Template:M intro isda tail events: Difference between revisions

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{{Quote|“A portfolio of [[asset-backed securities]] cannot,” a commodities trader would say, “suffer water damage. They do not rust.”}}
{{Quote|“A portfolio of [[asset-backed securities]] cannot,” a commodities trader would say, “suffer water damage. They do not rust.”}}


Not having to deal with rust, water damage, and manufacturing defect simplifies the business of investing. The ''effects'' of these events are supposed to play out in the information layer , and translate efficiently into the prices at which related instruments trade. If an oil company’s tanker is wrecked, it's share price declines.  
Not having to deal with rust, water damage, and manufacturing defect simplifies the business of investing. The ''effects'' of these events are supposed to play out in the information layer, and translate efficiently into the prices at which related instruments trade. If an oil company’s tanker is wrecked, its share price declines.  


It is tempting to infer information from price: to put a drop in the market to “unexpectedly soft non-farm payroll data”. Many people make a living reading tea-leaves in this way.  
It is tempting to infer information from price: to put a drop in the market to “unexpectedly soft non-farm payroll data”. Many people make a living reading tea-leaves in this way.  


From this price information we can ''derive'' a relationship between transactions — price went up, price stayed the same, price went down — and a ''trend''. A trend is a stab at extracting a [[signal]] from the [[noise]].
From this price information we can ''derive'' a relationship between transactions — price went up, price stayed the same, price went down — and a ''trend''. A trend is a stab at extracting a signal from the noise.


The [[signal]] depends on a theory of the game,  Otherwise the “relationship” between the two discrete transactions is arbitrary. Without a theory, everything is [[noise]].  
The [[Signal-to-noise ratio|signal]] depends on a theory of the game: otherwise the “relationship” between the two discrete transactions is arbitrary.
 
Without a theory, ''everything is noise''.  
=====The theory-dependence of signal=====
=====The theory-dependence of signal=====
If events are truly “independent” — in a first order sense, they are: the participants in the later trade do not know who or where the participants in the earlier even are, let alone what their motivations for trading were — then any “trend” we draw between them beyond their distribution is, more or less, meaningless. All that is left is mathematics.  
If events are truly “independent” then any “trend” we draw between them beyond their distribution is, more or less, meaningless.  In a first order sense, market events are independent: the participants in the later trade do not know who or where the participants in the earlier even are, let alone what their motivations for trading were. All we have is a theory and some mathematics. But we draw the line all the same. We make assumptions: the market is homogeneous; all participants have similar price information; all are propelled by the same rationale. No trader sells things she expects to do well, or buys things she expects to do badly.  
 
But we have a theory, so we draw the line all the same. We assume the market is homogeneous, that all participants have similar price information — those who have more are forbidden to trade — and that all are propelled by the same rationale: you don’t sell things you expect to do well, and you don’t buy things you expect to do badly.  


=====Private narratives wash out=====
=====Private narratives wash out=====
Given these assumptions, across the market investors’ private motivations, opinions, theories and idiosyncrasies cancel out — they are like the [[Brownian motion]] of molecules in a [[nice hot cup of tea]]. They are reversions to the [[entropy|entropic mean]]; baseline white noise — so we can disregard them. Which is just as well for the complexity of our models. Until it isn’t.
Given these assumptions, individual investors’ private motivations, opinions, theories and idiosyncrasies cancel each other out, so we can disregard them. They are like the [[Brownian motion]] of molecules in a [[nice hot cup of tea]]: reversions to the [[entropy|entropic mean]]; baseline white noise. This is just as well, because otherwise our models would not work. We can ignore individual sentiments because they don’t matter. Until they do.
 
Put another way: although the “interconnectedness” of similar transactions means they do ''not'' have the quality of independence that [[normal distributions]] require, most of the time it’s close enough: the information is chaotic — as traders say, “noisy” — in the immediate term, here the dissimilarities between trader motivations are most pronounced, but over a large aggregation of trades and a longer period a “signal” emerges. This is what [[Black-Scholes option pricing model|Black-Scholes]], volatility and convexity models track: as long as all traders all use the same aggregated market information — and the market works hard to ensure they do — a “normal” probabilistic model<ref>I am working hard not to use the intimidating term [[stochastic]]” here by the way.</ref> works fairly well. It’s not a bad ''model''.  


We treat professional market participants as a largely homogenous group from which emerges, over time, a [[signal]]. Almost like, you know, like an ''invisible hand'' is guiding the market.
Put another way: although the “interconnectedness” of similar transactions means they do ''not'' have the quality of independence that a [[normal distribution]] requires, most of the time they ''pretty much'' do: information is chaotic in the immediate term, here the dissimilarities between trader motivations are most pronounced, but over a large aggregation of trades and a longer period a “signal” emerges. This is what [[Black-Scholes option pricing model|Black-Scholes]], volatility and convexity models track: as long as all traders all use the same aggregated market information — and the market works hard to ensure they do — a “normal” probabilistic model works fairly well. It’s not a bad ''model''.  


This is good: it gets our model out of the gate. If investors were not broadly homogeneous, our probability models would not work. “The average height of every item in this shed” is not a particularly useful calculation. Which way the causal arrow flows — whether signal drives theory or theory determines what counts as a signal — is an open question.
So we treat professional market participants as a largely homogenous group from which emerges, over time, a [[signal]]. Almost like, you know, like an ''invisible hand'' is guiding the market. This gets our model out of the gate. If investors were not broadly homogeneous, our models would not work. “The average height of every item in this shed” is not a particularly useful calculation. Which way the causal arrow flows — whether signal drives theory or theory determines what counts as a signal — is an open question.


But there is a second-order sense in which the earlier and later trades ''are'' related, in practice: the later participants know about the earlier trade and its price — it is part of that universal corpus of market information, deemed known by all, it informs price formation process: all can thereby infer the trend from prior trades — and use this abstract information to form their [[bid]] or [[ask]].  
But there is a second-order sense in which the earlier and later trades ''are'' related, in practice: the later participants know about the earlier trade and its price — it is part of that universal corpus of market information, deemed known by all, it informs price formation process: all can thereby infer the trend from prior trades — and use this abstract information to form their [[bid]] or [[ask]].