Template:Limited value of security in repack: Difference between revisions

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Created page with "We shouldn’t get hung up about the whys and wherefores of the security structure of a repackaging as long as it is ''there'', it covers everything it is meant to cover, and all necessary perfections and execution formalities are observed. For in a repackaging, the security just sits there and will almost certainly never be exercised. All that tedious business about automatically releasing it to make payments, powers to appointing receivers, calling and collecting in,..."
 
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We shouldn’t get hung up about the whys and wherefores of the security structure of a repackaging as long as it is ''there'', it covers everything it is meant to cover, and all necessary perfections and execution formalities are observed. For in a repackaging, the security just sits there and will almost certainly never be exercised.  
We shouldn’t get ''too'' hung up about the whys and wherefores of the security structure of a repackaging ''as long as it is there'', it covers all the rights and assets it is meant to cover, and all necessary [[perfection|perfections]] and execution formalities are observed. For in a repackaging, the security just sits there and will almost certainly never be exercised.  


All that tedious business about automatically releasing it to make payments, powers to appointing receivers, calling and collecting in, the trustee’s rights and obligations under the [[Law of Property Act 1925]] and so on — look it is all good stuff; let your trustee lawyer have his day — but as long as it is ''there'', none of it really matters.  
All that [[Tedium|tedious]] business about automatically releasing it to make payments, powers to appointing receivers, calling and collecting in, the trustee’s rights and obligations under the [[Law of Property Act 1925]] and so on — look it is all good stuff; let your trustee lawyer have his day — but as long as it is ''there'', none of it really matters.  


Why? Because — unless you have negligently buggered up your structuring, and your Trustee has let you, and both of these are quite hard to do — the SPV ''cannot go insolvent''. Any repack unwind will be triggered by an external event: a defaulted underlying asset or a failing counterparty or agent. ''None relate to the solvency or ability to meet its debts of the Issuer itself''.  
Why? Because — unless you have negligently buggered up your ring-fencing ''and'' your Trustee has ''let'' you: both of these are quite hard to do — the SPV ''cannot go insolvent''. Any repack redemption will be triggered by an external event: a non-payment on an underlying asset or by a failing counterparty or agent. ''None relate to the solvency or ability to meet its debts of the Issuer itself''.  


That being the case, once it exists, the security package will never actually ''do'' anything: any diminution in value to of the secured assets — will happen ''regardless'' of how strong the security is. The security is a formal belt and brace there to fully isolate from each other the noteholders of different series, and even that only matters ''only when the SPV is bankrupt''. Which is, ''never''.  
That being the case, once it exists, the security package will never actually ''do'' anything: any diminution in value to of the secured assets — will happen ''regardless'' of how strong the security is. The security is a formal belt and brace there to fully isolate from each other the noteholders of different series, and even that only matters ''only when the SPV is bankrupt''. Which is, ''never''.  
The limited purpose of the security package in a [[repackaging]]  is widely misunderstood – all it does is defend against ''unexpected holes in the [[Limited recourse|ring-fencing]]''.


This is why it is ''de rigueur'' to accelerate, liquidate and distribute the proceeds of a repackaged note ''without enforcement of the security''.
This is why it is ''de rigueur'' to accelerate, liquidate and distribute the proceeds of a repackaged note ''without enforcement of the security''.

Latest revision as of 10:30, 20 September 2023

We shouldn’t get too hung up about the whys and wherefores of the security structure of a repackaging as long as it is there, it covers all the rights and assets it is meant to cover, and all necessary perfections and execution formalities are observed. For in a repackaging, the security just sits there and will almost certainly never be exercised.

All that tedious business about automatically releasing it to make payments, powers to appointing receivers, calling and collecting in, the trustee’s rights and obligations under the Law of Property Act 1925 and so on — look it is all good stuff; let your trustee lawyer have his day — but as long as it is there, none of it really matters.

Why? Because — unless you have negligently buggered up your ring-fencing and your Trustee has let you: both of these are quite hard to do — the SPV cannot go insolvent. Any repack redemption will be triggered by an external event: a non-payment on an underlying asset or by a failing counterparty or agent. None relate to the solvency or ability to meet its debts of the Issuer itself.

That being the case, once it exists, the security package will never actually do anything: any diminution in value to of the secured assets — will happen regardless of how strong the security is. The security is a formal belt and brace there to fully isolate from each other the noteholders of different series, and even that only matters only when the SPV is bankrupt. Which is, never.

The limited purpose of the security package in a repackaging is widely misunderstood – all it does is defend against unexpected holes in the ring-fencing.

This is why it is de rigueur to accelerate, liquidate and distribute the proceeds of a repackaged note without enforcement of the security.