Template:Critical theory, modernism and the death of objective truth: Difference between revisions

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This does not go very far towards undermining the materialist tenets of western European philosophy, I grant you. But it is far enough.
This does not go very far towards undermining the materialist tenets of western European philosophy, I grant you. But it is far enough.


This argument used to play out between Christians and Atheists. Now the critical theorists are involved it is a lot less fun because they tend to be humourless, so we will pretend the protagonists are still Christians and Atheists. Damnation to hell for eternity I can handle. Cancellation by the woke mind virus is a bridge too far.
This argument used to play out between Christians and Atheists. It was fun, and — since the conclusion of the Spanish Inquisition, at least — no-one took it too seriously. Now the [[critical theory|critical theorists]] are involved it is less fun because they tend to be humourless, so we will pretend the protagonists are still Christians and Atheists. Damnation for all eternity I can handle: cancellation by the woke mind virus is a bridge too far.


At this point two images are cast into the ring: atheists in foxholes, and postmodernists on planes.  
====Airborne relativists====
{{Drop|A|t this point}} two self-refuting mythological creatures are cast into the ring: “atheists in foxholes”, and “postmodernists on aeroplanes”. Neither , according to the other, exists.


“Show me,” [[Richard Dawkins]] huffs, “a [[relativist]] on a plane and I'll show you a hypocrite at 30,000 feet”. By the fact that he takes his argument no further, we expect Dawkins believes he has won it, [[quod erat demonstrandum]]. There are objective truths, everyone knows it, and this [[postmodernist]] blather is all a ''posture''. Because aeroplanes.
“Show me,” [[Richard Dawkins]] huffs, “a [[relativist]] on a plane and I'll show you a hypocrite at 30,000 feet”.  


But Dawkins misreads consensus for truth. And he mistakes observation for explanation. The truth to which he appeals is not “the veracity of modern aerodynamics” — we imagine the finer points of that were not worked out when Richard Pearse took his first flight, so clearly that belief is not needed — nor even the general principles that are broadly right, and have been with us since Leonardo — but the simple statement that “planes fly reliably enough that I am prepared to get one”. Our postmodernist might even hold a degree in advanced aeronautics, and might happen to think it provides an excellent model based on known data. She just holds that caveat that, you know, the conclusion is inductive, can't be proven, and is provisional.  
By the fact that he takes his argument no further, we expect Dawkins believes he has won it, [[quod erat demonstrandum]]. There are objective truths, everyone knows it, and this [[postmodernist]] blather to the contrary is all a ''posture''. Because ''aeroplanes''.


In any case, generalised observations about the typical behaviour of physical objects are not the sorts of things postmodernists disagree about. Even if you could establish they were true — as per the above, logically you can’t — it would not establish anything about the sorts of things post modernists ''do'' disagree about.
But Dawkins misreads ''consensus'' for ''truth'', and he mistakes ''observation'' for ''explanation''. The “truth” to which he appeals here is not “the veracity of modern aerodynamics” — we imagine the finer points of that were not worked out when Richard Pearse took his first flight, so that specificity of knowledge is not needed, and in any case even now few airline passengers ''have'' that kind of understanding — but the simple statement that “planes go up and come down reliably enough that I am prepared to get in one”.  


These tend to have a social cast to them. They are about history, sociology, psychology, politics, ethics, morality.  And it is not just post modernists who disagree about these things. ''Everyone'' does.  
One can have any number of reasons for believing that, including “St. Christopher watches over travellers”, scientists are clever and they figured it out or just, “the probability of planes falling randomly out of the sky has declined markedly since the seventies, and there is less than a one-in-a million chance I’ll die on a passenger flight.”
 
In any case the belief we care about is that this ''particular'' plane won’t fall out of the sky, and — inductive fallacy again — no one actually knows.
 
In fact a relativist does not needs faith in the accuracy of aerodynamics but only its ''regularity''. We do not board planes at 30,000 feet, but on the ground. An aeroplane would never get ''off'' the ground, and so would have no prospect of falling back onto it, unless some aerodynamic principle was at play. It does not matter what that aerodynamic principle is, as long as it keeps working until the flight is over.
 
Our postmodernist might even hold a degree in advanced aeronautics, and might happen to think it provides an excellent model based on known data. She just holds that caveat that, you know, the conclusion is inductive, can't be proven, and is provisional. After all, the history of science is of astounding discoveries that reveal the universe does not work the way we thought it did. Given we still can’t reconcile the physics of atoms with that of galaxies, and neither provide a great explanation of what we experience when we get in planes, we can’t really blame the relativist.
 
All the relativist asks is that we don’t overstate our case: that we downgrade unjustifiable statements of transcendent truth to pragmatic statements of provisional fitness. Functionally, stopping with “it works as far as we know” is not a grea~t concession. JC is not aware of any university that has yet closed its physics department on account of completion of its mission.
====Sociological quibbles====
{{Drop|I|n any case}}, generalised observations about the typical behaviour of physical objects at the human scale of interaction are not the sorts of things postmodernists tend to disagree about. Even if you could establish they were true — as per the above, you can’t — it would not establish anything about the sorts of things post modernists ''do'' disagree about.
 
These tend to have a ''human'' cast to them: they hail from social and not physical sciences. They are about history, sociology, psychology, politics, ethics, morality.  And it is not just post modernists who disagree about these things. ''Everyone'' does.  


Indeed, in much of economic theory, disagreement is not just possible but imperative. Economic system cannot function without differing evaluations of the same goods.
Indeed, in much of economic theory, disagreement is not just possible but imperative. Economic system cannot function without differing evaluations of the same goods.
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