The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations: Difference between revisions
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Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) (Created page with "{{A|book review|}} Of a piece with {{author|Charles Perrow}}’s {{br|Normal Accidents}}, in rooting the cause of accidents in poor system design and unnecessary complexity, o...") Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit |
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{{A|book review|}} | {{A|book review|}} | ||
Of a piece with {{author|Charles Perrow}}’s {{br|Normal Accidents}}, in rooting the cause of accidents in poor system design and unnecessary complexity, overlaying safety features and compliance measures which only make the problem worse — that is, at the door of management and not poor benighted [[subject matter expert]]s who are expected to make sense of the {{author|Rube Goldberg}} machine that management expect them to operate. | Of a piece with {{author|Charles Perrow}}’s {{br|Normal Accidents}}, in rooting the cause of accidents in poor system design and unnecessary complexity, overlaying safety features and compliance measures which only make the problem worse — that is, at the door of management and not poor benighted [[subject matter expert]]s who are expected to make sense of the {{author|Rube Goldberg}} machine that management expect them to operate. | ||
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*[[Warning light]] | |||
*[[Complexity]] | |||
*[[Systems analysis]] | |||
*{{br|Normal Accidents}} | |||
Revision as of 10:06, 25 October 2020
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Of a piece with Charles Perrow’s Normal Accidents, in rooting the cause of accidents in poor system design and unnecessary complexity, overlaying safety features and compliance measures which only make the problem worse — that is, at the door of management and not poor benighted subject matter experts who are expected to make sense of the Rube Goldberg machine that management expect them to operate.