Template:Warrantydescription: Difference between revisions
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A {{tag|warranty}} is a statement of a current fact made as a term of a {{tag|contract}}. If a warrantor breaches its {{tag|warranty}} the injured party might claim damages for the breach of {{tag|contract}} and sue for damages, but cannot [[rescind]] it altogether. For that you would need a breach of {{tag|representation}}.<br | A {{tag|warranty}} is a statement of a ''current'' [[fact]] made as a term of a {{tag|contract}}. If a warrantor breaches its {{tag|warranty}} the injured party might claim damages for the breach of {{tag|contract}} and sue for damages, but cannot [[rescind]] it altogether. For that you would need a breach of {{tag|representation}}. | ||
Purists would say that a “[[warranty]]” is also not appropriate for a statement of ''future'' fact — if, [[Epistemology|epistemologically]], such a thing as a future fact is even possible, and those same purists would say it is not — for who knows what the future brings? The [[common law]] is not a deterministic slave to the rhythm; if the future is a soufflé, it has not so much risen yet, but those who might be eating it have not yet considered whether we’re even going to that French place by the roundabout, which may not even have soufflé on the menu in the first place. The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune may yet pin us to a different hill. The thing the common law understands for making commitments about the world that’s yet to come is called the ''[[promise]]'' or, if you want to sound flash about it, the “[[undertaking]]”. <br> | |||
Revision as of 15:04, 6 April 2020
A warranty is a statement of a current fact made as a term of a contract. If a warrantor breaches its warranty the injured party might claim damages for the breach of contract and sue for damages, but cannot rescind it altogether. For that you would need a breach of representation.
Purists would say that a “warranty” is also not appropriate for a statement of future fact — if, epistemologically, such a thing as a future fact is even possible, and those same purists would say it is not — for who knows what the future brings? The common law is not a deterministic slave to the rhythm; if the future is a soufflé, it has not so much risen yet, but those who might be eating it have not yet considered whether we’re even going to that French place by the roundabout, which may not even have soufflé on the menu in the first place. The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune may yet pin us to a different hill. The thing the common law understands for making commitments about the world that’s yet to come is called the promise or, if you want to sound flash about it, the “undertaking”.