Template:Adrs and sanctions: Difference between revisions
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===[[Depositary receipt]]s and hostile governmental action=== | ===[[Depositary receipt]]s and hostile governmental action=== | ||
Now imagine that rather than [[Nationalization, Insolvency and Delisting - Equity Derivatives Provision| | Now imagine that rather than [[Nationalization, Insolvency and Delisting - Equity Derivatives Provision|nationalizing]], a national government announced some draconian law preventing corporations in its jurisdiction from accessing the international capital markets even through [[depositary receipt]] programmes — you know, something crazy like that.<ref>Attentive readers may wonder whether this is really a figment of the [[JC]]’s imagination, or something the Russian State ''Duma'' actually did, in April 2022.</ref> So say, ooh: the DRs must be converted into underlying shares within a stipulated period, failing which the underlying shares lose their dividend and voting rights<ref>And therefore become largely worthless: they entitle a holder to a pro-rata share of the {{eqderivprov|Issuer}}’s assets on a ''non-insolvent winding up'' or something like that — but who ever wound up a non-insolvent company?</ref> | ||
The common sense (and economically correct) answer is “however it shakes out, this is all the customer’s risk” — remember the synthetic equity mantra: ''this is just equity brokerage done with swaps''. Imagine what would happen, dear customer, had your broker sold you the ADR outright, a year ago, and now it has been unwound by wartime governmental manoeuvre. Whose problem would that be? Not your [[equity broker]]’s, for sure. | The common sense (and economically correct) answer is “however it shakes out, this is all the customer’s risk” — remember the synthetic equity mantra: ''this is just equity brokerage done with swaps''. Imagine what would happen, dear customer, had your broker sold you the ADR outright, a year ago, and now it has been unwound by wartime governmental manoeuvre. Whose problem would that be? Not your [[equity broker]]’s, for sure. | ||
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:*Isn’t a {{eqderivprov|nationalization}} | :*Isn’t a {{eqderivprov|nationalization}} | ||
:*Isn’t an [[insolvency]] | :*Isn’t an [[insolvency]] | ||
:*It isn’t *inherently* a delisting (though ''de facto'' almost certainly will be as the international (...er ''hostile''?...) {{eqderivprov|Exchange}}s will most likely delist the | :*It isn’t *inherently* a [[Delisting - Equity Derivatives Provision|delisting]] (though ''de facto'' almost certainly will be as the international (...er ''hostile''?...) {{eqderivprov|Exchange}}s will most likely delist the [[DR]]s, but they don’t ''have'' to) | ||
*'''{{eqderivprov|Triple Cocktail}}''' | *'''{{eqderivprov|Triple Cocktail}}''' | ||
:*It isn’t a {{eqderivprov|Change in Law}} as that refers to laws impacting the counterparties to the trade, not the {{eqderivprov|Issuer}}; | :*It isn’t a {{eqderivprov|Change in Law}} as that refers to laws impacting the counterparties to the trade, not the {{eqderivprov|Issuer}}; | ||
Latest revision as of 17:15, 21 April 2022
Depositary receipts and hostile governmental action
Now imagine that rather than nationalizing, a national government announced some draconian law preventing corporations in its jurisdiction from accessing the international capital markets even through depositary receipt programmes — you know, something crazy like that.[1] So say, ooh: the DRs must be converted into underlying shares within a stipulated period, failing which the underlying shares lose their dividend and voting rights[2]
The common sense (and economically correct) answer is “however it shakes out, this is all the customer’s risk” — remember the synthetic equity mantra: this is just equity brokerage done with swaps. Imagine what would happen, dear customer, had your broker sold you the ADR outright, a year ago, and now it has been unwound by wartime governmental manoeuvre. Whose problem would that be? Not your equity broker’s, for sure.
That said, the 2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions don’t do a magnificent job of specifically dealing with what is undoubtedly an extremely far-fetched situation. For once, we should not be too exacting on ISDA’s crack drafting squad™. I mean, who ever heard of a government forcing local issuers to unwind their GDRs just to spite hostile foreign investors?
So, anyway, you are a swap dealer, everything is messy as hell, tanks are unexpectedly rolling across foreign lands somewhere, and now your customer is on the horn asking what the hell is going on. You, naturally, will be as accommodating and constructive as you can in looking for outcomes for your client in such devilish times, but would still like the peace of mind of knowing, should everything go titten hoch, you can cancel the swap and walk away, paying a nugatory Cancellation Amount based on the worthlessness of the underliers. How can you?
- Nationalization, Insolvency and Delisting: this probably:
- Isn’t a nationalization
- Isn’t an insolvency
- It isn’t *inherently* a delisting (though de facto almost certainly will be as the international (...er hostile?...) Exchanges will most likely delist the DRs, but they don’t have to)
- It isn’t a Change in Law as that refers to laws impacting the counterparties to the trade, not the Issuer;
- It isn’t an Increased Cost of Hedging. well — it just isn’t, is it?
- It may be a Hedging Disruption – I mean it is hard to hedge an instrument that has just been compusorily dissolved, right? — though is disappearance of an instrument altogether so that there is nothing to replicate the return of at all really just a hedge disruption?
Also useful at least by way of analogy is “Tender Offer”. It’s not quite on point – but close, and perhaps useful by way of analogy should you have counterparties that are in denial about the fact that, from a very basic standpoint, they are the ones that are long local “craziest regulator in the room” risk, and not their long-suffering swap dealer.
- ↑ Attentive readers may wonder whether this is really a figment of the JC’s imagination, or something the Russian State Duma actually did, in April 2022.
- ↑ And therefore become largely worthless: they entitle a holder to a pro-rata share of the Issuer’s assets on a non-insolvent winding up or something like that — but who ever wound up a non-insolvent company?