Events of Default - 1992 ISDA Provision
1992 ISDA Master Agreement A Jolly Contrarian owner’s manual™ 5(a) in all its glory
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Overview
5(a)(i): The significant change between 1992 ISDA and 2002 ISDA is the restriction of that grace period from three Local Business Days to one. And a bit of convolutional frippery in introducing Local Delivery Days as well.
Compare also Failure to Pay under the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, which is subtly different given the different purpose that it plays under a CDS.
5(a)(ii): Note the addition of Repudiation of Agreement to the 2002 ISDA. Common law purists like the JC will grumble that you don’t really need to set out repudiation as a breach justifying termination of a contract, because that’s what it is by definition but stating the bleeding obvious has never stopped ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ before. Also, an interesting question: if you do feel the need to provide for what is in essence an evolving common law remedy, then, to the extent your draw that remedy inside the cope of the common law remedy — or the common law evolves some new different and remedy that no-one had thought of before — then what? Section 9(d) has you covered. Woo-hoo.
5(a)(iii): A bit of pedantic flannel found its way into the 2002 ISDA — it captures not just the failure of the Credit Support Document itself, but any security interest granted under it, catering to the legal eagle’s most paranoid fears that a contractual right can have some sort of distinct ontological existence independently from the agreement which gives it breath and enforceable currency in the first place. But otherwise the same.
5(a)(iv): No change between 1992 ISDA and 2002 ISDA.
5(a)(v): DUST has been expanded in five significant ways by the 2002 ISDA. See the summary and general sections for details.
5(a)(vi): The 2002 ISDA updates the 1992 ISDA’s Cross Default so that if the combined amount outstanding under the two limbs of Cross Default exceed the Threshold Amount, then it will be an Event of Default. Normally, under the 1992 ISDA, Cross Default requires one or the other limbs to be satisfied — you can’t add them together. This was a bit of a snafu.
The two limbs are:
- a default under a financial agreement that would allow a creditor to accelerate any indebtedness that party owes it;
- a failure to pay on the due date under such agreements after the expiry of a grace period.
5(a)(vii): There are two differences between the 1992 ISDA and 2002 ISDA definitions of Bankruptcy.
First, the 2002 ISDA has a slightly more specific concept of “insolvency”. In limb 4 (insolvency proceedings) a new limb has been included to cover action taken by an entity-specific regulator or supervisor (as opposed to a common or garden insolvency proceeding): If initiated by a regulator, the game’s up as soon as the action is taken. If initiated by a random creditor, the action must have resulted in a winding-up order, or at least not have been discharged in 15 (not 30) days.
About that grace period. Second, and unnervingly for those of little faith in their own accounts payble departments, the grace period in which one must arrange the dismissal of a vexations or undeserving insolvency petition (under 5(a)(vii)(4)) or the exercise of security over assets (under 5(a)(vii)(7)) is compressed from 30 days to 15 days.
5(a)(viii): ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ giveth and ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ taketh away. As it neatly excises one square of flannel here, it inserts another one, further itemising ways in which a company might reorganise itself, there. In practical terms — ones that might make a difference were they to be considered by the King’s Bench Division, that is — no real change between 1992 ISDA and 2002 ISDA.
Summary
Types of Events of Default
Independently verifiable
Some Events of Default you can independently verify without counterparty's confirmation, for example:
- Direct breaches: direct breaches of the Agreement (eg Failure to Pay; Breach of Agreement);
- Public events: Events which are necessarily public (most of the Bankruptcy limbs; Merger Without Assumption
Not independently verifiable
Some require the counterparty to tell you as they depend on facts which you could not know are not public knowledge, are not breaches of a direct obligation to the counterparty and would not otherwise come to the firm's attention: Particularly:
- Cross Default
- other limbs of Bankruptcy (eg "has a secured party take possession of all or substantially all its assets".
“Hard” Events of Default
Hard events where some positive action has actually been taken representing a default - such as a Failure to Pay
“Soft” or “Passive” Events of Default
Where a state of affairs has arisen permitting a hard Event of Default to be called, but it has not been designated it happened, such as Cross Default, where person owning the actual "hard" default right against your counterparty may not have triggered (or have any intention of triggering) it.
That said, and for the same reason, such “not independently verifiable” termination/default events are effectively soft anyway, even where we have such an obligation from counterparty to notify us of their occurrence, because we have no means of policing whether or not the Counterparty has in fact notified us, and therefore no practical remedy anyway if it does not. It is a self certification, after all, and all we can rely on is its moral force and the party's competence to monitor its own position and be sufficiently organised to tell us.
Additionally, the obligation on a counterparty to monitor "passive" Events of Default like Cross Default (as opposed to cross acceleration where QED a defaulting party will be notified about the occurrence) is a pretty onerous one particularly for a large entity, and even more so where (as they often are for funds) derivatives are included in definition of Specified Indebtedness.
Given that cross defaults may have artificially low Threshold Amounts (as do some of ours) and are set at levels where actual counterparties owning those rights directly are most unlikely to exercise them, it should not be a surprise to find parties resistant to notifying us about these.
This becomes a credit call but a practical recommendation would be:
- Impose notification requirement only on "active" termination/default events which are non-public and CP has no excuse for not having monitored them and counterparty has actually exercised; and
- If that doesn't work, agree to drop the provision altogether, as in my view its practical utility is limited to "moral" at best (as there is no effective sanction for counterparty breach anyway)
Illegality
Illegality trumps Event of Default. Be careful where, for example, a Failure to Pay is occasioned by a mandatory change in law by a government having jurisdiction over one or other counterparty — see Illegality. Good example: Greek capital controls of June 2015.
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- The JC’s famous Nutshell™ summary of this clause