Goldsworthy v Brickell: Difference between revisions
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{{ | {{cn}}{{Cite|Goldsworthy|Brickell|[1987]|Ch|378}} is a case on the seldom talked-about topic of [[laches]]. | ||
:“Sometimes [[laches]] is taken to mean undue delay on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting his claim and no more. Sometimes acquiescence is used to mean [[laches]] in that sense. And sometimes [[laches]] is used to mean acquiescence in its proper sense, which involves a standing by so as to induce the other party to believe that the wrong is assented to. In that sense it has been observed that acquiescence can bear a close resemblance to [[promissory estoppel]].” (410A-C) | |||
{{c|Case Note}} | {{c|Case Note}} |
Revision as of 08:48, 17 July 2019
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Goldsworthy v Brickell 1987 Ch 378 is a case on the seldom talked-about topic of laches.
- “Sometimes laches is taken to mean undue delay on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting his claim and no more. Sometimes acquiescence is used to mean laches in that sense. And sometimes laches is used to mean acquiescence in its proper sense, which involves a standing by so as to induce the other party to believe that the wrong is assented to. In that sense it has been observed that acquiescence can bear a close resemblance to promissory estoppel.” (410A-C)