Template:M summ 2002 ISDA 3(g): Difference between revisions

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===Investment managers as agents===
{{isda 3(g) summ|isdaprov}}
In practice, many {{isdama}}s ''are'' entered by [[agent]]s — [[investment manager]]s and [[asset manager]]s (so called “real money” managers) — on behalf of underlying principals — [[investment fund]]s, and institutional clients who have appointed them as discretionary [[investment adviser]]s.
 
These [[manager]]s often enter transactions in aggregate and only allocate them to their underlying [[principal]]s later in the day. This means that the [[broker]] will have a nervous few hours before it knows whom it is expected to sue if the principal doesn’t pony up on time. General principles of [[agency]] — in particular liability for an [[undisclosed principal]] —mean [[agent]]s are not quite so footloose and fancy-free as many of them seem to believe.
 
Look, it is not the end of the world if your counterpart refuses to renounce all agency, as long as you set up the accounts correctly with the underlying principals, and the firm has a robust approach to trade allocation. Ultimately — and notwithstanding the nervous few hours pending allocation — the person against whom you are, long term, booking the trade ''is'' the principal.

Latest revision as of 15:05, 27 December 2023

If you like a bit of agency chat, you might like our articles about principals and agents, undisclosed agents, undisclosed principals and all that good stuff.

Investment managers as agents

In practice, many ISDA Master Agreements are entered by agents — investment managers and asset managers (so-called “real money” managers) — on behalf of underlying principals — investment funds, and institutional clients who have appointed them as discretionary investment advisers.

These managers often enter transactions in aggregate and only allocate them to their underlying principals later in the day. This means that the broker will have a nervous few hours before it knows whom it is expected to sue if the principal doesn’t pony up on time. General principles of agency — in particular liability for an undisclosed principal —mean agents are not quite so footloose and fancy-free as many of them seem to believe.

Look, it is not the end of the world if your counterpart refuses to renounce all agency, as long as you set up the accounts correctly with the underlying principals, and the firm has a robust approach to trade allocation. Ultimately — and notwithstanding the nervous few hours pending allocation — the person against whom you are, long term, booking the trade is the principal.

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