First-loss: Difference between revisions
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{{a|g|}}Of potential claims against a given pool of assets, the first one up against the wall when the revolution comes. This is to do with priority, preference and capital structure. | {{a|g| | ||
[[File:Vegas housing.jpg|450px|thumb|center|Des res Nevada style, yesterday.]] | |||
}}Of potential claims against a given pool of assets, the first one up against the wall when the revolution comes. This is to do with priority, preference and capital structure. | |||
The first one for the [[down-trou]] will be one whose claim is most [[subordinated]]. That will be the common shareholder, if there is one, and if not (in, say, a CDO or a structured note of some sort) it will be the one bringing up the rear in the [[security waterfall]]. That will usually be the Noteholder or, if there are several [[tranche]]s of Notes, the most [[junior]], most deeply subordinated, ones. | The first one for the [[down-trou]] will be one whose claim is most [[subordinated]]. That will be the common shareholder, if there is one, and if not (in, say, a CDO or a structured note of some sort) it will be the one bringing up the rear in the [[security waterfall]]. That will usually be the Noteholder or, if there are several [[tranche]]s of Notes, the most [[junior]], most deeply subordinated, ones. | ||
It is only once the “[[first-loss]] piece” has been wiped out that the fellow holding the “[[second-loss]] piece” has anything to be worried about. This was a great source of comfort, in the lead-up to the [[global financial crisis]], for those holding the most senior [[tranche]] of the [[CDO squared]] products that, well, precipitated it. | It is only once the “[[first-loss]] piece” has been wiped out that the fellow holding the “[[second-loss]] piece” has anything to be worried about. This was a great source of comfort, in the lead-up to the [[global financial crisis]], for those holding the most senior [[tranche]] of the [[CDO squared]] products that, well, precipitated it. | ||
“The estimated loss on your average mortgage portfolio is about 5%,” these people would think, “and I have ''four'' [[tranche]]s below me, absorbing up to 40% of the losses of this one. So I’m, | “The estimated loss on your average mortgage portfolio is about 5%,” these people would think, “and I have ''four'' [[tranche]]s below me, absorbing up to 40% of the losses of this one. So I’m, like, ''literally'' as safe as houses!” | ||
And so he was: as safe as the hundreds of crappy, leaking, triple-mortgaged prefabs situated on recently reclaimed Nevada desert that made up all most all of his portfolio. | And so he was: as safe as the hundreds of crappy, leaking, triple-mortgaged prefabs situated on recently reclaimed Nevada desert that made up all most all of his portfolio. | ||
Don’t shed a tear for him: it was all for the best. | Don’t shed a tear for him: it was all for the best. | ||
Revision as of 13:51, 20 October 2020
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Of potential claims against a given pool of assets, the first one up against the wall when the revolution comes. This is to do with priority, preference and capital structure. The first one for the down-trou will be one whose claim is most subordinated. That will be the common shareholder, if there is one, and if not (in, say, a CDO or a structured note of some sort) it will be the one bringing up the rear in the security waterfall. That will usually be the Noteholder or, if there are several tranches of Notes, the most junior, most deeply subordinated, ones.
It is only once the “first-loss piece” has been wiped out that the fellow holding the “second-loss piece” has anything to be worried about. This was a great source of comfort, in the lead-up to the global financial crisis, for those holding the most senior tranche of the CDO squared products that, well, precipitated it.
“The estimated loss on your average mortgage portfolio is about 5%,” these people would think, “and I have four tranches below me, absorbing up to 40% of the losses of this one. So I’m, like, literally as safe as houses!”
And so he was: as safe as the hundreds of crappy, leaking, triple-mortgaged prefabs situated on recently reclaimed Nevada desert that made up all most all of his portfolio.
Don’t shed a tear for him: it was all for the best.