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Let us coin a [[maxim]]:  
Let us coin a [[maxim]]:


{{quote|“[[before an apocalypse becomes an apocalypse, it doesn’t look like an apocalypse|before an apocalypse ''becomes'' an apocalypse, it doesn’t ''look'' like an apocalypse]].}}  
{{quote|“{{maxim|Before an apocalypse becomes an apocalypse, it doesn’t look like an apocalypse}}.”}}


The studied, logical outrage vouchsafed by those in the riskless position of having twenty-twenty hindsight and engaged in the fruitless, if satisfying, pursuit of blaming the [[meatware]] ''was not available to those on deck at the time''. No-one ''knew'' or — at least until it was too late, even ''believed'' — that things would turn out like this. [[Q.E.D.]]
Risk-free, twenty-twenty hindsight is by definition not available to those who must make the decisions that lead to it. Only later does the reactor core melt down. Only later does the market crash. Beforehand, no-one ''knew'' or — at least until it was too late, even ''believed'' — that things would turn out like this. [[Q.E.D.]]


Ergo, the decision calculus ''then'' was nowhere near as obvious as it appears ''now'', as an object in the rear-view mirror: if it had been, ''the [[Apocalypse|catastrophe]] would not have happened''.
Why did people do what they did when it was so obviously stupid looking back at it? Well, As {{author|Sidney Dekker}} puts it in his excellent {{br|The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations}}:


Furthermore, it is one thing to have a legal right to pull your trigger, it is quite another to resolve to use it. ''Especially'' if you don’t know how this all will play out.  
{{quote|“Forks in the road stand out so clearly to you, looking back. But when inside the tunnel, when looking forward and being pushed ahead by unfolding events, these forks were shrouded in the uncertainty and complexity of many possible options and demands; they were surrounded by time constraints and other pressures.”}}


''After'' the event, the client is a smoking hulk; all that remains is twisted wreckage strewn across the landscape. ''Now'', it could not ''be'' more obvious: there was only ever one option.  
Ergo, the decision calculus then was nowhere near as obvious as it appears now, as an object in the rear-view mirror: if it had been, t''he catastrophe would not have happened''.


''Before'' it, there were twenty million dollars of annual revenues at stake: few individual risk managers will be prepared to blow up a key client on their own initiative, without diffusing responsibility through some kind of institutional [[Escalation circle|escalations]]. But going to a Counterparty Risk Oversight Committee takes time. And CROCs are fraught, intimidating things. To recommend affronting a [[platinum client]] is to invite a shellacking from those a long way further up the tree than you.  
And it is one thing to have a right to pull your trigger, it is quite another to be prepared to use it. Especially if you don’t know how this all will play out.


Now: if ''these'' are the options, and our valiant risk manager doesn’t yet have that twenty-twenty hindsight of what might come about tomorrow — she won’t remember, ][[Q.E.D.]] — is it any wonder she’ll be tempted to do nothing?
''After'' the event, all that remains is is a smoking hulk and twisted wreckage strewn across the landscape and it could not be more obvious that there was only ever one option.


{{maxim|Before an apocalypse becomes an apocalypse, it doesn’t look like an apocalypse]].
''Before'' it, there were twenty million dollars of annual revenues at stake.
 
Few individuals will blow up a significant business relationship without diffusing responsibility through some kind of institutional [[escalation]]. But that takes time. And escalations are fraught: to recommend affronting a [[platinum client]] is to invite a shellacking from someone [[Christian name|a long way further up the tree than you]].
 
Now: if these are the options, and our valiant risk manager doesn’t yet have that twenty-twenty hindsight of what might come about tomorrow, is it any wonder she’ll be tempted to do nothing?
 
{{maxim|Before an apocalypse becomes an apocalypse, it doesn’t look like an apocalypse}}.

Latest revision as of 16:39, 20 August 2021

Let us coin a maxim:

Before an apocalypse becomes an apocalypse, it doesn’t look like an apocalypse.”

Risk-free, twenty-twenty hindsight is by definition not available to those who must make the decisions that lead to it. Only later does the reactor core melt down. Only later does the market crash. Beforehand, no-one knew or — at least until it was too late, even believed — that things would turn out like this. Q.E.D.

Why did people do what they did when it was so obviously stupid looking back at it? Well, As Sidney Dekker puts it in his excellent The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations:

“Forks in the road stand out so clearly to you, looking back. But when inside the tunnel, when looking forward and being pushed ahead by unfolding events, these forks were shrouded in the uncertainty and complexity of many possible options and demands; they were surrounded by time constraints and other pressures.”

Ergo, the decision calculus then was nowhere near as obvious as it appears now, as an object in the rear-view mirror: if it had been, the catastrophe would not have happened.

And it is one thing to have a right to pull your trigger, it is quite another to be prepared to use it. Especially if you don’t know how this all will play out.

After the event, all that remains is is a smoking hulk and twisted wreckage strewn across the landscape and it could not be more obvious that there was only ever one option.

Before it, there were twenty million dollars of annual revenues at stake.

Few individuals will blow up a significant business relationship without diffusing responsibility through some kind of institutional escalation. But that takes time. And escalations are fraught: to recommend affronting a platinum client is to invite a shellacking from someone a long way further up the tree than you.

Now: if these are the options, and our valiant risk manager doesn’t yet have that twenty-twenty hindsight of what might come about tomorrow, is it any wonder she’ll be tempted to do nothing?

Before an apocalypse becomes an apocalypse, it doesn’t look like an apocalypse.