Coming to the nuisance is no defence: Difference between revisions
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The principle, established in {{casenote|Sturges|Bridgman}} that if something is a nuisance, the fact that it has been a {{tag|nuisance}} for a long time without anyone complaining about it doesn't stop it being a {{tag|nuisance}}. | The principle, established in {{casenote|Sturges|Bridgman}} that if something is a nuisance, the fact that it has been a {{tag|nuisance}} for a long time without anyone complaining about it doesn't stop it being a {{tag|nuisance}}. In {{casenote|Sturges|Bridgman}} it was an apothecary’s noisy mortar and pestle. | ||
So if someone moves into the neighborhood and decides this thing everyone else doesn't consider a nuisance ''is'' a {{tag|nuisance}}, then saying "the nuisance was here first" is no defence. | So if someone moves into the neighborhood and decides this thing everyone else doesn't consider a nuisance ''is'' a {{tag|nuisance}}, then saying "the nuisance was here first" is no defence. | ||
There is a suggestion that either (a) this general principle doesn't apply to {{tag|cricket}} or (b) {{tag|cricket}} is, at law, not a {{tag|nuisance}} (per Lord Denning MR's juidgment in {{Casenote|Miller|Jackson}}. Sadly Lord Denning’s very famous view was articulated in the course of a dissenting judgment so sadly, in the eyes of the {{tag|common law}}, {{tag|cricket}} | There is a suggestion that either (a) this general principle doesn't apply to {{tag|cricket}} or (b) {{tag|cricket}} is, at law, not a {{tag|nuisance}} (per Lord Denning MR's juidgment in {{Casenote|Miller|Jackson}}. Sadly Lord Denning’s very famous view was articulated in the course of a dissenting judgment (the remainder of the court was sympathetic to Lord Denning’s excellent arguments but felt itself [[Doctrine of precedent|bound]] by the superior court judgment in {{Sturges|Bridgman}}, and for whaever reason, the Lintz {{tag|Cricket}} Club did not appeal) so sadly, in the eyes of the {{tag|common law}}, {{tag|cricket}} remains susceptible to {{tag|nuisance}} actions. | ||
{{Seealso}} | {{Seealso}} | ||
*[[Nuisance]] | |||
* {{casenote|Miller|Jackson}} | * {{casenote|Miller|Jackson}} | ||
*{{casenote|Sturges|Bridgman}} | |||
Revision as of 08:41, 25 August 2017
The principle, established in Sturges v Bridgman that if something is a nuisance, the fact that it has been a nuisance for a long time without anyone complaining about it doesn't stop it being a nuisance. In Sturges v Bridgman it was an apothecary’s noisy mortar and pestle.
So if someone moves into the neighborhood and decides this thing everyone else doesn't consider a nuisance is a nuisance, then saying "the nuisance was here first" is no defence.
There is a suggestion that either (a) this general principle doesn't apply to cricket or (b) cricket is, at law, not a nuisance (per Lord Denning MR's juidgment in Miller v Jackson. Sadly Lord Denning’s very famous view was articulated in the course of a dissenting judgment (the remainder of the court was sympathetic to Lord Denning’s excellent arguments but felt itself bound by the superior court judgment in Template:Sturges, and for whaever reason, the Lintz Cricket Club did not appeal) so sadly, in the eyes of the common law, cricket remains susceptible to nuisance actions.