Template:Critical theory, modernism and the death of objective truth: Difference between revisions

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Nor is it clear to which “transcendent truth” he appeals. It does not seem to be “the veracity of modern aerodynamics” — the finer points of which were not worked out when {{Plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Pearse|Richard Pearse}} took his first flight and are in any case quite lost on birds — so that kind of truth is not needed to take a flight. It may be nothing more than the simple statement that “planes seem to go up and come down reliably enough that I am prepared to get in one”.  
Nor is it clear to which “transcendent truth” he appeals. It does not seem to be “the veracity of modern aerodynamics” — the finer points of which were not worked out when {{Plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Pearse|Richard Pearse}} took his first flight and are in any case quite lost on birds — so that kind of truth is not needed to take a flight. It may be nothing more than the simple statement that “planes seem to go up and come down reliably enough that I am prepared to get in one”.  


One can have any number of reasons for believing that planes fly: “scientists are clever and they figured it out”, “it’s magic!”, “St. Christopher watches over all travellers” or just, “a cursory glance at the statistics tells me the probability of planes falling randomly out of the sky has declined markedly since the nineteen-sixties, and there is now less than a one-in-a million chance I’ll die on a passenger flight. I care not why.”
One can have any number of reasons for believing that planes fly: “scientists are clever and they figured it out”, “it’s magic!”, “St. Christopher watches over all travellers” or just, “a cursory glance at the statistics tells me the probability of planes falling randomly out of the sky has declined markedly since the nineteen-sixties, and there is now less than a one-in-a-million chance I’ll die on a passenger flight. I care not why.”


The statistics were not always as good. We imagine fewer would have volunteered for a backsie on Pearse’s ''Improved Aerial Flying Machine'' in April 1903 than would be prepared to ride in an Airbus now — though maybe not a 737 MAX — and this has nothing to do with changes in the laws of aerodynamics.
The statistics were not always as good. We imagine fewer would have volunteered for a backsie on Pearse’s ''Improved Aerial Flying Machine'' in April 1903 than would be prepared to ride in an Airbus now — though maybe not a 737 MAX — and this has nothing to do with changes in the laws of aerodynamics.
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{{Quote|Show me a Simonyi Professor for the Public Understanding of Science who is not prepared to jump off the Eiger in a wingsuit, and I’ll show you a hypocrite.}}
{{Quote|Show me a Simonyi Professor for the Public Understanding of Science who is not prepared to jump off the Eiger in a wingsuit, and I’ll show you a hypocrite.}}


In any case, the important belief here is that “this ''particular'' plane won’t fall out of the sky ''in the immediate future''”, and — inductive fallacy again — until that immediate future becomes the past and it turns out not to have, no one knows for sure whether the statement will turn out to be true.


In any case the important belief here is that ,“this ''particular'' plane won’t fall out of the sky”, and — inductive fallacy again — until it turns out not to have, no one actually knows whether that is true. It may, fall out of the sky for reasons quite unrelated to aerodynamics. We are taking an awful lot of things, over and above aerodynamics, on trust. That the ground-crew remembered to put the petrol cap on. That there are no undiscovered stress fractures in the fuselage, no surface-to-air-missiles launched at the plane , the airline has not secretly changed the aircraft’s flight path without telling the pilot — and so on. Experience tells us none of these things are a certainty.
It may fall out of the sky for reasons quite unrelated to aerodynamics. An air passenger takes an awful lot of things, over and above aerodynamics, on ''trust'': that the ground-crew remembered to fill the tank and replace the petrol cap.<ref>{{Plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Transat_Flight_236|Air Transat Flight 236, 2001}}.</ref> That there are no undetected stress fractures in the fuselage.<ref>{{plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BOAC_Flight_781|BOAC Flight 781}}.</ref> That no surface-to-air-missiles are launched at the plane.<ref>{{plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Lines_Flight_007|Korean Airlines Flight 007, 1983}}.</ref> That airline has not secretly changed the aircraft’s flight path without telling the pilot<ref>{{plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_Erebus_disaster|Air New Zealand Flight 901}}.</ref> — and so on. Experience tells us none of these things are a certainty.


The fact, if we have to talk about facts, is this: millions of people get aboard giant compressed tubes and catapult themselves across the planet each year because they have blind trust that everything will be okay if they do, and not because of their considered opinions of the plane’s aerodynamic design.
The fact, if we have to talk about facts, is this: millions of people get aboard giant compressed tubes and catapult themselves across the planet each year because they have blind trust that everything will be okay if they do, and not because of their considered opinions of the plane’s aerodynamic design.


In fact a relativist does not need faith in the objective truth of aerodynamics but only its ''regularity''. We do not board planes at 30,000 feet, but on the ground. An aeroplane that could not fly would not get ''off'' the ground, and so would have have a hard time falling back onto it, unless some aerodynamic principle putting it there was at play. It does not matter what that aerodynamic principle is, as long as it keeps working until the flight is over.
A [[cultural relativist]] does not need faith in the objective truth of aerodynamics but only its ''regularity''. We do not board planes at 30,000 feet but ''on the ground''. An aeroplane that could not fly would not get ''off'' the ground, and so would have a hard time falling back onto it. ''Some'' aerodynamic principle must be at play to get a plane into the air. To the average punter it does not matter what that principle is, nor even whether the aeroplane’s designer was mistaken about it, as long as it keeps working until the flight is over.


Our postmodernist might even be an aircraft engineer with a degree in advanced aeronautics, and might have good grounds to think it an excellent model based on known data. She just holds that opinion with a caveat: the conclusion is inductive, can't be proven, and is therefore
And our [[cultural relativist]] might even be an aircraft engineer with a degree in advanced aerodynamics and good grounds for believing the plane’s design to be an excellent based on known data. She just needs to hold her opinions provisionally, recognising that, as with all knowledge arrived at through induction it cannot be proven, and is by nature ''subject to revision''.  
by nature ''provisional''. After all, the history of science is of astounding discoveries that reveal the universe does not work the way the cleverest scientists hitherto thought it did.  


Given the brightest minds still can’t reconcile the physics of atoms with that of galaxies, and neither provides a great explanation of what we experience at a human scale when we get in planes, we can’t really blame the relativist for arching an eyebrow at Professor Dawkins and his purported certainty. It seems rather a matter of ''faith''.<ref>If you need further evidence of the bad place modern cosmology finds itself in, try this: “{{plainlink|https://www.newscientist.com/article/2433294-time-may-be-an-illusion-created-by-quantum-entanglement/|Time may be an illusion created by quantum entanglement}}:
After all, Science’s history is of astounding hypotheticals that up-end the previously-settled wisdom of the world’s cleverest scientists. And for all Professor Dawkins’s grumbling,  JC is not aware of any university physics department that has closed yet on account of mission completion.
The true nature of time has eluded physicists for centuries, but a new theoretical model suggests it may only exist due to entanglement between quantum objects” — ''New Scientist'', 31 May 2024</ref>


So hand wavey appeals to planes, or desks, or throwing ourselves out the window, don’t advance the argument about ''truth''.
It isn’t like we ''need'' truth, after all. All relativism asks is that when we talk about “knowledge” we don’t overstate our case: that we downgrade unjustifiable statements about ''Platonic forms'' to pragmatic statements of ''present fitness''. These are matters of ''consensus'', not ''truth''.  Truth is a platonic, static forever that we are stuck with, for better or worse. We can tinker about with consensus.


There is an irony here: materialist philosophers have grappled ineffectually at the question of consciousness, because it seems to defy scientific explanation: it gets in the way of the Platonic, materialist idea that there are forms, we just can’t directly apprehend them, but that science and rationalism are somehow allowing us covertly to converge, by increments, on the these ideal forms — the fundamental truth of the cosmos.
Relegating ourselves to consensus is no great concession.
 
The general vibe is therefore to define consciousness away — to make it an illusion, a trick of the mind. Algorithms appear to open that door: we can replicate intelligence without consciousness then perhaps consciousness disappears in a puff of logic.
 
But preserving ''truth'' at the expense of ''consciousness'' is surely to throw out the baby and keep the bathwater. The relativist says, why not keep the idea of consciousness and give up on truth?
 
It isn’t like we ''need'' it, after all. All the relativist asks is that when we talk about knowledge we don’t overstate our case: that we downgrade unjustifiable statements about ''forms'' to pragmatic statements of ''fitness''. Functionally, stopping with “it works as far as we know” is not a grea~t concession. JC is not aware of any university that has yet closed its physics department on account of completion of its mission.


====Sociological quibbles====
====Sociological quibbles====
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