Template:Contract vs document: Difference between revisions
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The [[contract]], ''[[consensus ad idem]]'' is an [[Res cogitans|immaterial thing]]. It has no [[Res extensa|physical extension]]. It does not intrude on the mortal plane. Its best Earthly representative is the ''written agreement'', a memorial on parchment wherein the parties do their best to set out the boundaries of their compact. The document is not the contract; the contract is not the document — they are spirit and flesh; a [[Platonic ideal]] and its flickering shadow on the grotto wall. | The [[contract]], ''[[consensus ad idem]]'' is an [[Res cogitans|immaterial thing]]. It has no [[Res extensa|physical extension]]. It does not intrude on the mortal plane. Its best Earthly representative is the ''written agreement'', a memorial on parchment wherein the parties do their best to set out the boundaries of their compact. The document is not the contract; the contract is not the document — they are spirit and flesh; a [[Platonic ideal]] and its flickering shadow on the grotto wall. | ||
But ''if'' there should be some executed paper — for most contracts there need not, but let’s just say there ''is'' — a [[Lord Justice Cocklecarrot M.R.|court]] will be disinclined to look beyond its “four corners” when divining the parties’ commercial intentions in signing it. This is in part convenience, in part laziness, but in part the fair assumption that, since the parties were bothered to write down the important parts of their agreement, anything they ''didn’t'' write down either didn’t exist or can’t have been important enough to justify memorialising. In this way the [[Platonic form]] of the contract and its extension into our | But ''if'' there should be some executed paper — for most contracts there need not, but let’s just say there ''is'' — a [[Lord Justice Cocklecarrot M.R.|court]] will be disinclined to look beyond its “four corners” when divining the parties’ commercial intentions in signing it. This is in part convenience, in part laziness, but in part the fair assumption that, since the parties were bothered to write down the important parts of their agreement, anything they ''didn’t'' write down either didn’t exist or can’t have been important enough to justify memorialising. In this way the [[res cogitans|Platonic ''form'']] of the contract and its [[Res extensa|bodily ''extension'']] into our decadent organic realm become one. It’s rather biblical. | ||
Since an issue that has attracted the attention of the [[Queen’s Bench Division]] ''must'' be important, the Court’s doubt will benefit not one party or the other, but the paperwork both of them signed. The Lord is not your witness, so the signed written record will have to do. | Since an issue that has attracted the attention of the [[Queen’s Bench Division]] ''must'' be important, the Court’s doubt will benefit not one party or the other, but the paperwork both of them signed. The Lord is not your witness, so the signed written record will have to do. | ||
This rule against extraneous evidence — as with so many historic principles of the [[common law]], these days a diminished thing, is known as the “[[parol evidence]]” rule. | This rule against extraneous evidence — as with so many historic principles of the [[common law]], these days a diminished thing, is known as the “[[parol evidence]]” rule. | ||
Revision as of 18:21, 19 March 2020
The contract versus the written agreement
The contract, consensus ad idem is an immaterial thing. It has no physical extension. It does not intrude on the mortal plane. Its best Earthly representative is the written agreement, a memorial on parchment wherein the parties do their best to set out the boundaries of their compact. The document is not the contract; the contract is not the document — they are spirit and flesh; a Platonic ideal and its flickering shadow on the grotto wall.
But if there should be some executed paper — for most contracts there need not, but let’s just say there is — a court will be disinclined to look beyond its “four corners” when divining the parties’ commercial intentions in signing it. This is in part convenience, in part laziness, but in part the fair assumption that, since the parties were bothered to write down the important parts of their agreement, anything they didn’t write down either didn’t exist or can’t have been important enough to justify memorialising. In this way the Platonic form of the contract and its bodily extension into our decadent organic realm become one. It’s rather biblical.
Since an issue that has attracted the attention of the Queen’s Bench Division must be important, the Court’s doubt will benefit not one party or the other, but the paperwork both of them signed. The Lord is not your witness, so the signed written record will have to do.
This rule against extraneous evidence — as with so many historic principles of the common law, these days a diminished thing, is known as the “parol evidence” rule.