Template:Warrantydescription: Difference between revisions

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A {{tag|warranty}} is a statement of a ''current'' [[fact]] made as a term of a {{tag|contract}}. If a warrantor breaches its {{tag|warranty}} the injured party might claim damages for the breach of {{tag|contract}} and sue for damages, but cannot [[rescind]] it altogether. For that you would need a breach of {{tag|representation}}.  
A {{tag|warranty}} is a statement of a ''current'' [[fact]] made as a term of a {{tag|contract}}. If a warrantor breaches its {{tag|warranty}} the injured party might claim damages for the breach of {{tag|contract}} and sue for damages, but cannot [[rescind]] it altogether. For that you would need a breach of {{tag|representation}}.  


Purists would say that a “[[warranty]]” is no more suitable for a statement of ''future'' fact — if, [[Epistemology|epistemologically]], such a thing is even a thing, and those same purists would say it is not — for who knows what the future brings? The [[common law]] is no hard determinist; the [[Golden thread|golden thread of precedent]] looks backward, not forward. The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune may yet pin us to a different hill. If the future is a soufflé, it is not so much that it hasn’t yet risen, but that the jurists who might be eating it have not yet decided whether they’re even going to that ''restaurant'' and nor can they say just yet whether it even has soufflé on the menu in the first place. The thing the [[common law]] understands for making commitments about the world that’s yet to come is called the ''[[promise]]'' or, if you want to sound flash about it, the “[[undertaking]]”. <br>
Purists would say that a “[[warranty]]” is no more suitable for a statement of ''future'' fact — if, [[Epistemology|epistemologically]], such a thing is even a thing, and those same purists would say it is not — for who knows what the future brings? The [[common law]] is no hard determinist; the [[Golden thread|golden thread of precedent]] looks backward, not forward; the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune may yet pin us to a different hill. If the future is a ''soufflé'', it is not so much that it hasn’t yet risen, but that the jurists who might be eating it have not yet decided whether they’re even going to that ''restaurant'', and nor do they know whether it even has ''soufflé'' on the menu in the first place.  
 
The thing the [[common law]] understands for making commitments which measure the world that’s yet to come is called the ''[[promise]]''or, if you want to sound flash about it, the “[[undertaking]]”. <br>

Revision as of 15:17, 6 April 2020

A warranty is a statement of a current fact made as a term of a contract. If a warrantor breaches its warranty the injured party might claim damages for the breach of contract and sue for damages, but cannot rescind it altogether. For that you would need a breach of representation.

Purists would say that a “warranty” is no more suitable for a statement of future fact — if, epistemologically, such a thing is even a thing, and those same purists would say it is not — for who knows what the future brings? The common law is no hard determinist; the golden thread of precedent looks backward, not forward; the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune may yet pin us to a different hill. If the future is a soufflé, it is not so much that it hasn’t yet risen, but that the jurists who might be eating it have not yet decided whether they’re even going to that restaurant, and nor do they know whether it even has soufflé on the menu in the first place.

The thing the common law understands for making commitments which measure the world that’s yet to come is called the “promise” or, if you want to sound flash about it, the “undertaking”.