Template:Critical theory, modernism and the death of objective truth: Difference between revisions

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We ''trust'' the regularity of established systems. If we did not, we would not use them. (Trust is an important factor in all social relationships.)
We ''trust'' the regularity of established systems. If we did not, we would not use them. (Trust is an important factor in all social relationships.)


It isn’t like we ''need'' truth, after all. All relativism asks is that when we talk about “knowledge” we don’t overstate our case: that we downgrade unjustifiable statements about ''Platonic forms'' to pragmatic statements of ''present fitness''. These are matters of ''consensus'', not ''truth''.  Truth is a platonic, static forever that we are stuck with, for better or worse. We can tinker about with consensus.
It isn’t like we ''need'' truth, after all. All relativism asks is that when we talk about “knowledge” we don’t overstate our case: that we downgrade unjustifiable statements about ''Platonic forms'' to pragmatic statements of ''present fitness''. These are matters of ''consensus'', not ''truth''.  Truth is a platonic, static forever that we are stuck with, for better or worse. We can tinker about with consensus.
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====Sociological quibbles====
====Sociological quibbles====
{{Drop|I|n any case}}, generalised observations about the typical behaviour of physical objects at the human scale of interaction are not the sorts of things postmodernists tend to disagree about. As Professor Dawkins observes, relativists ''do'' get on planes. Even if you could establish aerodynamics were true — as per the above, you can’t — it would not establish anything about the sorts of things post modernists ''do'' disagree about.
{{Drop|I|n any case}}, generalised observations about how physical objects behave at everyday scales are not the sorts of “personal truths” postmodernists tend to disagree about.  
 
As Professor Dawkins observes, relativists ''do'' get on planes. Even if you could establish our knowledge of aerodynamics was complete it would not establish anything about the sorts of things post modernists ''do'' disagree about.


These tend to have a ''human'' cast to them: they hail from social and not physical sciences. They are about history, sociology, psychology, politics, ethics, morality. And it is not just post modernists who disagree about these things. ''Everyone'' does.  
These tend to have a ''human'' cast to them: they hail from social and not physical sciences. They are about history, sociology, psychology, politics, ethics, morality. And it is not just post modernists who disagree about these things. ''Everyone'' does.  


Indeed, in much of economic theory, disagreement is not just possible but imperative. Economic system cannot function without differing evaluations of the same goods.
Indeed, in much of economic theory, disagreement is not just possible but imperative. Economic system cannot function without differing evaluations of the same goods.
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