Template:M intro disaster tunnel vision

By tunnel vision, JC means that “compendium of common heuristics and logical fallacies,” to which we are all susceptible, that lead actors in the criminal justice system to “focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will ‘build a case’ for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away from guilt.” This process leads investigators, prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers alike to focus on a particular conclusion and then filter all evidence in a case through the lens provided by that conclusion.

— The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases by Keith Findley and Michael Scott (2006)

Prosecutor’s tunnel vision
/ˈprɒsɪkjuːtəz/ /ˈtʌnᵊl/ /ˈvɪʒᵊn/ (n.)
The collection of biases and misconceptions that can lead prosecutors — being those who assert a particular model or narrative about the world, and not just literal criminal prosecutors — to frame and maintain curious views, seemingly in the face of common sense. In putting this together, JC draws on The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases by Keith Findley and Michael Scott in the Wisconsin Law Review (2006) and Robert Cialdini’s Persuasion. To some extent also the madness of crowds and Jon Haidt’s Template:Brilliant. The essence of all if these are we are not nearly as logical as we think. Prosecutor’d tunnel vision can therefore form a useful template for screening all kinds of bad decision-making environments.

It may be that this syndrome describes all decision-making — especially of a “conviction” kind, like political and religious ones — that, once they have taken root, are hard to defeat.

The “wrongful conviction” cases are bracing because, with hindsight, it is so hard to understand the compulsion to stick with plainly untenable views. If we treat Template:Ptv as akin to a religious or political conviction, we can understand better how “prosecutors” can be so energetic in their maintenance of a bad model. It perhaps explains the gruesome in-house performance in the Post Office Horizon IT scandal.

Here a “prosecutor” is the prosecutor of a theory: of innocence or guilt. The Lucy Letby dialogue is characterised by proponents on both sides who are equally afflicted with Template:Ptv and few committing to dispassion: hence intemperate allegations of conspiracy from both sides.

There are three stages of a tunnel vision scenario: the first establishes conditions that make us vulnerable to tunnel vision; second are those considerations that push us down a given tunnel; the third are those that keep us there once we go there.

Call these “setting out”, “getting there” and “staying there”.

In order of appearance:

Setting out

To get to a position where tunnel vision might toddle hold,we need:

Overconfidence

An unjustified belief in our own ability to diagnose and judge subtle problems. Where we are overly confident in our case — where we see its essential rectitude — we are less likely to consider alternatives, different models, theories or even evidence.

Anchoring effect

When making decisions we tend to rely on the first piece of information we get. Initial impressions can disproportionately influence our strategy and assessment of responsibility. This is the anchoring effect.

=Role pressure

The central investigation department is there to clear complaints and uphold prosecutions. No-one will be satisfied by an agency who The pressure to fulfil the expectations and responsibilities of one’s role. Someone analogous to the “to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail” syndrome: prosecutors may feel intense pressure to secure convictions due to career advancement considerations, public expectations, or institutional culture. The literal meaning of “iatrogenic” — an illness produced by the treatment.

Getting there

Confirmation bias: The tendency to search for, interpret, and remember information that confirms pre-existing beliefs or hypotheses. Prosecutors may give undue weight to evidence that supports their case and disregard or minimize evidence that contradicts it.

Selective information processing: Focusing on certain pieces of evidence while ignoring others. Prosecutors might only present evidence that strengthens their case and neglect exculpatory evidence that could help the defense.

Groupthink: Thinking or making decisions as a group in a way that discourages creativity or individual responsibility: Prosecutors might conform to the prevailing opinion within their office, stifling dissenting views and critical analysis of the case.

Reductionism: Drilling deep into technical details that, by themselves, and shorn of all context, seem to lead to one conclusion — especially one you are already anchored to — notwithstanding the wider picture

Staying there

Hindsight bias: In hindsight, people tend to think an eventual outcome was inevitable, or more likely or predictable, than originally expected. “Hindsight bias” is a means through which people project new knowledge (of actual outcomes) onto knowledge of the past (observed behaviour), without realising that the perception of the past has been tainted by the subsequent information.

Once a person becomes a prime suspect and prosecutors arrive at an outcome in their own determination of who they believe is guilty — hindsight bias suggests that, upon reflection, the suspect was the inevitable and likely suspect from the beginning. Evidence is malleable in light of this “realisation”.

There is also a “reiteration effect”: A reiteration effect is also linked to hindsight bias. Confidence in an assertion increases the more it is repeated, independent of its truth or falsity. Accordingly, the longer that police, prosecutors and witnesses live with a conclusion of guilt, the more entrenched their conclusion becomes, and the more obvious it appears that all evidence pointed to that conclusion from the very beginning. This “reiteration effect” makes it increasingly difficult for police and prosecutors to consider alternative perpetrators or theories of a crime.

Outcome bias: Like hindsight bias, outcome bias involves a process in which people project outcomes onto the past without realising the outcome information has influenced their perception of the past, but it does not reflect judgments about the likelihood of an event, but about the quality of a suspect’s decision. Subjects are more likely to judge as bad a suspect’s decision to operate when they are told the patient died during surgery than when told the patient survived.

Sunk cost fallacy: The inclination to continue an endeavour once money, effort, time or credibility has been invested, even when new evidence suggests the defendant might be innocent. (see also commitment when talking about persuasion)

Cognitive dissonance: The discomfort experienced when holding two conflicting cognitions. To reduce discomfort, prosecutors may rationalize or dismiss information that challenges their belief in the defendant's guilt.

Belief perseverance: Maintaining a belief despite new information that firmly contradicts it. Even in the face of strong contrary evidence, prosecutors may cling to their original theory.

Ethical blindness: The inability to see the ethical dimensions of a situation due to focusing on other aspects. Prosecutors might neglect the ethical implications of their actions in the pursuit of winning a case.