Template:M summ EUA Annex (d)(ii): Difference between revisions

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This strikes us as quite different to the common experience of settlement fails in the [[stock loan]] and [[repo]] markets, for example, which are famously not {{gmslaprov|Events of Default}}, precisely because they happen all the time.
This strikes us as quite different to the common experience of settlement fails in the [[stock loan]] and [[repo]] markets, for example, which are famously not {{gmslaprov|Events of Default}}, precisely because they happen all the time.


We are beginning to understand why. So real European “operators” — those who belch hot air into Mediterranean skies, as they generate energy from their coal-fired power-stations — must pay their european overlords for the privilege of doing so. They must do this by 20 April in each year — the so called Reconciliation Deadline. If they are late in surrendering their carbon allowances, such that they have emitted more carbon than they have, in effect, paid for, they can become liable to pay {{euaprov|Excess Emissions Penalties}} under the EU ETS directive. This is something like EUR100 per tonne of uncertificated carbon.
We are beginning to understand why. So real European “operators” — those who belch hot air into Mediterranean skies, as they generate energy from their coal-fired power-stations — must pay their European overlords for the privilege of doing so. They must do this by 20 April in each year — the so called {{euaprov|Reconciliation Deadline}}. If they are late in surrendering their {{euaprov|Allowance}}s, such that they have emitted more carbon than they have, in effect, paid for, they can become liable to pay {{euaprov|Excess Emissions Penalties}} under the EU ETS directive. This is something like EUR100 per tonne of uncertificated carbon.


Dabei, if you as a ''counterparty'' to such an operator, are not able, without fair excuse, to deliver the {{euaprov|EUA}}s you owe that operator, and as a result the operator misses its {{euaprov|Reconciliation Deadline}}, you must pay compensation. This is translated through to your Allowance Transactions ''as long as you remember to apply {{euaprov|EEP}}, and an {{euaprov|EEP Risk Period}}, in your Confirmation''.
''Dabei'', if you, as a ''counterparty'' to such an operator, cannot without fair excuse, deliver the {{euaprov|EUA}}s you owe that operator and, the operator thereby misses its {{euaprov|Reconciliation Deadline}}, you must pay compensation. This is translated through to your {{euaprov|Allowance Transaction}}s ''as long as you remember to apply {{euaprov|EEP}}, and an {{euaprov|EEP Risk Period}}, in your {{euaprov|Confirmation}}''.
==={{euaprov|EEP Risk Period}}===
==={{euaprov|EEP Risk Period}}===
{{M summ EUA Annex EEP Risk Period}}
{{M summ EUA Annex EEP Risk Period}}

Revision as of 10:39, 5 January 2023

This one is sure to have those with a liberal arts education pleading for mercy — but one thing we can say is this is a delivery failure that doesn’t arise through caprice of governments, regulators, market dislocation, or the overwhelming lack political will to care less about carbon emissions any more. This is where the Seller has, to put it bluntly, stuffed up.

Failure to Deliver is not an Event of Default

Here is the question we put to all EU Emissions Allowance Ninjas out there — and there must be some, Lord only knows there must; it can’t just be me out here wrestling with this, can it? Can it? CAN IT? — why is a Failure to Deliver — one that specifically isn’t caused by some mendacious circumstance outside the Delivering Party’s control, like a Settlement Disruption Event, or Suspension of the European infrastructure, Abandonment of Scheme, Force Majeure or any of those other things — why is an inexcusable Failure to Deliver an Emissions Allowance when due not just a normal old Section 5(a)(i) Failure to Pay or Deliver Event of Default like it would be for any other asset class? Or, perhaps, is it, a normal Event of Default, but in the alternative?

This strikes us as quite different to the common experience of settlement fails in the stock loan and repo markets, for example, which are famously not Events of Default, precisely because they happen all the time.

We are beginning to understand why. So real European “operators” — those who belch hot air into Mediterranean skies, as they generate energy from their coal-fired power-stations — must pay their European overlords for the privilege of doing so. They must do this by 20 April in each year — the so called Reconciliation Deadline. If they are late in surrendering their Allowances, such that they have emitted more carbon than they have, in effect, paid for, they can become liable to pay Excess Emissions Penalties under the EU ETS directive. This is something like EUR100 per tonne of uncertificated carbon.

Dabei, if you, as a counterparty to such an operator, cannot without fair excuse, deliver the EUAs you owe that operator and, the operator thereby misses its Reconciliation Deadline, you must pay compensation. This is translated through to your Allowance Transactions as long as you remember to apply EEP, and an EEP Risk Period, in your Confirmation.

EEP Risk Period

And if you forget to specify whether EEP applies, you are hardly likely to remember to designate an EEP Risk Period, are you? The EEP Risk Period is relevant to the consequences of a Failure to Deliver when Excess Emissions Penalty applies. In that regard see:

(i) Paragraph (d)(ii)(1)(B)(Y) (yes, seriously) which might have been entitled “Failure to Deliver by Delivering Party where Failure to Deliver is not Rememedied and Excess Emissions Penalty applies”.
(ii) Paragraph (d)(xi), which is entitled Failure to Deliver (Alternative Method) - EEP Applicable.