Credit mitigation: Difference between revisions
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The controversial protections in master trading agreements are there for one reason: To stop you losing money. They’re “''[[credit mitigant|credit mitigants]]''”: | The controversial protections in master trading agreements are there for one reason: To stop you losing money. They’re “''[[credit mitigant|credit mitigants]]''”: | ||
====[[Event of default|Events of default]]==== | ====[[Event of default|Events of default]]==== | ||
*If a party [[failure to pay|fails to pay]] or deliver things it owes under the agreement | *'''Direct [[Failure to pay]]''': If a party [[failure to pay|fails to pay]] or deliver things it owes under the agreement | ||
*Things that increase the likelihood that the party will be unable to do so in the future: | *'''Indirect credit issues''': Things that increase the likelihood that the party will be unable to do so in the future: | ||
**The party goes [[insolvent]] (or gets close to it) | **'''[[Bankruptcy]]''': The party goes [[insolvent]] (or gets close to it) | ||
**The party’s credit | **'''Credit impairment''': The party’s [[credit rating]]s are prejudiced (via a merger) | ||
**The party | **'''[[Cross default]]''': The party breaches important obligations owed to other counterparties | ||
*Things that undermine the comfort you took as to the party’s creditworthiness | *'''[[Misrepresentation]]''': Things that tend to undermine the comfort you took as to the party’s creditworthiness at the outset of the arrangement, such as representations and warranties no longer being true. | ||
*'''[[Credit support provider]] issues''': similar things happening to the counterparty’s named guarantors or [[credit support provider]]s. | |||
* | These [[events of default]] live in the pre-printed the agreement, and tend not to be negotiated (except perhaps [[cross-default]], and that's a whole different story). | ||
====[[Additional termination events]]==== | |||
We also throw in customised “[[additional termination event|additional termination events]]” tailored to the idiosyncrasies of each counterparty. For example, for [[hedge fund]]s we may require “key person” events allowing termination if named individuals cease to be associated with the fund; [[NAV trigger]]s granting close-out rights related to significant decreases in the [[net asset value]] of the fund. | |||
These customised events tend to be more controversial and more complicated: [[NAV trigger]]s may be set at different thresholds over different periods | |||
====Margin==== | |||
Master trading agreements also have less invasive means of mitigating | |||
Revision as of 13:35, 10 December 2016
The controversial protections in master trading agreements are there for one reason: To stop you losing money. They’re “credit mitigants”:
Events of default
- Direct Failure to pay: If a party fails to pay or deliver things it owes under the agreement
- Indirect credit issues: Things that increase the likelihood that the party will be unable to do so in the future:
- Bankruptcy: The party goes insolvent (or gets close to it)
- Credit impairment: The party’s credit ratings are prejudiced (via a merger)
- Cross default: The party breaches important obligations owed to other counterparties
- Misrepresentation: Things that tend to undermine the comfort you took as to the party’s creditworthiness at the outset of the arrangement, such as representations and warranties no longer being true.
- Credit support provider issues: similar things happening to the counterparty’s named guarantors or credit support providers.
These events of default live in the pre-printed the agreement, and tend not to be negotiated (except perhaps cross-default, and that's a whole different story).
Additional termination events
We also throw in customised “additional termination events” tailored to the idiosyncrasies of each counterparty. For example, for hedge funds we may require “key person” events allowing termination if named individuals cease to be associated with the fund; NAV triggers granting close-out rights related to significant decreases in the net asset value of the fund.
These customised events tend to be more controversial and more complicated: NAV triggers may be set at different thresholds over different periods
Margin
Master trading agreements also have less invasive means of mitigating