Template:Future facts: Difference between revisions

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Purists would say that a “[[warranty]]” is no more suitable for a statement of ''future'' fact — if, [[Epistemology|epistemologically]], such a thing is even a thing, and those same purists would say it is not — for who knows what the future brings? The [[common law]] is no hard determinist; the [[Golden thread|golden thread of precedent]] looks backward, not forward; the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune may yet pin us to a different hill. If the future is a ''soufflé'', it is not so much that it hasn’t yet risen, but that the jurists who might be eating it have not yet decided whether they’re even going to that ''restaurant'', and nor do they know whether it even has ''soufflé'' on the menu in the first place.
Purists would say that a “[[warranty]]” is no more suitable for a statement of ''future'' fact than a [[representation]] — if, [[Epistemology|epistemologically]], a “future fact” is even a thing, and those same purists would say it is not — for who knows what the future brings? The [[common law]] is no hard determinist; the [[Golden thread|golden thread of precedent]] looks backward, not forward; the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune may yet pin us to a different hill. If the future is a ''soufflé'', it is not so much that it hasn’t yet risen, but that the jurists who might be eating it have not yet decided whether they’re even going to that ''restaurant'', and nor do they know whether it even has ''soufflé'' on the menu in the first place.

Revision as of 23:26, 8 November 2020

Purists would say that a “warranty” is no more suitable for a statement of future fact than a representation — if, epistemologically, a “future fact” is even a thing, and those same purists would say it is not — for who knows what the future brings? The common law is no hard determinist; the golden thread of precedent looks backward, not forward; the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune may yet pin us to a different hill. If the future is a soufflé, it is not so much that it hasn’t yet risen, but that the jurists who might be eating it have not yet decided whether they’re even going to that restaurant, and nor do they know whether it even has soufflé on the menu in the first place.