Template:Obligations binding as a representation: Difference between revisions

From The Jolly Contrarian
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Created page with "You may see assiduous types striking out an representation or warranty that its own contractual obligations are “legal, valid, binding and enforceable in accordance with their terms”. The grounds will be the technical one that “the question of whether a contract is enforceable or not is one of law, not fact, and therefore is a fit subject for a legal opinion, not a factual representation. I, the client, on whom this contract will — or, wh..."
 
No edit summary
 
Line 1: Line 1:
You may see [[Pedantry|assiduous]] types striking out an [[representation]] or [[warranty]] that its own contractual obligations are “legal, [[valid, binding and enforceable]] in accordance with their terms”. The grounds will be the technical one that “the question of whether a contract is enforceable or not is one of law, not fact, and therefore is a fit subject for a legal opinion, not a factual representation. I, the client, on whom this contract will — or, who knows? will not — be binding, am not qualified to opine on that.
You may see [[Pedantry|assiduous]] types striking out a [[representation]] or [[warranty]] that its own contractual obligations are “legal, [[valid, binding and enforceable]] in accordance with their terms”.  
 
The grounds for resisting such an obvious and evidently harmless statement will be the technical one that “the question of whether a contract is enforceable or not is one of law, not fact, and therefore is a fit subject for a [[legal opinion]], not a factual [[representation]]. I, the client, on whom this contract will — or, who knows? will not — be binding, am not qualified to opine on that.


''Phooey and nonsense''.  
''Phooey and nonsense''.  


When she deals, a merchant takes outright ownership of her business affairs. This includes their legal consequences. She takes legally significant actions all day, on every day. We ''all'' do. She may be ''advised'' by her lawyers, on especially tricky ones, when she does, but the statement that a merchant who stands ready to ''take'' the undeniable ''value'' presented to her a new contract, but is not prepared to swear on her mother’s favourite cotton jumper that the obligations she is promising to ''give'' in ''return'' for that benefit — you know, ''literally'' promising to give — will be enforceable to the full extent of the law, is ''patently absurd''.
When she deals, a merchant takes outright ownership of her business affairs. This includes their legal consequences. She takes legally significant actions all day, on every day. We ''all'' do. She may be ''advised'' by her lawyers, on especially tricky ones, when she does, but the statement that a merchant who stands ready to ''take'' the undeniable ''value'' presented to her a new contract, but is not prepared to swear on her mother’s favourite cotton jumper that the obligations she is promising to ''give'' in ''return'' for that benefit — you know, ''literally'' promising to give — will be enforceable to the full extent of the law, is ''patently absurd''.

Latest revision as of 16:03, 15 September 2023

You may see assiduous types striking out a representation or warranty that its own contractual obligations are “legal, valid, binding and enforceable in accordance with their terms”.

The grounds for resisting such an obvious and evidently harmless statement will be the technical one that “the question of whether a contract is enforceable or not is one of law, not fact, and therefore is a fit subject for a legal opinion, not a factual representation. I, the client, on whom this contract will — or, who knows? will not — be binding, am not qualified to opine on that.

Phooey and nonsense.

When she deals, a merchant takes outright ownership of her business affairs. This includes their legal consequences. She takes legally significant actions all day, on every day. We all do. She may be advised by her lawyers, on especially tricky ones, when she does, but the statement that a merchant who stands ready to take the undeniable value presented to her a new contract, but is not prepared to swear on her mother’s favourite cotton jumper that the obligations she is promising to give in return for that benefit — you know, literally promising to give — will be enforceable to the full extent of the law, is patently absurd.