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| [[Know your customer]] is just a part of the [[anti-money laundering]] compliance procedures that any regulated financial services provider anywhere in the world must undergo. These days it is a serious, onerous business, and it means [[on-boarding]] a client, and keeping it on-boarded, is a tremendous pain in the arse. Which makes you wonder why you still get account statements from that Halifax account you closed in 2004 but that is another story. | | {{g}}[[Know your customer]] is just a part of the [[anti-money laundering]] compliance procedures that any regulated financial services provider anywhere in the world must undergo. These days it is a serious, onerous business, and it means [[on-boarding]] a client, and keeping it on-boarded, is a tremendous pain in the arse. Which makes you wonder why you still get statements from Halifax relating to an account you closed in 2004 but that is another story. |
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| {{seealso}}
| | Is anti-money laundering “the world’s lease effective policy experiment?” |
| *[[Anti-money laundering]]
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| *[[On-boarding]]
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| *[[FATF]] and [[OFAC]]
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| | {{author|Ron Pol}} thinks so: |
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| Some source materials for [[anti-money laundering]] regulation:
| | {{quote|“... the anti-money laundering policy intervention has less than 0.1 percent impact on criminal finances, compliance costs exceed recovered criminal funds more than a hundred times over, and banks, taxpayers and ordinary citizens are penalized more than criminal enterprises. The data are poorly validated and methodological inconsistencies rife, so findings cannot be definitive, but there is a huge gap between policy intent and results.” |
| | :—Abstract, ''[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339486326_Anti-money_laundering_The_world's_least_effective_policy_experiment_Together_we_can_fix_it/fulltext/5e55561e4585152ce8ee54c5/Anti-money-laundering-The-worlds-least-effective-policy-experiment-Together-we-can-fix-it.pdf Anti-money laundering: The world’s least effective policy experiment? Together, we can fix it]'', 2020}} |
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| *Clause 7 of the [http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/2157/regulation/7/made Anti-Money Laundering Regulations 2007]
| | Hard to argue, though the [[Basel Accords|Basel]] rules on [[close-out netting]] run it fairly close. |
| *The [[Financial Action Task Force]] [http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html Recommendations] which countries should implement in order to combat [[money laundering]] and terrorist financing, as well as the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
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| *The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group [http://www.jmlsg.org.uk/ Guidance] as to good practice in countering money laundering and to give practical assistance in interpreting the UK Money Laundering Regulations. This is primarily achieved by the publication of industry guidance.
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| *the [[Wolfsberg]] [http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/ principles] for financial services industry standards, and related products, for [[know your customer]], [[anti-money laundering]] and Counter Terrorist Financing policies
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| *[[EU]] rules on AML as to which see [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-crime/index_en.htm here].
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| {{quote|
| | [https://www.amlassurance.com/uploads/2/1/1/6/21169026/pol_2019_acc_docket_almost_completely_ineffective.pdf This], in which Dr Pol summarises the paper, in nuggets designed for the attention span of [[inhouse counsel]], would be amusing were it not so distressing. |
| ====Application of customer due diligence measures====
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| 7.—(1) Subject to regulations 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16(4) and 17, a relevant person must apply customer due diligence measures when he—
| | {{sa}} |
| ::(a) establishes a business relationship; <br>
| | *[[Anti-money laundering]] |
| ::(b) carries out an occasional transaction; <br>
| | *[[On-boarding]] |
| ::(c) suspects money laundering or terrorist financing; <br>
| | *[[FATF]] and [[OFAC]] |
| ::(d) doubts the veracity or adequacy of documents, data or information previously obtained for the purposes of identification or verification. <br>
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| :(2) Subject to regulation 16(4), a relevant person must also apply customer due diligence measures at other appropriate times to existing customers on a risk-sensitive basis. <br>
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| :(3) A relevant person must— <br>
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| ::(a) determine the extent of customer due diligence measures on a risk-sensitive basis depending on the type of customer, business relationship, product or transaction; and <br>
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| ::(b) be able to demonstrate to his supervisory authority that the extent of the measures is appropriate in view of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. <br>
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| :(4) Where— <br>
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| ::(a) a relevant person is required to apply customer due diligence measures in the case of a trust, legal entity (other than a body corporate) or a legal arrangement (other than a trust); and <br>
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| ::(b) the class of persons in whose main interest the trust, entity or arrangement is set up or operates is identified as a beneficial owner, <br>
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| the relevant person is not required to identify all the members of the class. <br>
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| :(5) Paragraph (3)(b) does not apply to the National Savings Bank or the Director of Savings.
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| [...] | |
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| ====Timing of verification====
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| 9.—(1) This regulation applies in respect of the duty under regulation 7(1)(a) and (b) to apply the customer due diligence measures referred to in regulation 5(a) and (b). <br>
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| :(2) Subject to paragraphs (3) to (5) and regulation 10, a relevant person must verify the identity of the customer (and any beneficial owner) before the establishment of a business relationship or the carrying out of an occasional transaction. <br>
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| :(3) Such verification may be completed during the establishment of a business relationship if— <br>
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| ::(a) this is necessary not to interrupt the normal conduct of business; and <br>
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| ::(b) there is little risk of money laundering or terrorist financing occurring, <br>
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| :provided that the verification is completed as soon as practicable after contact is first established. <br>
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| ::(4) The verification of the identity of the beneficiary under a life insurance policy may take place after the business relationship has been established provided that it takes place at or before the time of payout or at or before the time the beneficiary exercises a right vested under the policy. <br>
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| :(5) The verification of the identity of a bank account holder may take place after the bank account has been opened provided that there are adequate safeguards in place to ensure that— <br>
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| ::(a) the account is not closed; and <br>
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| ::(b) transactions are not carried out by or on behalf of the account holder (including any payment from the account to the account holder), before verification has been completed. <br> }}
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Index — Click the ᐅ to expand:
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Know your customer is just a part of the anti-money laundering compliance procedures that any regulated financial services provider anywhere in the world must undergo. These days it is a serious, onerous business, and it means on-boarding a client, and keeping it on-boarded, is a tremendous pain in the arse. Which makes you wonder why you still get statements from Halifax relating to an account you closed in 2004 but that is another story.
Is anti-money laundering “the world’s lease effective policy experiment?”
Ron Pol thinks so:
“... the anti-money laundering policy intervention has less than 0.1 percent impact on criminal finances, compliance costs exceed recovered criminal funds more than a hundred times over, and banks, taxpayers and ordinary citizens are penalized more than criminal enterprises. The data are poorly validated and methodological inconsistencies rife, so findings cannot be definitive, but there is a huge gap between policy intent and results.”
- —Abstract, Anti-money laundering: The world’s least effective policy experiment? Together, we can fix it, 2020
Hard to argue, though the Basel rules on close-out netting run it fairly close.
This, in which Dr Pol summarises the paper, in nuggets designed for the attention span of inhouse counsel, would be amusing were it not so distressing.
See also