Law firm panel: Difference between revisions

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{{a|work|}}{{quote|“Within a couple of millennia, bankers in many parts of the franchise were doing little from dawn to dusk other than taking care of law firms. It wasn’t easy. The lawyers demanded a lot of them. Lawyers didn’t like personal responsibility for anything, so the bankers broke their backs forging disclaimers, liability waivers and caps for their advisors. Lawyers didn’t like sharing their fees with other firms, so bank operations teams laboured long days under the scorching sun building impregnable barriers to entry (so-called “panels”) within which their “captive” law firms could safely play without risk to their livelihoods.
{{a|work|}}{{quote|“Within a couple of millennia, bankers in many parts of the franchise were doing little from dawn to dusk other than taking care of legal advisors. It wasn’t easy. The lawyers demanded a lot. They didn’t like personal responsibility for anything, so the bankers broke their backs, forging them disclaimers and liability caps and waivers. They didn’t like being categorical, so the bankers suffered pages and pages of assumptions, conditions and qualifications. They didn’t like sharing their fees with other firms, so operations teams laboured long days under the scorching sun building impregnable barriers to entry which they called “panels” within which their delicate “captive” law firms could safely conjure up their intricate gossamer figurines without risk to their livelihoods.


The investment bank was not evolved for this. It was long adapted to gouging sovereign wealth funds, appropriating customer deposits towards casino banking and ripping faces from unsuspecting end-users: it was not designed to mutely agree terms of engagement and to carrying water for this high-paid advisors. Banker spines and brass necks paid the price.  
The bankers were not evolved for this. They had long adapted to gouging sovereign wealth funds, ploughing customer deposits into casino banking and ripping faces from defenceless end-users: they was not designed to tamely agreeing terms of engagement and carrying water for high-paid dilettantes. Banker spines and brass necks paid the price.  


Moreover, the new tasks demanded so much time that banks were forced to install thousands of lawyers inside their businesses, who would
Moreover, their lawyers were so confusing and their work products so baffling that the bankers had to co-opt thousands of extra lawyers to work inside their businesses, who could keep the crops and fields of lawyers happy, throwing out fresh instructions on any matter across which they could contrive to cast doubt. This completely, and permanently, changed the bankers’ way of life.  
instinctively throw out instructions on any and every matter of doubt that crossed their minds. This completely changed the banks’ way of life.  


Banks did not domesticate law firms. Law firms domesticated banks.”
Banks did not domesticate law firms. Law firms domesticated banks.”
:—Noah Yuval Harari, ''Legio Cadabra: A Brief History of The Magic Circle''}}
:—Noah Yuval Harari, ''Legio Cadabra: A Brief History of The Magic Circle''}}
As good an illustration as you could ask for that the financial markets are an [[extended phenotype]] — a ghastly, metastasised [[spandrel]] that exists for the pleasure and enrichment of the commercial law industry.
{{Definitely|Law firm panel||n|}}Proof that, far from being a seething pit of apex predation, the financial services industry is no more than an [[extended phenotype]] — a gruesome, metastasised [[spandrel]] illuminating the space between adjacent domes of legal excellence — that exists for the pleasure and enrichment of those saintly white-shoed attorneys who grace the serene frescoes overhead.
.
{{drop|T|he image of investment banks}} as docile harnessed sauropods munching stupidly away in the service of pan-dimensional superbeings — and not just their executives — might not be the first one that springs to mind. But nor does it immediately grab us that wheat coopted unwitting humankind to serve its basest biological ends, but that is what Noah Yuval Harari tells us.


Investment banking is riven with contradiction:
But banking is riven with contraction. That such devoted apostles of laissez-faire should instinctively organise themselves into Marxist dictatorships should tell us something is not right.


That a calling devoted to the principles of the anarchic free market systematically organises itself into enterprises that behave like Communist dictatorships.  
The law firm panel, we submit, is another.


That these cash-generating leviathans can be harnessed towards the better ends of not their shareholders, nor even employees, but a scarcely visible constituency of legal advisors.  
It looks like a case of the banks taming and cultivating their legal advisors: penning them in, maximising their contribution, squeezing them in and extracting all remaining marrow from their tired bones — but it looks that way for wheat, too.  


{{drop|T|he image of investment banks}} as docile harnessed sauropods munching stupidly away in the service of pan-dimensional superbeings — and not just their executives — might not be the first one that springs to mind. But then, nor does it immediately grab you that wheat has domesticated humankind to its biological ends, but that is what Noah Yuval Harari tells us.
The panel  springs from an observation — investment banks spend an awful lot of money of legal fees — coupled with that unavoidable trope of modern commerce: ''scale is everything''.
 
The law firm panel looks like the banks taming and cultivating their lawfirms, but springs from an observation — investment banks spend an awful lot of money of legal fees — coupled with that unavoidable trope of modern commerce: ''scale is everything''.


Picture the scene: an enterprising fellow in the [[Legal operations|legal COO]] team has pulled 5 years’ of legal spend, totalled it, and used the AVERAGE function in Excel. It generates this no-brainer:
Picture the scene: an enterprising fellow in the [[Legal operations|legal COO]] team has pulled 5 years’ of legal spend, totalled it, and used the AVERAGE function in Excel. It generates this no-brainer:

Revision as of 19:10, 26 March 2024

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“Within a couple of millennia, bankers in many parts of the franchise were doing little from dawn to dusk other than taking care of legal advisors. It wasn’t easy. The lawyers demanded a lot. They didn’t like personal responsibility for anything, so the bankers broke their backs, forging them disclaimers and liability caps and waivers. They didn’t like being categorical, so the bankers suffered pages and pages of assumptions, conditions and qualifications. They didn’t like sharing their fees with other firms, so operations teams laboured long days under the scorching sun building impregnable barriers to entry which they called “panels” within which their delicate “captive” law firms could safely conjure up their intricate gossamer figurines without risk to their livelihoods.

The bankers were not evolved for this. They had long adapted to gouging sovereign wealth funds, ploughing customer deposits into casino banking and ripping faces from defenceless end-users: they was not designed to tamely agreeing terms of engagement and carrying water for high-paid dilettantes. Banker spines and brass necks paid the price.

Moreover, their lawyers were so confusing and their work products so baffling that the bankers had to co-opt thousands of extra lawyers to work inside their businesses, who could keep the crops and fields of lawyers happy, throwing out fresh instructions on any matter across which they could contrive to cast doubt. This completely, and permanently, changed the bankers’ way of life.

Banks did not domesticate law firms. Law firms domesticated banks.”

—Noah Yuval Harari, Legio Cadabra: A Brief History of The Magic Circle

Template:DefinitelyProof that, far from being a seething pit of apex predation, the financial services industry is no more than an extended phenotype — a gruesome, metastasised spandrel illuminating the space between adjacent domes of legal excellence — that exists for the pleasure and enrichment of those saintly white-shoed attorneys who grace the serene frescoes overhead. . The image of investment banks as docile harnessed sauropods munching stupidly away in the service of pan-dimensional superbeings — and not just their executives — might not be the first one that springs to mind. But nor does it immediately grab us that wheat coopted unwitting humankind to serve its basest biological ends, but that is what Noah Yuval Harari tells us.

But banking is riven with contraction. That such devoted apostles of laissez-faire should instinctively organise themselves into Marxist dictatorships should tell us something is not right.

The law firm panel, we submit, is another.

It looks like a case of the banks taming and cultivating their legal advisors: penning them in, maximising their contribution, squeezing them in and extracting all remaining marrow from their tired bones — but it looks that way for wheat, too.

The panel springs from an observation — investment banks spend an awful lot of money of legal fees — coupled with that unavoidable trope of modern commerce: scale is everything.

Picture the scene: an enterprising fellow in the legal COO team has pulled 5 years’ of legal spend, totalled it, and used the AVERAGE function in Excel. It generates this no-brainer:

“We spend £750m a year on external legal across 1,500 firms at an average run rate of half a million quid each firm.[1] This is insane. If we concentrated that on say ten firms — even a hundred — we could dramatically reduce our administrative costs and leverage our scale. If we guarantee firms £50 million in billings we can push down their hourly rates, commit them to a programme of rolling secondees, have them run our annual training programme. That way we could cut our overall spend by 30% and get more legal value than we get right now.

This logic being unimpeachable, an action plan is implemented without ado. The pathological impulse to shower good money randomly over a myriad of anonymous law firms will be controlled. Order will be restored.

There will be a colossal multilateral

Now, had our fellow used a pivot chart he might have told a different story. For these firms span for 150 different jurisdictions, for a start. The mean may have been half a million, but the median spend was £10,000.

Five hundred of them billed less than £5,000 each. That third of the group account for just 2m of the total spend.

  1. Do not for a moment think this is an exaggeration.