Rumpelheimer v Haddock

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RUMPELHEIMER v HADDOCK
“Port to Port”
From A. P. Herbert’s unparalleled Uncommon Law

This case, involving some difficult points of Marine and Traffic Law, was brought to a conclusion to-day.

The President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division ( who had the assistance of an assessor) giving judgment. This action was originally instituted in the King’s Bench, but, Mr Justice Juice holding that the issues disclosed pertained to the Law of Admiralty, although the ground of the claim was damage to a motor-car, the case was withdrawn from the King's Bench List and referred to this Court.

Mr Rumpelheimer is suing Mr Haddock for negligent behaviour on the highroad, as a result of which his motor-car, a costly Botellini-Nine, was damaged. The dispute, as is usual at the present time, is only nominally between the parties named, the real litigants being two insurance companies. If it were not for the insurance companies there would be very little litigation of any kind to-day, and members of the legal profession owe to them a debt which we can only repay by careful labour and clear decisions.

On the 21st March last Mr Rumpelheimer was driving his motor-car along the thoroughfare known as Chiswick Mall, which runs beside the north bank of the River Thames. Now, it appears that during the high spring tides, particularly those of the equinoctial seasons, the waters of the Thames overflow the banks and cover the highway to a depth of from two feet on the river side of the road to a few inches on the landward side. Such was the condition of affairs a little before high water on the date in question, when Mr Rumpelheimer, who had an important business appointment in the City, began his voyage along the Mall.

His evidence is that he was keeping carefully to the left or landward side of the road, where it was still possible to drive through the shallow water without fear of damage. While thus engaged he was startled, he says, to see ahead of him, and coming towards him on the same side of the road, the defendant, Mr Haddock, who was navigating with a paddle a small boat of shallow draught. The plaintiff blew his horn vigorously, but the defendant held his course. Mr Rumpelheimer shouted courteously, “Out of the road, you fool!” and Mr Haddock replied, as he admitted under cross-examination, “Port to port, you foxy beetle! Are you not acquainted with the Regulations for Prevention of Collision at Sea? I am going to starboard.”

The plaintiff judged from this speech that he had to do with a maniac, and, obeying an instinct of humanity which in the circumstances deserves all praise, he swerved to the right rather than collide with the defendant’s flimsy craft. But this manoeuvre brought him into the deeper water, which penetrated to the delicate mechanism of his motor and caused it to stop.

It would not be profitable or seemly to dwell upon the exchange of views which followed. Although clearly expressed they reflect small credit on the breeding and education of either party. Mr. Rumpelheimer was compelled to remain where he was until the tide fell (Mr. Haddock, by the way, in gross breach of the customs of the sea, declined to convey him to the shore or pavement in his boat, on the ground that he feared a breach of the peace). On the waters subsiding it was found that the car had been seriously damaged, and it had to be towed to the nearest garage. Mr Rumpelheimer was unable to keep his appointment, and as a result, he tells us, suffered pecuniary loss.

The evidence of Mr Haddock was most unsatisfactory, and if he thought that by singing snatches of sea-chanties he would commend himself to the Admiralty Court he was mistaken. Further, he has imported into the case a deplorable element of personal prejudice. He made certain comments on the personal appearance of the plaintiff which he must have known can have no juridical significance. He said that he had once or twice with resentment observed the defendant going about the neighbourhood in an opulent motor-car of foreign make, driving to the public danger, in excess of the statutory speed-limit, and to his (Mr Haddock’s) inconvenience and alarm. He said that plaintiff seemed to think that he might be a law unto himself on the highroads, but that he (Mr Haddock) was blowed if he (Mr Rumpelheimer) was going to get away with it on the high seas as well. He had therefore acted as he did, willing to discomfit Mr Rumpelheimer, but believing that the law was on his side, that is to say, the regulations for the prevention of collisions at sea or in tidal waters.

The defendant is clearly one who insufficiently appreciates the value of the motor-car to the human race. But we must not allow our natural detestation for such an individual to cloud our Judgment. The meanest citizen, impelled by the meanest motives, is entitled to insist upon the enforcement of the law. The question is, “What is the law?”—a question which frequently arises in our Courts and sometimes receives a satisfactory answer.

Now, the law or custom of the road is that when two vehicles meet each shall keep to the left. But the law or custom of the sea is that when two vessels meet they shall go to starboard and pass port to port, that is to say, each shall keep to the right. It is the contention of Mr Haddock that when the tide covers the road that road becomes a part of the tideway, that traffic upon it is thenceforth governed by the regulations and customs of the sea, and that he did right, therefore, to steer so as to pass Mr Rumpelheimer on his port hand. Further, it is the duty of a steam-vessel to keep out of the way of a rowing-boat; and Mr Haddock argues that the plaintiff’s motor-car when navigating the tideway has the status of a steam-vessel, and that plaintiff has nobody but himself to blame.

With considerable reluctance we find that there is some substance in these contentions. The law of the land says one thing, the law of the water says the contrary; and it seems elementary that (upon navigable waters) the law of the water must prevail. It is idle to say that Chiswick Mall was not at the time of the accident navigable water. Mr Haddock was, in fact, navigating it, and if Mr. Rumpelheimer chooses to navigate it at the same time he must be bound by the appropriate regulations and should make himself familiar with them Mr. Rumpelheimer makes the rather childish objection that his motor-car is not a vessel and ought not to be treated as such. I find no difficulty there. Recent developments of the internal combustion engine, and in particular the outboard motor, have produced a type of water-conveyance which in aspect and dignity is little more than a floating automobile; and though Mr. Rumpelheimer’s motorcar appears to be unseaworthy it is otherwise as much a boat as many motor-boats. The point is that, boat or not, it was navigating the tideway.

Agam, it was argued for the plaintiff that, since the highroad was only covered with water by an exceptional inundation of short duration, it cannot be held to have lost the character of a highroad. But to accept this view would be to admit a very dangerous and confusing precedent. Suppose that large sections of our southern counties were covered for a long period by exceptional floods, so that the inhabitants were compelled to cross them regularly in steam- or motor-vessels, can it be doubted that the regulations of the water, as to the avoidance of collisions, the carrying of lights, sound signals in case of fog, and so forth, would be observed and enforced in that area? Yet in principle the two cases are the same, and differences of degree cannot be allowed to derogate from principle. The fact that a certain area of water was once dry land and is expected to be dry land again is unimportant. Much of what we now know as land was once covered by the ocean, and vice versa, but a motorist would not be allowed to appeal to the customs of the sea because he was crossing the Romney Marshes, on the ground that that land used to be sea. In the same way it is idle for the plaintiff to urge that Chiswick Mall used to be dry land. The question in every case must be a question of fact — Was this area at the material dates water or dry land? And neither geographical size nor extent of time is a relevant consideration We find in this case that the scene of the mishap was water, and tidal water. Now, tidal waters lead to the ocean and are navigated by the vessels of every maritime country. The regulations upon which Mr Haddock relies are not of British origin or sanction only; they govern the movements and secure the safety of the ships of the world. The nations rely upon each other to observe them faithfully and defend them jealously. It will be easily seen what international complications might ensue if it were to go forth that the Admiralty Court of Great Britain was prepared to play fast and loose with them for the benefit of a motorist, however small the issues at stake. The defendant is no gentleman, but that is neither here nor there. We find for the defendant, much as we dislike him.

NOTE—See Bracton “Lex non risu deletur” or “Ridicule will not repeal”, or (Lord Mildew in The Dukeries Case) “A man may laugh at the law, but the law will laugh last”. See Rex v Flanagan (I9I9) 2 AC, in which the wife of a plumber died intestate leaving issue three children and net personalty £31,482. A charge of murder was preferred against the plumber, who raised the defence that, man and wife being at Common Law one person, it could not be murder to kill his wife. The plea was allowed, and a verdict of “Suicide while of unsound mmd” was returned, but it was held (Mould, L J , dissenting) that, being insane, the man was ineligible for unemployment relief See also Earl of Erne v Maltravers and Gareth (1893, 2 HL ), where the Yaffle hounds hunted an aged peer for four miles over the property of the plaintiff, who had forbidden the Hunt to cross his boundaries. In an action for trespass it was held (Fruit, LJ, dissenting) that though the Master had been guilty of negligence in employing short-sighted foxhounds their pursuit of Lord Gareth was an Act of God which he could not have foreseen or prevented. On appeal, however, the House of Lords decided that, though not responsible for damage done by the dogs, he must make good that which was due to the passage of himself and his horse, and the case was referred to assessors for apportionment quantum pertinent. Later, on a writ of quo corpore (Rex v Maltravers), the Master was found guilty of constructive assault in venery, and went bankrupt. (And see Wedderburn on Water-courses).