View source for Template:M intro isda a swap as a loan

{{quote|
People come out from their jobs, most of which are meaningless to them, and they watch me jump 20 cars, and maybe get splattered. It means something to them. They jump right alongside of me. They take the bars in their hands and for one split second, they’re all daredevils. I am the last gladiator in the new Rome. I go into the arena and I compete against destruction and I win. And next week, I go out there and I do it again. And this time, civilisation being what it is, and all, we have very little choice about our life. The only thing really left us is a choice about our death. And mine will be ''glorious''.
:—{{plainlink|https://youtu.be/zIZXGXE1aF8|''Evel Kneivel'' (1971)}}, on jumping the Grand Canyon
}}
{{drop|[[a swap as a loan|I]]|n}} his [[The bilaterality, or not, of the ISDA|leaden exposition]] on the “bilaterality” of the {{isdama}}, JC remarked that, despite ''looking'' like a bilateral, unfunded instrument, a swap is, in reality, an ''implied loan''. 

This throwaway comment prompted explosions of indignance from friends, colleagues and people who JC greatly respects so he decided to double down on it. Look, if you are going to go down in an attempt, it might as well be at the Grand Canyon. So, here goes.

To recap the background to that post:

{{Quote|{{drop|W|hereas most}} finance contracts imply dominance of one party and subservience of the other — a loan, for example, has a ''lender'' who takes mortgages, sharpens knives and extracts excruciating covenants the way a dentist does teeth and a ''borrower'' whose mortal soul is traduced with the indignities of indebtedness but who must yet feign affection through gritted teeth and deep resentment — swaps are ''not like that''.
 
Swaps, so conventional wisdom would have it, are ''exchanges among peers''. “A swap is,” cognoscenti are given to say, “an equal-opportunity, biblically righteous compact ''between equals''. Yes, the Transaction may go in and out of the money but it swings either way. As it does, each participant is an honest rival for Lady Fortune’s favour, however capricious may she be.”}}

That is the theory. But JC says, at least beyond the limited class of inter-dealer swap transactions, and even then, often within it, ''fiddlesticks''. This conventional wisdom is not true.  In the bigger picture, ''swaps are loans''.

An “end user” swap ''is'', in fact, a “synthetic” loan from a [[dealer]] to [[customer]]. <ref>Where regulations require dealers to ''post'' [[variation margin]] outright against their own [[out-of-the-money]] swap exposures (rather than simply calling for it when their customers are [[ouit-of-the-money]]), the regulations make the financial system ''less'' stable, ''more'' risky, ''more'' leveraged, and ''more'' prone to the market calamities that fueled the global financial crisis. Bilateral [[variation margin]] is a category error.

''Swap dealers should not collateralise their customers.''

There. I said it.</ref>

JC is blessed with charitable friends who forgive intellectual softness. 

“Oh, well,” they are prone to say when the old boy goes off on one, “I suppose you ''could'' analyse an [[Interest rate swap mis-selling scandal|interest rate swap]] as a pair of off-setting loans. Yes, that seems strictly true. But is it not rather to miss the point? Seeing each party lends to the other, and as notional principal flows in both directions at the same time, the loan, as you put it, cancels out. The parties to a swap are not ''really'' lending to each other, old thing.” 

But this is not what JC means. When a dealer provides a swap to a customer, even after taking into account the “offsetting loans” of this traditional theory, economically the dealer is ''still'' lending outright to the customer. The dealer doesn’t actually disburse any money to the customer, but that doesn’t matter: the dealer applies the loan proceeds instead in financing its hedge on the customer’s behalf. 
====Customers and dealers====
{{drop|N|ow there is}} a boundless universe of “[[end user]]” swap {{isdaprov|Transaction}}s. Here, one party is a “dealer” and the other — the “end user” — is a “customer”. Hence, the expressions “[[sell side|sell-side]]” — dealers — and “[[buy side|buy-side]]” — customers. These are the great majority of all swap arrangements in the known cosmos. 

So what, in a bilateral arrangement, determines who is “dealer” and who is “customer”? It is not who is “long” and who “short” the swap exposure — one of the great [[Swappist Oath|swappist]] beauties of the ISDA framework is that customers can go long ''or'' short, as they please. Nor is it who pays “fixed” and who pays “floating”. Rather it is who is “on risk” and who is “flat”. Customers want to change their net economic exposure. Dealers do not. 

The argument JC will mount for the remainder of this piece is this:
{{quote|To change one’s economic exposure to any financial instrument involves ''capital investment''. An investor must either make that capital investment itself from its own funds or it must borrow the money from someone else. In a swap, that “someone else” is the ''dealer''. The way a dealer “makes that capital investment” is by ''hedging''.}}

Therefore,  the economic difference between the ''customer'' and ''dealer'' in a swap Transaction is that ''the dealer is lending and the customer is borrowing''.   
====The capital cost of changing your position====
{{drop|F|or a customer}}, the object of any {{isdaprov|Transaction}} is to ''change its overall market exposure'': to get into a position it did not have before, or get out of one it did. But dealers do ''not'' do this. Dealers stay ''flat''. 

“Hang on, though, JC: if a swap is bilateral, how ''can'' that be so? Does it not follow that if the ''customer'' changes its position one way, the dealer must change its position the ''other'' way?” 

In the narrow confines of a specific ISDA {{isdaprov|Transaction}} — ignoring any hedging arrangements — this is so. But the narrow {{isdaprov|Transaction}} is not the whole picture. There ''are'' hedging arrangements. In the wider context of the parties’ overall net risk positions, customers ''invest'': they take on risk. They change their positions. Dealers don’t. Their interest is only in commission. They do not have a market position.<ref>To be sure, [[dealer|dealers]] may have an “[[axe|trading axe]]”, as they delta-hedge across their whole derivatives trading book. But — especially since the [[global financial crisis]], and in large part before it, this axe is largely aimed at flattening the risk in their trading book and optimising their financing costs of all that hedging.</ref>

The dealer “provides” exposure by sourcing it in the market, delta-hedging it, and charging its customer a [[commission]]. There are all kinds of enterprising and funding-efficient ways it can do this, but fundamentally, the dealer stays market-neutral. The customer’s credit risk for the life of the trade is all the excitement the dealer wants. ''More'', actually.  As long as the dealer’s market-side hedges work, the only market risk the dealer takes arises if the customer fails. That is to say, the dealer has customer ''credit'' exposure for as long as the customer stays in its risk position. As long as the customer remains solvent, it chooses when to exit. The dealer is (morally) committed to staying in.<ref>Not legally, necessarily: there may well be regulatory capital reasons that a dealer must have a termination right on say 30 or 60 days’ notice — these give negotiation teams the thrill of arguing about the gilding of a lilly — but do not expect a dealer ever to exercise those rights, short of a market meltdown that threatens its own existence.</ref> If the customer wants to exit before a stated term, even where it has no legal right to do so, it is an odd swap dealer indeed who will make a price.<ref>Swap break costs are easy enough to calculate.</ref> 

Now: the thing about being net long, or net short, a financial exposure is that someone needs to acquire that exposure. Even if it is an “unfunded” derivative like a rate or index, in the real world one can only achieve that rate or index return by making an actual capital investment in the underlying products that generate that rate or index. Even if it is not the investor, ''someone'' has to ''commit capital'' to generate that return. That someone is the dealer.

This is the same capital expenditure that a bank must make when extending a loan. The difference is only that a bank commits that capital directly to its customer, wheras a swap dealer commits it to its own hedging programme and then charges the financing cost of that capital to the customer. 

This is the fundamental difference, for example, between an [[equity swap|delta-one equity swap]] and a [[Margin loan|margin loan]]. This is why equity swaps are also called “[[synthetic prime brokerage|''synthetic'' prime brokerage]]”.

====Worked example====
Imagine [[Hackthorn Capital Partners]] holds USD10m shares of [[Lexrifyly|Lexrifyly, Inc.]] and wants to gain exposure to [[Cryptöagle|Cryptöagle, GmbH]]. Hackthorn is fully invested and has no spare cash.

Hackthorn can do one of three things: 

{{Quote|{{divhelvetica|
(i) ''sell'' [[Lexrifyly]] and ''buy'' [[Cryptöagle]] — that is, make an outright long investment out of the proceeds of sale;

(ii) ''hold'' [[Lexrifyly]] and ''borrow'' to buy [[Cryptöagle]] — that is, take a [[margin loan]];

(iii) ''hold'' [[Lexrifyly]] and ''get synthetic exposure to'' [[Cryptöagle]] via an [[equity swap]] from its dealer, without, apparently borrowing any money.}}}}

To make it easy, let’s say the quantity and strike price for each is 10m shares at USD1, and the market value (MV) for [[Lexrifyly]] is USD1.2 and for [[Cryptöagle]] is USD1.4. Let’s say the investment period was 1 year and interest accrued at 1% per annum.

Here are the positions:

{{Quote|{{divhelvetica|
'''Sale'''<br>
If it sells [[Lexrifyly]] outright and buys [[Cryptöagle]] outright:
:''Sold: USD10m [[Lexrifyly]] @ USD1.
:''Borrowed'': 0.
:''Bought'': 10m [[Cryptöagle]] @ USD1.
:''Current MV of  [[Cryptöagle]]: USD1.4.
----
:''MV(10m [[Cryptöagle]])'' equals '''USD14m'''


'''Loan'''<br>
If it keeps [[Lexrifyly]] and borrows to buy [[Cryptöagle]]:
:''Held: USD10m [[Lexrifyly]].
:''Borrowed: USD10m.
:''Bought'': USD10m [[Cryptöagle]] @ USD1.
----
:''MV(10m [[Lexrifyly]]) + MV(10m [[Cryptöagle]]) - USD10m and accrued interest'' equals:
----
:USD12m + USD14m - USD10.1m equals '''USD15.9m'''


'''Swap'''<br>
If it keeps [[Lexrifyly]] and buys a swap on [[Cryptöagle]] struck at USD1:
:''Held: USD10m [[Lexrifyly]].
:''Borrowed: Zero.
:''Swap outgoings'': Interest on USD10m
:''Swap incomings'': (MV([[Cryptöagle]] - Strike) * 10m) 
----
:''MV(10m [[Lexrifyly]]) + ((MV([[Cryptöagle]] - Strike) * 10m) - accrued interest on USD10m''
----
:USD12m + USD4m - USD100,000 equals  '''USD15.9m'''}}}}

No surprise that switching out of one stock and into another yields a different result. But the economics of the “loan” and the “swap” are ''identical''. The investor pays a floating rate and has a USD10m notional loan value deducted from its pay-out. Like a loan, the [[equity swap]] gives the investor exposure to [[Cryptöagle]] whilst keeping its exposure to [[Lexrifyly]], which it uses to fund cashflows on its new capital asset. 

This is a form of ''[[leverage]]''. ''As it would have'' ''in a loan.'' 

The [[floating rate]] Hackthorn pays is ''implied funding''. The [[dealer]] will only accept this if it is satisfied Hackthorn has enough capital to finance its swap payments and settle any differences at termination. This is the same risk calculation a bank would make on a loan. (To keep it simple, I have ignored the scope for synthetic margin loan and rehypothecation.)  

But, hang on: this is a bilateral arrangement, right, so isn’t the converse also true for the dealer? Isn’t the dealer, in a sense, “borrowing” by paying the total return of the asset to get “exposure” to the floating rate in the same way? Is not a “short” swap position, for a dealer, exactly the same as a “long” swap position for a customer? 

No, because in providing these swap exposures whether long or short, the dealer simultaneously [[Delta-hedging|delta-hedges]]. It does not change its market position. The customer ''buys'' an exposure: that is, starts ''without'' and ends up ''with'' a “position”; the dealer manufactures and then ''sells'' an exposure: it starts ''without'' a position, takes an order, buys a hedge, and then sells an offsetting position to the customer, ending up where it started, flat, and ''without'' a position.  

Provided the [[dealer]] knows what it is about, its main risk in running a swap portfolio is not market risk — it should not have any — but ''customer credit'' ''risk''. The moment a customer fails, the dealer’s book is no longer hedged: what was a delta-hedge is now an outright long or short position. when the reason your customer has blown up is that its highly levered investment in the same segment of thinly traded illiquid stocks has just gapped downwards, this is enough of a risk to be a real bummer, as those involved in the [[Archegos]] omnishambles will tell you.

==== Fixed/floating swaps ====
{{Quote|{{Script|Nuncle}}: ’Tis none so mincey as a Farrington chop<br>And nowt so [[loansome]] as a fixed rate swap. 
:—{{buchstein}}, {{dsh}}
}}
{{smallcaps|Ok; that’s a}} [[delta-one]] equity swap. But [[synthetic equity swap|synthetic prime brokerage]] is, surely, an unusual case?  

Aren’t “''normal''” swaps truly bilateral? How about good old-fashioned [[interest rate swap]]s? Surely simply ''paying'' a [[fixed rate]] and ''receiving'' a [[floating rate]] has none of these same loan-like characteristics? 

The first thing to say here is that in the real universe of actual, non-[[derivative]] instruments, interest rate cashflows ''do not exist independently of an investment in principal''.<ref>This is just as true of [[dividend]]s on equities, of course.</ref> This is because an interest rate is, by definition, the ''income'' on a capital investment.

Oh, sure, you can detach and sell a strip of [[coupon]]s off a [[Debt security|bond]]: okay. But to do that, there must first ''be'' a bond, and you must buy it, cut it up and sell the stripped bond principal back into the market. Once you’ve done that, you have your disembodied interest cashflow, all right — ''but someone else has its dark inversion'': this weird, mutilated, principal-only, [[Zero-coupon bond|zero-coupon]] instrument that trades at a heavy discount to its fully-limbed equivalent. It will exist, but unhappily: like Weird Barbie or one of those intercised children with no daemon in ''His Dark Materials''. Once you have sold the principal you might not be able to ''see'' it any more, ''but it is still there''.

{{Quote|{{drop|“I|n the real world}} interest rates do not exist independently of principal investments. This is because an interest rate is, by definition, the income on a capital investment.”}}

Repeat: in the real world, ''interest rate cashflows depend on income-generating assets''. It stands to reason. A rate without principal is like a shadow without a boy. 

Do swaps change all that? 

No: because at some point, swaps must be ''based in the reality from which they are derived''. This is not bitcoin, folks.
====Derivatives as “engines of hypothesis”====
{{quote|
{{D|Derivative|/dɪˈrɪvətɪv/|n}}
FINANCE: (of a product) having a value ''deriving from'' an underlying variable asset. (''emphasis added'')}}

{{Drop|W|hen the [[Children of the Forest|Children]]}} [[Children of the Woods|of the Forest]] wrought their wristy magic on the [[First Men]] and the [[Single agreement|Way of the One Agreement]] passed into common understanding our leaden, earth-bound notions of “necessary principal” were swept away. Only then did the swap market take wing, upon the nuclear power of [[leverage]]. Income could flow, at last, unshackled of its leaden ''principal'' host, and was free to nudely frolic in ISDA’s glittering starlight. 

The “synthetic” world is an alternative, magical realm. Normal rules of [[space-time]] do not apply. There are amulets, magic instruments and imaginary tools with which even ordinary mortals can do impossible things. As we have seen, we can isolate income from [[principal]] and trade them hypothetically, as discrete instruments. 

But gravity is not banished; only ''postponed''. At some point, this fantasia must alight on planet Earth and engage with real-world instruments, ''because that is what it is all derived from''. Ultimately, somewhere, someone needs to construct each enchanting payoff from grubby, weighty, principal-laden corporate rights and obligations. Those rights and obligations are — on our mortal coil, ''must be'' — embedded in a scaly crust of [[principal]]. 

And ''that principal'' ''must be financed''.

So if you want to earn [[floating rate]] on a notional of a hundred bucks in the real world, you pony up a hundred bucks. That means selling an investment you already own: going off some other risk. Even free cash deposited with the bank is an investment: it is a loan to the bank. If you don’t want to sell down another investment, you must instead ''borrow'' from someone. We are somewhere near the foundational mythologies of modern capitalism, here, by the way. this sort of talk gets [[bitcoin]]ers quite agitated.

If that someone is the [[dealer]] from whom you bought the [[floating rate note]], consider the final cashflows: you ''pay'' a fixed rate on your loan; you finance that from the income generated by your asset portfolio, the principal on the note you’ve bought cancels out against the principal of your loan and bingo: ''you have an interest rate swap''.

====Leverage is a state of mind (or balance sheet)====
{{drop|O|ne last way}} to look at this: an interest rate swap is a levered investment in a debt instrument. Interest rate swaps are, in this sense, “synthetic ''fixed income'' prime brokerage”: a [[margin loan]] to buy a fixed income asset.

We can see this by considering the parties’ respective economic positions before and after trading. The [[customer]] changes its net position; the [[dealer]] does not. Swapping a fixed cashflow for a floating one is to ''keep'' the “asset” funding that fixed cashflow, and to borrow the funds required to buy the new floating-rate asset. Because that borrowing has the same principal amount as the purchased floating-rate asset, the principal amounts cancel out, and the customer is left with just the floating rate cashflow, for which it must pay the fixed rate cashflow it has agreed. 

Without that [[swap|implied loan]], the customer would have to sell an asset to raise the proceeds to buy the floating-rate bond outright from the dealer. That is, pay the principal amount to the dealer, and acquire the interest ''and'' principal cashflows of a floating rate asset. Here the customer is certainly not borrowing anything. It is making a fully-funded long investment.

“But, but, but JC: can’t you see? If you pay someone 100 and they pay you the return of an instrument worth 100 and interest, ''you'' have loaned ''them'' the money?”

Quite so: but ''that is the nature of a floating-rate bond''. It ''is'' a loan. But it is ''not a loan to the dealer''. It is a loan ''to the issuer of the floating-rate bond''. If the dealer is paying you the return of a floating-rate bond you may be assured it has used your money to buy the floating-rate bond, to hedge itself.  It is flat. You have not, net, lent the dealer ''anything''.