Intention to create legal relations: Difference between revisions

From The Jolly Contrarian
Jump to navigation Jump to search
← Older editNewer edit →
VisualWikitext
No edit summary
No edit summary
Line 3: Line 3:
There is some debate on whether the [[intention to create legal relations]] is a separate ingredient in a legally binding contract, or really just an evaluative description of what all the other ingredients ([[offer]], [[acceptance]] and [[consideration]]) add up to.
There is some debate on whether the [[intention to create legal relations]] is a separate ingredient in a legally binding contract, or really just an evaluative description of what all the other ingredients ([[offer]], [[acceptance]] and [[consideration]]) add up to.


''Express contracts''': Their worshipful honours have held<ref>{{cite|Edwards|Skyways|1964|1WLR|349}}</ref> that in an “express” contract or an “ordinary commercial transaction”, the burden of proof is on she who alleges the ''absence'' of an intention (but really? if, in actually signing a legal agreement, you did not intend to create legal relations, then what on earth did you think you ''were'' doing?)  
'''Express {{tag|contract}}s''': Their worshipful honours have held<ref>{{cite|Edwards|Skyways|1964|1WLR|349}}</ref> that in an “express” contract or an “ordinary commercial transaction”, the burden of proof is on she who alleges the ''absence'' of an intention (but really? if, in actually signing a legal agreement, you did not intend to create legal relations, then what on earth did you think you ''were'' doing?)  


'''Implied contracts''': Where offer and acceptance of a contract can only be implied from conduct, then there are authorities<ref>{{cite1|The Aramis|1989|1Lloyd’sRep|213}}</ref> that the person alleging the contract has the burden of proof. But this seems to be no more than a burden of proving [[offer and acceptance]] in the first place.
'''Implied contracts''': Where offer and acceptance of a contract can only be implied from conduct, then there are authorities<ref>{{cite1|The Aramis|1989|1Lloyd’sRep|213}}</ref> that the person alleging the contract has the burden of proof. But this seems to be no more than a burden of proving [[offer and acceptance]] in the first place.

Revision as of 08:04, 18 June 2019

The Jolly Contrarian’s Glossary
The snippy guide to financial services lingo.™
Index — Click the ᐅ to expand:
Glossary

Tell me more
Sign up for our newsletter — or just get in touch: for ½ a weekly 🍺 you get to consult JC. Ask about it here.

But I never thought it would come to this....

There is some debate on whether the intention to create legal relations is a separate ingredient in a legally binding contract, or really just an evaluative description of what all the other ingredients (offer, acceptance and consideration) add up to.

Express contracts: Their worshipful honours have held[1] that in an “express” contract or an “ordinary commercial transaction”, the burden of proof is on she who alleges the absence of an intention (but really? if, in actually signing a legal agreement, you did not intend to create legal relations, then what on earth did you think you were doing?)

Implied contracts: Where offer and acceptance of a contract can only be implied from conduct, then there are authorities[2] that the person alleging the contract has the burden of proof. But this seems to be no more than a burden of proving offer and acceptance in the first place.

so while there is some judicial authority that the intention to create legal relations is a separate thing, but dammit, that legal authority, however binding it might be, is wrong.

As the maxim has it, anus matronae parvae malas leges faciunt.

This is a contrarian view, by the way. The clue is in the url.

See also

References

  1. ↑ Edwards v Skyways [1964] 1WLR 349
  2. ↑ The Aramis [1989] 1Lloyd’sRep 213[1]
Retrieved from "https://jollycontrarian.com/index.php?title=Intention_to_create_legal_relations&oldid=30962"