Playbook

Playbooks derive from the belief that business is a heuristic.

In Thomas Kuhn’s conception of it, normal science: There are no mysteries or conundrums. The landscape has been fully mapped, boundaries have been set, tolerances limited, parameters fixed, risks codified and processes fully understood. Playbooks are algorithms for meatware: a means of efficiently operating within a fully risked environment.

They speak to the belief that the only material risk lies in not complying with established rules: Playbooks are of a piece with the doctrine of precedent: When the playbook runs out of road, there is an escalation to a control function. the control function acts like a competent court, the idea being (in theory, if not in practice) that the the control function can develop the heuristic to deal with the new situation, and it can be fed back down and incorporated into the playbook as a kind of stare decisis to updating and building out the corpus of established process.<ref>This is rarely what happens in practice. control functions make ad hoc exceptions to the process, do not build them into the playbook as standard rules, meaning that the playbook has a natural tolerance (and therefore inefficiency). The heuristic is set inside the organsiation’s risk tolerance (this is a good thing from a risk monitoring perspective, but a bad one from an efficiency perspective, as escalation is a wasteful and costly exercise.

In theory the control function will have its own playbook, and the “court of first instance” is as bound by that as the baseline process is by the basic playbook. There is an algorithm, a recipe, and the main ill that comes about is by not following it. Hence the existence of an internal audit function. Two roles: (i) identifying the rule set, and (ii) seeking data as to compliance with it. It is a formal role only. Note the behaviour that this encourages: following an if/then logic structure requires no understanding of the underlying subject of the process (you don't need to know how an internal combustion engine works to drive a car), and indeed such comprehension risks challenge or subversion of that process: subject matter expertise might incline one to take a view on a formal, non material issue. This accelerates the particular item through the system, but at a cost to the integrity of the process.

The other thing about subject matter experts is that they are expensive. The name of the game is cost reduction. The ideal process participant costs nothing, follows instructions with perfect fidelity, doesn't break down or make errors, and certainly doesn't think or question the process. One escalates within the process, one doesn't question it. There is a paradox here, though, because to get the best outcome within the playbook parameters requires a degree of advocacy, inasmuch as the process participant is facing the outside world (beyond the playbook control) - you can best negotiate if you understand your subject material. The portfolio risk engine ascribes the same value to any outcome as long as it conforms to the playbook. The principle measurement is speed.

The theory is we operationalise a negotiation process. We divide into doers and thinkers. Wherever there is a playbook, the demands of fidelity and economy require a deskilling and deemphasis of subject matter expertise.

But we also operationalise the escalationprocess - the dogma of internal audit and the bottomline imperative see to that. As a result subject matter expertise leaks out of the whole system.

See also

• Escalation
• Control function
• Internal audit