Discourse on Intercourse: Difference between revisions
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{{a|myth|}}[[Discourse on Intercourse]] is a well-intended though basically wrong-headed philosophical tract formulated by delusional Austrian librettist [[Otto Büchstein]] in the depths of dengue fever delirium in 1769. | {{a|myth|}}[[Discourse on Intercourse]] is a well-intended though basically wrong-headed philosophical tract formulated by delusional Austrian librettist [[Otto Büchstein]] in the depths of dengue fever delirium in 1769. It immediately preceded his last, great unfinished play {{dsh}}. | ||
Outraged by [[René Descartes]] [[Discourse on the Method|suggestion in 1637]] that the only indubitable thing in the universe was | Outraged by [[René Descartes]] [[Discourse on the Method|suggestion in 1637]] that the only indubitable thing in the universe was one’s own existence as a [[res cogitans|thinking thing]], [[Büchstein]] attempted to deduce an entire multi-personal [[epistemology]] from the commercial inevitability of [[conference call]]s. | ||
His logic was this: all-hands conference calls must exist, since no-one in her right mind would make the idea up if she didn’t have to. So, since someone ''has'' | His logic was this: [[All-hands conference call|all-hands conference calls]] must exist, since no-one in her right mind would make the idea up if she didn’t have to. So, since someone ''has'' had such an idea, and indeed it is endemic, [[conference call]]s must be a necessary, indubitable, fact of corporate life. | ||
On that predicate, it follows that as it is an ''[[a priori]]'' fact that a [[conference call]] must comprise more than one person (“a man cannot meet alone”, | On that predicate, it follows that as it is an ''[[a priori]]'' fact that a [[conference call]] must comprise more than one person (“a man cannot meet alone”, {{buchstein}} was fond of quipping), for conference calls to be possible the most basic [[irreducible]] ontology of the universe must contain ''multiple'' individuals. | ||
“God is omniscient,” | At least three, thought [[Büchstein]]: the “meetor” (which he regarded as an analog of [[Descartes]]’ “thinking thing”, or “[[res cogitans]]”), one “meetee” (which [[Büchstein]] characterised primarily as a talking thing (“[[res verbositans]]”) and since, transparently, neither of these homunculi would willingly meet without there being some kind of compulsion to do so, a third person (usually a [[management consultant]] or [[project manager]]) to ensure the meeting happens, that minutes are taken, actions assigned and timelines “agreed” for “action closure” (this third person {{Buchstein}} called an “action-assigning thing” or “[[res bossitans]]”). | ||
In any case, since they were all engaged on a [[conference call]], none of them needed to be God. | |||
“God is omniscient,” {{buchstein}} said. “God doesn’t ''do'' [[conference call]]s. What would be the point? God already knows everything. Any come to think of it, God is ''omnipotent''. It is, as I have said, axiomatic that ''no one goes on a conference call that she is not obliged to''. Since there is no way of forcing an omnipotent being onto a conference call it follows that ''omnipotent beings will not do conference calls''. | |||
Rather than simply rebutting [[Descartes]]’ proof that there ''must'' be a God, by illustrating one was not necessary, [[Büchstein]] went further: “a universe in which [[conference call]]s necessarily exist,” he contended, “is logically inconsistent with the continued presence of an omniscient, benign, omnipotent deity”. He took this as an ''[[a priori]]'' proof of the ''non''-existence of God. | Rather than simply rebutting [[Descartes]]’ proof that there ''must'' be a God, by illustrating one was not necessary, [[Büchstein]] went further: “a universe in which [[conference call]]s necessarily exist,” he contended, “is logically inconsistent with the continued presence of an omniscient, benign, omnipotent deity”. He took this as an ''[[a priori]]'' proof of the ''non''-existence of God. |