From The Jolly Contrarian
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| {{a|risk|}}{{risk|Trust}}ing is a risky strategy. Generally one side doesn’t survive. How can {{risk|trust}} survive?
| | #redirect[[Prisoner’s dilemma]] |
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| Single round [[prisoner’s dilemma]] says it can’t. The [[prisoner’s dilemma]] assumes a zero sum outcome where one guy dies (or goes away for ten years – is any rate out of the game). A [[prisoner’s dilemma]] in the narrow sense is necessarily “brutish”. We are doomed to brutish existence. but this is not true in commerce: Let’s craft a wealthy equivalent of the prisoner’s dilemma that takes this into account: the [[eBayer’s dilemma]]. Here the worst that can happen on defection is you pay for but never get your second-hand Louboutins (or vice versa) – losing to a defector is not generally fatal. The [[eBayer’s dilemma]] is usually “iterative”. as we know, the game theory implications of an iterated [[prisoner’s dilemma]] are more benign.<br>
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| {{seealso}}
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| *[[Prisoner’s dilemma]]
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Latest revision as of 13:02, 28 August 2019