Equity v credit derivatives showdown: Difference between revisions

From The Jolly Contrarian
Jump to navigation Jump to search
No edit summary
No edit summary
Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit
Line 8: Line 8:
The {{eqdefs}} were published in 2002 and, while not perfect, do a serviceable enough job at describing what is essentially, and usually, a fairly straightforward product, though they get a bit gummed up about dividends. The product traded is for the most part a [[delta-one]] exposure to shares, share baskets and indices and, while hedging can be fraught in times of dislocation, and hedging costs get passed through to end users, the basic notional value of an equity derivative is not: the market price if a listed share: you can see it printed in 6 point font in the Financial Times every day.
The {{eqdefs}} were published in 2002 and, while not perfect, do a serviceable enough job at describing what is essentially, and usually, a fairly straightforward product, though they get a bit gummed up about dividends. The product traded is for the most part a [[delta-one]] exposure to shares, share baskets and indices and, while hedging can be fraught in times of dislocation, and hedging costs get passed through to end users, the basic notional value of an equity derivative is not: the market price if a listed share: you can see it printed in 6 point font in the Financial Times every day.


The {{cddefs}} are for the connoisseur ISDA ninja. They have an abstract intellectual purity fairy brutally dislocated from the messy business of real world of market trading. They are the stuff of JP Morgan brainboxes, [[Potts Opinion|QC opinions]], and civilisation-threatening financial disasters. The product emerged in the 1990s, became highly fashionable, by 2003 had earned its own definitions booklet, and as the [[CDO]] mania of the noughties reached fever pitch, began to become standardised. Each actual credit default represented a lesson learned about the multifarious ways in which the product didn’t work very well, but its real “come-to-Jesus” moment was the [[credit crunch]] of 2007 and then 2008’s full blown [[global financial crisis]], both of which revealed the degree to which a nice idea in theory doesn’t hold up so well in the white heat of conflict.  There was a ''lot'' of litigation about misfiring — or allegedly misfiring — credit derivatives.
The {{cddefs}} are for the connoisseur [[ISDA ninja]]. Their original abstract intellectual purity has long since evaporated,  brutalised repeatedly by savage real-world market dislocation. They are now a fearful, paranoid, jabbering wreck. It is as if the winsome fever dream of some JP Morgan brainboxes, strained through the gusset of the [[First Men]] and wrung through some [[Potts Opinion|QC opinions]] has taken root, allowed to flourish, run wildly out of control, threatened life as we know it and then mercilessly beaten, bent and twisted by a community of embittered banking regulators, themselves branded by the white-hot iron of civilisation-threatening financial disaster.
In fact, that is more or less what happened.


The {{cddefs}} were, consequently, monstrously overhauled in 2014, and at the same time the product standardised yet further, moving away from single name, bilateral, privately negotiated deals and towards cleared, standardised, broad-based index products. There are still some privately negotiated deals but, compared with equity swaps, which are the bedrock of hedge fund equity long/short strategies, not many. More that ten trades a week on a given Reference Entity rates special mention in ISDA’s credit market summary.  
The product emerged in the 1990s, became highly fashionable, by 2003 had earned its own definitions booklet, and as the [[CDO]] mania of the noughties reached fever pitch, it began to standardise. Legions of chancers, grifters and joiner-inners flooded the market and before you knew it there were all kinds of “exotic” structures, each more convoluted and less plausible than the last. Growth was periodically set back by actual credit events in the market, each it's own life lesson about the multifarious ways in which over-engineered, too-clever-by-half structured products can surprise their Inventors by finding unexpected ways to fail. The real “come-to-Jesus” moment for credit derivatives was the [[credit crunch]] of 2007 and then 2008’s full blown [[global financial crisis]], which between them revealed the degree to which nice ideas in theory don’t hold up in the sweaty throes of market panic. There was a ''lot'' of litigation about misfiring — or allegedly misfiring — credit derivatives.


Part of the lack of popularity is the sheer complication of the {{cddefs}}. Unlike the {{eqdefs}}, the 2003 Credit Derivatives Definitions really didn’t work, the move away was propelled by regulator angst and infrastructural imperative, so there was not the option of flat-out ignoring them, as the market did to the ill-fated [[2011 Equity Derivatives Definitions]].
The {{cddefs}} were, consequently, monstrously overhauled in 2014, and at the same time the product standardised yet further, moving away from single name, bilateral, privately negotiated deals and towards cleared, standardised, broad-based index products. There are still some privately negotiated deals but, compared with equity swaps, which are the bedrock of hedge fund equity long/short strategies, not many. More than ten trades a week on a given Reference Entity rates special mention in ISDA’s credit market summary.
 
Practitioners will tell you part of their lack of popularity is the sheer complication of the {{cddefs}}. Unlike the {{eqdefs}}, the 2003 Credit Derivatives Definitions really didn’t work, the move away was propelled by regulator angst and infrastructural imperative, so there was not the option of flat-out ignoring them, as the market did to the ill-fated [[2011 Equity Derivatives Definitions]]. Even though now impenetrable, they are ''still'' finding snafus needing quick fix patches.
 
==Synthetic investment versus loss insurance==
==Synthetic investment versus loss insurance==
{{Eqderiv}} are means of gaining exposure — positive or negative— to an instrument without owning it. The basic point of the contract is to replicate exactly the economic features of the [[Underlying|underlier]], minus the physical, reporting and funding aspects of being on the register. You buy or sell an {{eqderiv}} ''instead of'' buying or selling the [[Underlying|underlier]].
{{Eqderiv}} are means of gaining exposure — positive or negative— to an instrument without owning it. The basic point of the contract is to replicate exactly the economic features of the [[Underlying|underlier]], minus the physical, reporting and funding aspects of being on the register. You buy or sell an {{eqderiv}} ''instead of'' buying or selling the [[Underlying|underlier]].

Revision as of 17:32, 9 May 2023

Credit Derivatives Anatomy™
Ninja showdown, yesterday
From our machine overlords
Here is what, NiGEL, our cheeky little GPT3 chatbot had to say when asked to explain:
JC: Nigel, tell me a story about a boy who journeyed to a high mountain to train at the feet of an isda ninja for ten years to become a black belt in equity derivatives.

NiGEL: The boy was fascinated by the stories of the ISDA ninjas, the elite warriors who mastered the art of equity derivatives. He dreamed of becoming one of them and learning their secrets. He saved up enough money to travel to the high mountain where their dojo was located. He knocked on the door and asked to be accepted as a disciple.

The master of the dojo looked at him with a stern gaze and said, “Becoming an ISDA ninja is no game. It is a way of life. You will have to train hard, study hard, and endure many hardships. You will have to forsake your family, your friends, your credibility and your worldly possessions.”

The boy said, “Master. I am ready.”

The master smiled and said, “Very well. Come in. You are now one of us.”

The boy entered the dojo and began his training. He learned how to use as OSLAs, GMSLAs, CFDs, and of course equity swaps. He learned how to fight with his bare hands, using synthetics, lockups, delta-hedges, and close-outs. He learned how to move stealthily, evade NAV triggers, and escape from short squeezes. He learned how to meditate, control his margining, and focus his mind.

But most importantly, he learned how to trade equity derivatives. He learned how to analyze the market, calculate the risks and rewards, and execute the best strategies. He learned how to use options, futures, swaps, and other complex instruments. He learned how to hedge his positions, arbitrage opportunities, and exploit inefficiencies. He learned how to deal with volatility, liquidity, and leverage.

He studied the ISDA Master Agreement, the standard contract that governed all equity derivative transactions. He memorised it and the 2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions and all their clauses, definitions, and provisions. He understood its implications, interpretations, and applications. He knew how to handle Events of Default, Termination Events, close-out netting, and collateral management.

He passed all the tests and challenges that the master gave him. He earned the respect and admiration of his fellow disciples. He rose through the ranks and achieved higher levels of skill and knowledge.

After ten years of training, he was ready for his final test. The master summoned him to his chamber and said,

"You have done well, my son. You have learned everything I have taught you. You have proven yourself worthy of being an ISDA ninja. There is only one thing left for you to do."

"What is it, master?" the boy asked.

"You must face me in a martial swaps showdown," the master said. “It is a duel between two ISDA ninjas, each using their own chosen derivatives definitions booklet as a weapon. I choose the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions. You may chose the 2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions.We will each choose a portfolio of swaps with different underlying assets, maturities, notional amounts, and fixed or floating rates. We will then exchange cash flows based on these swaps until one of us runs out of money or concedes defeat."

"It is exciting," the master said, "but also dangerous. If you lose, you will lose everything you have worked for: your ninja status. Your honour. Your dignity. Your implausibly generous income. And your mortal soul will be cast into — ”

“What, Master?” the boy asked. “What? Where will my mortal soul be cast?”

The master hesitated. But them the boy understood. It was a place unmentionable to the sworn warriors of the Aïessdiyé. "This is the ultimate test of your skill and courage. This is how we determine who is the best among us."

"Then I accept your challenge," the boy said.

"Good," the master said. "Prepare yourself. We will meet at dawn in the derelict warehouse where we store our old equipment."

The next morning, the boy went to the warehouse with his portfolio of swaps. He saw the master waiting for him with his own portfolio.

They bowed to each other and began their showdown.

They traded swap after swap with lightning speed and precision. They matched each other's moves with counter-moves. They tried to outsmart each other with clever tactics and tricks.


Disclaimer: NiGEL’s a neural network, he drinks a lot, and he spends too much time on the internet, so if you listen to anything he has to say you only have yourself to blame.

Come to think of it, that is also true of the JC in general.

Tell me more
Sign up for our newsletter — or just get in touch: for ½ a weekly 🍺 you get to consult JC. Ask about it here.

Premium version of this page

After a long hiatus learning the ways of the 2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions, the JC is back in the land of credit derivatives, and has been undertaking remedial ninjery with the sacred texts of the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions. You can learn about his travails from NiGEL, in the panel.

Here we do the service of comparing, in broad strokes, equity derivatives with the credit derivatives.

Documentation

Each has its own definitions booklet — 2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions and 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions respectively — though their genealogies are different.

The 2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions were published in 2002 and, while not perfect, do a serviceable enough job at describing what is essentially, and usually, a fairly straightforward product, though they get a bit gummed up about dividends. The product traded is for the most part a delta-one exposure to shares, share baskets and indices and, while hedging can be fraught in times of dislocation, and hedging costs get passed through to end users, the basic notional value of an equity derivative is not: the market price if a listed share: you can see it printed in 6 point font in the Financial Times every day.

The 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions are for the connoisseur ISDA ninja. Their original abstract intellectual purity has long since evaporated, brutalised repeatedly by savage real-world market dislocation. They are now a fearful, paranoid, jabbering wreck. It is as if the winsome fever dream of some JP Morgan brainboxes, strained through the gusset of the First Men and wrung through some QC opinions has taken root, allowed to flourish, run wildly out of control, threatened life as we know it and then mercilessly beaten, bent and twisted by a community of embittered banking regulators, themselves branded by the white-hot iron of civilisation-threatening financial disaster. In fact, that is more or less what happened.

The product emerged in the 1990s, became highly fashionable, by 2003 had earned its own definitions booklet, and as the CDO mania of the noughties reached fever pitch, it began to standardise. Legions of chancers, grifters and joiner-inners flooded the market and before you knew it there were all kinds of “exotic” structures, each more convoluted and less plausible than the last. Growth was periodically set back by actual credit events in the market, each it's own life lesson about the multifarious ways in which over-engineered, too-clever-by-half structured products can surprise their Inventors by finding unexpected ways to fail. The real “come-to-Jesus” moment for credit derivatives was the credit crunch of 2007 and then 2008’s full blown global financial crisis, which between them revealed the degree to which nice ideas in theory don’t hold up in the sweaty throes of market panic. There was a lot of litigation about misfiring — or allegedly misfiring — credit derivatives.

The 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions were, consequently, monstrously overhauled in 2014, and at the same time the product standardised yet further, moving away from single name, bilateral, privately negotiated deals and towards cleared, standardised, broad-based index products. There are still some privately negotiated deals but, compared with equity swaps, which are the bedrock of hedge fund equity long/short strategies, not many. More than ten trades a week on a given Reference Entity rates special mention in ISDA’s credit market summary.

Practitioners will tell you part of their lack of popularity is the sheer complication of the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions. Unlike the 2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions, the 2003 Credit Derivatives Definitions really didn’t work, the move away was propelled by regulator angst and infrastructural imperative, so there was not the option of flat-out ignoring them, as the market did to the ill-fated 2011 Equity Derivatives Definitions. Even though now impenetrable, they are still finding snafus needing quick fix patches.

Synthetic investment versus loss insurance

Equity Derivatives are means of gaining exposure — positive or negative— to an instrument without owning it. The basic point of the contract is to replicate exactly the economic features of the underlier, minus the physical, reporting and funding aspects of being on the register. You buy or sell an Equity Derivatives instead of buying or selling the underlier.

Credit Derivatives assume you already own the underlier, but want to hedge away a specific embedded tail risk: namely, that it blows up. While you needn’t own the underlier to buy or sell Credit Derivatives — the Robin Potts opinion is at great pains to stress that a CDS is not a contract of insurance — generally speaking you will.


Overview and capital structure

Credit Derivatives address the market value of public, quoted, usually senior unsecured debt obligations — for this discussion, let’s call them “Bonds” while equity derivatives address the value of public, quoted common shares.

The instruments have very different qualities: Bonds repay principal and return income, equities return capital. Unless something really catastrophic happens, the return on a Bond is predictable — interest and principal — and values will be as affected by prevailing interest rates as by deterioration (or improvement) in the Issuer’s creditworthiness. That one really catastrophic thing is the Issuer’s failure: its Bankruptcy.

Because there are literally no expectations about what they will pay — not even a redemption date — equities pogo around, depending on the issuer’s quarterly performance, paranoia, market sentiment, geopolitical currents, internet memes, Reddit, whatever Elon tweets about and whatever the madness of collected action believes to be germane to the business of, well, business. Equities could quite easily be up 200% or down 70% over a six-month period with neither making a tremendous statement as to the basic creditworthiness of the Issuer.

so oddly, while you would expect equities to be about corporate default and credit derivatives to be about relative performance in the absence of default, it is the other way around. Credit derivatives, like Bonds, tend to have a fixed term and while you can mutually terminate them at market price, there is no right to in the absence of a catastrophic failure. Equities tend to be exercisable at any time,