, success is a matter of execution, and failure comes from failure to follow the form. This has a few implications. Firstly, it means the brilliant minds belong to those at the top of the organisation: they do the most inspired thinking. Secondly, there is no more sacred quest than the creation of excellent process. Our most talented personnel are those who can write and maintain formal rules. Thirdly, those at the edges of the organisation whose job is not to formulate policy but to follow it — those who must put the leadership’s plans and algorithms into practice must not think: they must, so far as possible: quickly, flawlessly, cheaply. If you are in a finite game environment, the ''last'' thing you want them to do is make things up as they go along, as that will upset the plan. ''They must act like machines''. The top-down model: God’s eye; the [[self-perpetuating autocracy]]. | ||
[[Infinite game]] | [[Infinite game]]s favour virtuoso performances in the field: in a [[wicked environment]] cheap, quick, accurate machines are no use, and the infrastructure they need to ensure they continue working may get in the way. Rather than being elaborate, internal infrastructure should be simple, robust and permissive — enabling communication, facilitating dynamic reallocation of resources, but fundamentally organising the architecture to empower quick and effective decision-making in the field. Seeing as the idea is not to win but to continue, conferring discretion upon those at the edge of the organisation who must engage with the complex adaptive system outside is not necessarily catastrophic as long as the individuals are experienced experts: they must ''not'' act like machines, and empowered — ''trusted'' to deal with unfolding situations as they perceive them. The ongoing prosperity of the organisation is an [[emergent]] property of the behaviour of these subject matter experts. This is quite the opposite model: here the greatest value is provided at the edges of the organisation. The bottom-up model: ''laissez-faire''; [[invisible hand]]; evolutionary. | ||
=== As [[Single-round prisoner’s dilemma|single-round]] and [[Iterated prisoner’s dilemma|iterated prisoner’s dilemmas]] === | === As [[Single-round prisoner’s dilemma|single-round]] and [[Iterated prisoner’s dilemma|iterated prisoner’s dilemmas]] === | ||