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{{drop|C|ommerce gives the}} lie to the idea that life is a [[zero-sum game]]. This was [[Adam Smith]]’s great liberating insight: life need not be [[Thomas Hobbes|nasty, brutish and short]] after all. Each of us will only strike a bargain if, on our own terms, we will be better off as a result. That being the case, there is no logical imperative to end a commercial relationship: all being well, it is an [[infinite game]]. If we are flexible enough, open-minded enough, and good enough at the [[Finite and Infinite Games|infinite game]] of business, we can keep this positive feedback loop going, for the mutual betterment of everyone, indefinitely. ''Infinitely'', even.  
{{drop|[[Terminating a financial contract|C]]|ommerce gives the}} lie to the idea that life is a [[zero-sum game]]. This was [[Adam Smith]]’s great insight: things need not be [[Thomas Hobbes|nasty, brutish and short]] and, when it comes to commerce, generally aren’t.  


Therefore, we wish our relationships well, pray Godspeed for their long and fruity lives and, should the twigs on this or that branch dry up, or things in general feel more trouble than they are worth, we can call time and bid a peaceful transition from the flush of vital ardour into the restful stasis of the ultimate hereafter. But we know such equanimity is not always possible. Things do not always work out. There is no more sacred a time in the lives of our commercial contracts than their departure from the earthly clutch.
Each of us will only strike a bargain if we think, on our own terms, we’ll be better off as a result. That being so, once we’ve built a good business relationship, there is no good reason to ''end'' it. All being well, trade is an [[infinite game]]. If we are good enough at it, we can keep its [[Feedback loop|positive feedback loop]] going, for the mutual betterment of everyone, indefinitely. ''Infinitely'', even.  


Therefore, we pack our trunk with tools, implements and weapons with which, if we have to, we can engineer a faster exit. There are a host of different ways this can happen. While lawyers will happily rabbit on about these hypotheticals in the gruesome specific, in general, big picture, terms we do not talk about them enough.  
Therefore, we wish our relationships well and pray Godspeed for their long and fruity lives. Should the plums dangling from this or that branch shrivel; if things become more trouble than they’re worth, we can of course call time and bid our relationship a peaceful transition to the hereafter.  


Below, JC comes over all over-analytical and counts the ''types'' of ways we can bid a commercial relationship to the earth.
But still, things do not always work out quite so equably. Sometimes, an ill wind blows. Relationships become fraught, counterparties get themselves in a pickle.


====Customers and service providers====
Therefore, we pack our trunk with tools, implements and weapons with which, if we must, we can engineer a faster exit from our contracts.  
{{drop|N|ow the great}} majority of [[financial contract]]s are between a “provider” on one side — a [[bank]], [[broker]] or [[dealer]] who provides a ''service'', broadly described: money outright, finance against an asset, or a financial exposure — and a “customer” on the other who buys that service. The customer is, as ever, king: the services exist for her benefit exclusively: the provider’s only interest is managing its own resources so it can best provide that service and extracting some [[fee]], [[commission]] or economic [[rent]] by way of [[consideration]] for it.  


This is to say, “providers” are indifferent to the substance of their services. They do not mean to be economically “the other side” of the trades they execute. They are, loosely, ''[[intermediaries]]''. [[Agent|Agents]]. A match risk takers together, collect a fee and wish them well. They do not take a side. They are “[[compassion]]ate” not “[[empathy|empathetic]]” in psychological terms. All being well, they are indifferent to how the instruments in which they deal perform. As long as their customers remain in fine fettle, they should never need, much less want, to ''terminate'' their services. They should want to keep them going, vigorously, seeing how that is how they earn a crust.  
There are a few different ways this can happen. While lawyers will happily rabbit on about these hypotheticals in the gruesome ''specific'', we do not talk about them in ''general'' terms often enough. So let’s do that now.  


So expectations on either side of a service contract are different: the customer has risk and a prerogative to go ''off'' risk as she sees fit. She can exit whenever she wants, by paying the provider’s fees and whatever it needs to terminate the arrangements it made to provide the service in the first place: its “[[breakage costs]]”.
Below, we count the ''types'' of ways to safely put a commercial relationship in the ground.


But [[Ceteris paribus|all else being equal]], the provider ''cannot'' just exit without the customer’s permission. A [[financial contract]] with a ostensible fixed term, binds a ''provider'' in a way it does not bind the ''customer'' to its term.
====Customers and service providers====
 
{{drop|N|ow the great}} majority of [[financial contract]]s are between a “''provider''” on one side — a [[bank]], [[broker]] or [[dealer]] providing a ''service'', broadly described: money outright, finance against an asset or a financial exposure — and a ''[[customer]]''” on the other who ''pays'' for that service. The customer is, as ever, king: the service exists for her exclusive benefit: the provider’s only wish is to manage its resources to most efficiently provide that service and extract a [[fee]], [[commission]] or economic [[rent]] by way of [[consideration]] for it.  
But things can change. The customer’s financial prospects may darken. She may turn out not to be as good as her word. The regulatory environment may change, making the services harder or more expensive to provide.
 
Where it is no longer sure of its expected return, the provider must have a set of “weapons” it can use to get out of its contracts. These fall into a bunch of different categories, as we shall see:
 
====Categories of termination====
We would put these “termination scenarios” into three categories: “''without cause''”<ref>You hear these described as “no-fault” terminations, but there is no ''fault'' in a termination brought about by unforeseen externalities, either.</ref>; ''unforeseen external events'' and ''counterparty failure''. This last category — which we might also label “default” — in turn breaks into two: ''direct misbehaviour'', ''indirect credit deterioration'', and [[Merger Without Assumption - ISDA Provision|{{icds}} in-jokes]].
 
There is also an odd category of “''pseudo''-termination” rights that some regulated financial institutions must have, but would never intend to use which, curiously, relate to concerns about its ''own'' solvency. These are a marker of our incipient failure in the [[The Victory of Form over Substance|battle between substance and form]].
 
=====“Without cause”=====
{{drop|T|erminations “without cause”}} arise ''just because'' — no fault, no pressing need; just a gradual drifting apart of interests. As we grow in life, the things we value change. Passions of youth dampen, we tend more towards songs of experience than those of innocent exuberance, and we sing those to a different tune. Here we prescribe a notice period long enough to allow our counterparty to make alternative arrangements it needs to keep its own house in order, but otherwise, we wish each other well and carry along on our way. These will generally be “clean-up” rights and they will exist under framework contracts, not specific transactions, and they will be expressed not to impact on the validity of in-flight services.
 
They are mainly of use to clear out low-value and dormant clients from the administrative record: there may be ongoing credit sanctioning or KYC obligations that the firm would rather not have to keep carrying out on a customer that no longer transacts any business.
 
=====“Pseudo-termination rights”=====
{{drop|W|here you do}} see [[dealer]] rights to terminate on notice without cause these will typically be ''pseudo''-termination rights: here a regulated institution must have the power to terminate transactions for formalistic or regulatory capital reasons, even though it never expects to actually use them.<ref>See here {{isdaprov|Automatic Early Termination}}, which is an extreme example of such pseudo termination right: in that it triggers automatically. Much more to say about that on the {{isdaprov|AET}} page.</ref>  For example, a [[swap dealer]]’s right to terminate a customer’s [[synthetic equity swap]] position on notice. The dealer can thereby treat its exposure as a “short-term obligation” for capital purposes — because it ''could'' get out, if it ''wanted'' to— and this is enough to get optimised regulatory treatment.
 
But a dealer ''having'' such a termination right is a different and distant thing from a sound-minded dealer ever ''exercising'' it. It might be ''forced'' to, in the direst of stress circumstances (where its own survival was threatened) — but in that case, with the dealer teetering, most vigilant customers would likely have long since moved their positions away in any case.
 
=====“Termination Events”: regrettable, but no-one’s fault=====
{{drop|I|t is in}} the nature of uncertainty that unexpected things can happen, Thanks to the machination of events beyond the knowledge or control of either party. [[Force majeure]], [[Change in law|changes in law]], changes in [[tax]]ation and [[regulatory capital]] treatment can make the continued provision of a service uneconomic or impractical.
 
These events, under the ISDA framework, are described as {{isdaprov|Termination Event}}s. They typically are measured {{isdaprov|Transaction}}-by-{{isdaprov|Transaction}}, so do not have the necessary consequence of shutting down ''all'' exposure under the agreement in one fell swoop; only under those {{isdaprov|Transaction}}s which are directly [[Affected Transaction - ISDA Provision|affected]].  
 
Secondly, there is generally more flexibility and leeway granted for the parties to explore workarounds and solutions to avoid having to terminate Transactions, seeing as no one is at fault. So the eventual decision to terminate {{isdaprov|Affected Transactions}}, while regretted, is likely to be arrived at in a state of relative psychological clarity, no malice, and probably even consensus. For the same reason, {{isdaprov|Default Rate}}s of interest do not automatically apply.
 
Thirdly, at least where both parties are {{isdaprov|Affected Parties}}, both will act as {{isdaprov|Determining Party}} to calculate their own replacement costs for the {{isdaprov|Transaction}}, so the ultimate {{isdaprov|Close-out Amount}}s will split the difference and will be situated at a “mid-market” rate rather than on the {{isdaprov|Non-defaulting Party}}’s side of the market. (Of the {{isdaprov|Termination Event}}s, {{isdaprov|Illegality}}, {{isdaprov|Force Majeure Event}} and {{isdaprov|Tax Event}} have ''some'' prospect of affecting both parties. That is less likely for party-specific {{isdaprov|Tax Event Upon Merger}} and {{isdaprov|Credit Event Upon Merger}} events, or for {{isdaprov|Additional Termination Event}}s which tend to be more “credit defaulty”).
 
=====“Default Events”: do we have a problem here?=====
{{drop|T|hen}} there are termination rights that flow from something untoward about your counterparty. These the {{isdaprov|Non-defaulting Party}} exercises unilaterally. This being a contract, the main category of “untoward facts” about your counterparty will be things it promised to do by the express terms of the contract but it has failed to: call these “performance failures”.
 
======Performance failures======
Direct performance failures — in old money, [[breach of contract|breaches of contract]] — tend not to be uncontroversial: if you think “failing to do a certain something” is an unreasonable ground for terminating a contract, you should not agree to do it in the first place.
 
The classic “performance failure” is a [[failure to pay]]. There could hardly be an obligation more “of the essence” of a [[financial contract]] than then rendering in full of what you promised when you promised it.
 
As a result there is little negotiation of payment failure default events. Nor, when it comes to it, is there much room for doubt as to whether one has happened. The payment either settled or it didn’t. Ops can tell you a few minutes after the cut-off time.
 
Ninety-five per cent of all ISDA close-outs — yes, I ''did'' just make that number up out of thin air, but I challenge you to disprove it — are triggered by a {{isdaprov|Failure to Pay or Deliver}}. It rather makes you wonder why we waste so much time haggling over the rest of the Events of Default.<ref>I put it down to “[[Parkinson’s law of triviality]]”: people spend most of their time attending to complicated things that don't matter, because they are take time and make us feel like we have achieved something. See also [[Qixx]]</ref>


[[Parkinson’s law of triviality]] exemplified: there is an inverse relationship between ''how long you will have to argue'' about a given close-out right during onboarding and ''how likely you are to ever have to use'' it.
“Providers” are indifferent to how the instruments they serve perform. They do not mean to be “the other side” of the trade. They are, loosely, ''[[intermediaries]]''. [[Agent|Agents]]. They match risk-takers, collect a fee and wish the parties well without taking sides: they are “[[compassion]]ate”, not “[[Empathy|empathetic]]”. As long as their customers remain in fine fettle, they should never need, much less want, to ''terminate'' their services, for that is how they earn a crust.  


The other direct performance failure {{isdaprov|Events of Default}} are slightly more oblique. Technical non-performance measures that are less “essential” than payment failure tend to have longer cure periods before being actionable: whereas payment failure might have a one-day<ref>Three days under the {{1992ma}}.<> [[grace period]], other breaches of agreement may have a 30 day cure period. <ref>This makes them useless in practice.</ref> Performance failures that imply bad faith, like repudiation, tend to have ''no'' grace period, but it is quite hard to goad a counterparty into committing one of these.  
But all the same we should note something important here: the expectations of parties to a service contract are very different: the customer takes risk and retains the prerogative to go ''off'' risk as she sees fit, as long as she pays the provider’s fees and whatever it needs to terminate the arrangements it made to provide the service in the first place: its “[[breakage costs]]”.


By order of how quickly you can accelerate them, then, here are the {{isdama}}’s “performance failure” {{isdaprov|Events of Default, are:
But [[Ceteris paribus|all else being equal]], a provider ''cannot'' exit a service contract early without the customer’s permission. A fixed term [[financial contract]], binds a ''provider'' in a way it does not bind its ''customer''.  
{{small|80}}
{{tabletopflex|100}}
|+ Itchy Trigger Finger Guide
{{aligntop}}
! Event of Default !!  Section !! Grace period
{{aligntop}}
| {{isdaprov|Repudiation of Agreement}} || {{isdaprov|5(a)(ii)}}(2) ({{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}}) or {{isdaprov|5(a)(iii)}}(3) ({{isdaprov|Credit Support Provider}}) || None.  
{{aligntop}}
| {{isdaprov|Misrepresentation}} || {{isdaprov|5(a)(iv)}} || None.
{{aligntop}}
| {{isdaprov|Credit Support Default}} (Total failure) || {{isdaprov|5(a)(iii)}}(2)|| None.
{{aligntop}}
| {{isdaprov|Failure to Pay or Deliver}} || {{isdaprov|5(a)(i)}} ||One {{isdaprov|Local Business Day}} after due date.
{{aligntop}}
| {{isdaprov|Breach of Agreement}} || {{isdaprov|5(a)(ii)}}(1)|| 30 days after notice of default.
{{aligntop}}
| {{isdaprov|Credit Support Default}} (direct default) || {{isdaprov|5(a)(iii)}}(1)|| Expiry of [[grace period]] in {{isdaprov|Credit Support Document}}.
|}
</div>
Seeing as it has ''no'' grace period, why aren’t {{isdaprov|Repudiation}} or {{isdaprov |Misrepresentation}} more commonly invoked to close out an ISDA then they are (i.e., almost never)? Because it would require not just artless non-performance, but ''bone-headedness''. However dire the situation gets, it remains within a struggling counterparty’s gift to be sensible enough to keep its trap shut and not denounce the contract altogether, or make untrue statements about its own financial condition.<ref>{{isdaprov|Repudiation of Agreement}} does go a bit runny at the edges, however.</ref>


======“Credit deterioration” events======
As long as the customer remains in good health, no problem. But the customer’s general prospects may darken. She may turn out not to be as good as her word. The regulatory environment may change, making the services harder or more costly to provide. There are times where a service provider may, justifiably, want out.
{{drop|D|epending on how}} you look at them, there are between three and four ''indirect'' {{isdaprov|Events of Default}}, that do not require the {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}} to directly fail to perform under the {{isdama}} but rather arise from independent indications that the {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}} shortly might be about to go [[titten hoch]]. These are more fraught, because the evidence for whether they have happened may not be in your possession, if they can even be determined at all.


These are the “credit deterioration” {{isdaprov|Events of Default}}: {{isdaprov|Default Under Specified Transaction}} — where the {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}} has defaulted to the {{isdaprov|Non-defaulting Party}} specifically, only under a separate master trading agreement (such as a stock lending agreement or a repo — these ones you will know about; {{isdaprov|Cross Default}}, when it has defaulted to someone else altogether under an unrelated [[Borrowed money|borrowing arrangement]]and {{isdaprov|Bankruptcy}}, where the {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}} crosses that [[phase transition into formal resolution or protection.
Where it is no longer sure of its expected return, the provider must have a set of “weapons” it can use to get out of its contracts. These fall into a bunch of different categories, as we shall see.


Being less directly connected with the performance of the ISDA itself, these “credit” {{isdaprov|Events of Default}} have the potential for sod’s law. {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} particularly — JC has a long and overblown article about that — but there are aspects of the {{isdaprov|Bankruptcy}} (especially {{isdaprov|Automatic Early Termination}}) that have the potential for severe unintended consequences.
Put these “termination scenarios” into three categories: ''without cause''; ''external events'' and ''counterparty failure''.


How are you meant to know the size of your customer’s private indebtedness, much less that it has categorically defaulted on it? What is a lender has granted a hastily cobbled waiver or amendment? Is it still a default?
====Without cause====
{{drop|T|erminations “without cause”}}<ref>You hear these described as “no-fault” terminations, but there is no ''fault'' in a termination brought about by unforeseen externalities, either.</ref> arise ''just because'' — no fault, no pressing need; just a gradual drifting apart of interests. As we grow in life, the things we value change. Passions of youth dampen, we tend more towards scabrous songs of experience than exuberant songs of innocence. If this should mean our commercial paths diverge, we prescribe a notice period long enough to allow each other to make reasonable alternative arrangements, but otherwise, we wish each other well and carry on our way.


These sorts of [[doubts]] will wrack the credit department. A senior relationship manager will storm in and insist his [[platinum client]] would never default. Any firm not populated in its senior echelons by lizards will sit on its hands. (This excludes Goldman).
“Without cause” termination rights for a service provider will generally be “clean-up” arrangements: to clear out low-value and dormant clientry whose mere presence on the books implies ongoing compliance or operational costs. These rights will not usually impair in-flight Transactions, which a service provider must still see through before it can be allowed to move on.  


=====ISDA in-jokes=====
=====Pseudo-termination rights=====
You might call {{isdaprov|Merger Without Assumption}} — where, through a [[corporate action]] the {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}} is transformed into a different legal entity which is somehow no longer bound by the {{isdama}} at all — as a type of credit deterioration event, but you could also consider it a direct failure under the present contract as well.
[[Dealer]]s sometimes must have rights to terminate in-flight customer Transactions on notice without reason. These will often be “''pseudo”'' rights that a dealer must ''have'' but will never actually ''use''. These rights help to optimise their liquidity and capital buffers, therefore reducing the dealers’ own costs of doing customer business.<ref>See {{isdaprov|Automatic Early Termination}}, which is an extreme example of a pseudo termination right: in that it triggers automatically. Much more to say about that on the {{isdaprov|AET}} page.</ref> For example, a [[swap dealer]]’s right to terminate a customer’s [[synthetic equity swap]] position on (longish) notice. If it has such a right, the dealer can treat its equity swap exposures as a “short-term obligation” for capital purposes — because it ''could'' get out, if it ''wanted'' to — and this is enough to get optimised regulatory treatment.


But the best way of looking at it is as a practical joke. A kind of forensic pun, stuck in there at a dark moment in the sacred [[Wording]] in which , to lighten the mood, someone lobbed in a harmless nonsense. As far as I can tell — and I checked this with the learned author of {{coc}}, and my young apprentice , and they both agree — Merger Without Assumption as articulated in the {{isdama}} is basically a practical joke.  
But a sound-minded dealer ''having'' such a termination right is a different and distant thing from ever ''exercising'' it. It might be ''forced'' to, in the direst of stress circumstances, where its own survival was threatened — we are in [[Lehman|September 2008]] territory here — but in that case, with the dealer teetering, most vigilant customers would be moving valuable positions away in any case.  


There is never a time at which one could exercise a {{isdaprov|Merger Without Assumption}} {{isdaprov|Event of Default}}.
Pseudo-termination rights, in that [[Dealer|dealers]] absolutely must ''have'' them but would never ''use'' them, are a marker of incipient failure in the [[The Victory of Form over Substance|battle between substance and form]]. What matters is that the termination right exists, not that it is ever used. It is sometimes hard to persuade neurotic buy side types that such termination rights are harmless, but in large part they are.

Latest revision as of 14:53, 1 November 2024

Commerce gives the lie to the idea that life is a zero-sum game. This was Adam Smith’s great insight: things need not be nasty, brutish and short and, when it comes to commerce, generally aren’t.

Each of us will only strike a bargain if we think, on our own terms, we’ll be better off as a result. That being so, once we’ve built a good business relationship, there is no good reason to end it. All being well, trade is an infinite game. If we are good enough at it, we can keep its positive feedback loop going, for the mutual betterment of everyone, indefinitely. Infinitely, even.

Therefore, we wish our relationships well and pray Godspeed for their long and fruity lives. Should the plums dangling from this or that branch shrivel; if things become more trouble than they’re worth, we can of course call time and bid our relationship a peaceful transition to the hereafter.

But still, things do not always work out quite so equably. Sometimes, an ill wind blows. Relationships become fraught, counterparties get themselves in a pickle.

Therefore, we pack our trunk with tools, implements and weapons with which, if we must, we can engineer a faster exit from our contracts.

There are a few different ways this can happen. While lawyers will happily rabbit on about these hypotheticals in the gruesome specific, we do not talk about them in general terms often enough. So let’s do that now.

Below, we count the types of ways to safely put a commercial relationship in the ground.

Customers and service providers

Now the great majority of financial contracts are between a “provider” on one side — a bank, broker or dealer providing a “service”, broadly described: money outright, finance against an asset or a financial exposure — and a “customer” on the other who pays for that service. The customer is, as ever, king: the service exists for her exclusive benefit: the provider’s only wish is to manage its resources to most efficiently provide that service and extract a fee, commission or economic rent by way of consideration for it.

“Providers” are indifferent to how the instruments they serve perform. They do not mean to be “the other side” of the trade. They are, loosely, intermediaries. Agents. They match risk-takers, collect a fee and wish the parties well without taking sides: they are “compassionate”, not “empathetic”. As long as their customers remain in fine fettle, they should never need, much less want, to terminate their services, for that is how they earn a crust.

But all the same we should note something important here: the expectations of parties to a service contract are very different: the customer takes risk and retains the prerogative to go off risk as she sees fit, as long as she pays the provider’s fees and whatever it needs to terminate the arrangements it made to provide the service in the first place: its “breakage costs”.

But all else being equal, a provider cannot exit a service contract early without the customer’s permission. A fixed term financial contract, binds a provider in a way it does not bind its customer.

As long as the customer remains in good health, no problem. But the customer’s general prospects may darken. She may turn out not to be as good as her word. The regulatory environment may change, making the services harder or more costly to provide. There are times where a service provider may, justifiably, want out.

Where it is no longer sure of its expected return, the provider must have a set of “weapons” it can use to get out of its contracts. These fall into a bunch of different categories, as we shall see.

Put these “termination scenarios” into three categories: without cause; external events and counterparty failure.

Without cause

Terminations “without cause”[1] arise just because — no fault, no pressing need; just a gradual drifting apart of interests. As we grow in life, the things we value change. Passions of youth dampen, we tend more towards scabrous songs of experience than exuberant songs of innocence. If this should mean our commercial paths diverge, we prescribe a notice period long enough to allow each other to make reasonable alternative arrangements, but otherwise, we wish each other well and carry on our way.

“Without cause” termination rights for a service provider will generally be “clean-up” arrangements: to clear out low-value and dormant clientry whose mere presence on the books implies ongoing compliance or operational costs. These rights will not usually impair in-flight Transactions, which a service provider must still see through before it can be allowed to move on.

Pseudo-termination rights

Dealers sometimes must have rights to terminate in-flight customer Transactions on notice without reason. These will often be “pseudo” rights that a dealer must have but will never actually use. These rights help to optimise their liquidity and capital buffers, therefore reducing the dealers’ own costs of doing customer business.[2] For example, a swap dealer’s right to terminate a customer’s synthetic equity swap position on (longish) notice. If it has such a right, the dealer can treat its equity swap exposures as a “short-term obligation” for capital purposes — because it could get out, if it wanted to — and this is enough to get optimised regulatory treatment.

But a sound-minded dealer having such a termination right is a different and distant thing from ever exercising it. It might be forced to, in the direst of stress circumstances, where its own survival was threatened — we are in September 2008 territory here — but in that case, with the dealer teetering, most vigilant customers would be moving valuable positions away in any case.

Pseudo-termination rights, in that dealers absolutely must have them but would never use them, are a marker of incipient failure in the battle between substance and form. What matters is that the termination right exists, not that it is ever used. It is sometimes hard to persuade neurotic buy side types that such termination rights are harmless, but in large part they are.

  1. You hear these described as “no-fault” terminations, but there is no fault in a termination brought about by unforeseen externalities, either.
  2. See Automatic Early Termination, which is an extreme example of a pseudo termination right: in that it triggers automatically. Much more to say about that on the AET page.