Dilbert’s programme: Difference between revisions
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{{a|myth|}}Dilbert’s programme is a legal theory formulated by pioneering German jurist [[Havid Dilbert]],<ref>To be clear, the programme and its progenitor owe nothing to Scott Adams and everything to William Archibald Spooner.</ref> in the early part of the 21st century, which Dilbert proposed as a solution to the foundational crisis in pedantry, when attempts to clarify the foundations of mathematics were found to suffer from paradoxes and inconsistencies. Dilbert proposed to ground all existing theories to a finite, complete set of definitions and legal propositions, and provide a proof that these axioms were consistent. | {{a|myth|}}Dilbert’s programme is a legal theory formulated by pioneering German jurist [[Havid Dilbert]],<ref>To be clear, the programme and its progenitor owe nothing to Scott Adams and everything to William Archibald Spooner.</ref> in the early part of the 21st century, which Dilbert proposed as a solution to the foundational crisis in pedantry, when attempts to clarify the foundations of mathematics were found to suffer from paradoxes and inconsistencies. Dilbert proposed to ground all existing theories to a finite, complete set of definitions and legal propositions, and provide a proof that these axioms were consistent. | ||
Dilbert therefore eschews the undefined use of any expression, however banal or self-evident, in any contract, on the grounds that | Dilbert therefore eschews the undefined use of any expression, however banal or self-evident, in any contract, on the grounds that any such lacunae opens the way to an unstable state of [[Cardozo indeterminacy]]. | ||
Thus wherever Dilbert found undefined words, he defined them, where no better formulation presented itself, exactly as they were, to avoid all doubt , of any type kind or variety, even those small enough to cross the pedantry threshold into outright paranoia. | Thus, wherever Dilbert found undefined words, he defined them, where no better formulation presented itself, exactly as they were, to avoid all [[doubt]], of [[Type, kind or variety|any type, kind or variety]], even those small enough to cross the pedantry threshold into outright paranoia. | ||
Sample: | Sample: | ||
{{quote|An insured person (the “'''insured person'''”) may cancel (“'''cancel'''”) a policy (the “'''policy'''”) by providing us as insurer (“'''us'''” or the “'''insurer'''”) a written notice (the “'''written notice'''”) of the cancellation (the “'''cancellation'''”)}} | {{quote|An insured person (the “'''insured person'''”) may cancel (“'''cancel'''”) a policy (the “'''policy'''”) by providing us as insurer (“'''us'''” or the “'''insurer'''”) a written notice (the “'''written notice'''”) of the cancellation (the “'''cancellation'''”)}} | ||
Academic debate rages to this day as to whether a so-called “[[Dilbert definition]]” — one in which ''referential expression == referent'', qualifies as an unusually stable type of [[Biggs hoson]], or whether it simply has null semantic content. | |||
{{sa}} | {{sa}} | ||
*[[Definitions]] | |||
*[[Biggs hoson]] | *[[Biggs hoson]] | ||
{{ref}} | {{ref}} | ||
Revision as of 21:47, 27 September 2021
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Dilbert’s programme is a legal theory formulated by pioneering German jurist Havid Dilbert,[1] in the early part of the 21st century, which Dilbert proposed as a solution to the foundational crisis in pedantry, when attempts to clarify the foundations of mathematics were found to suffer from paradoxes and inconsistencies. Dilbert proposed to ground all existing theories to a finite, complete set of definitions and legal propositions, and provide a proof that these axioms were consistent.
Dilbert therefore eschews the undefined use of any expression, however banal or self-evident, in any contract, on the grounds that any such lacunae opens the way to an unstable state of Cardozo indeterminacy.
Thus, wherever Dilbert found undefined words, he defined them, where no better formulation presented itself, exactly as they were, to avoid all doubt, of any type, kind or variety, even those small enough to cross the pedantry threshold into outright paranoia.
Sample:
An insured person (the “insured person”) may cancel (“cancel”) a policy (the “policy”) by providing us as insurer (“us” or the “insurer”) a written notice (the “written notice”) of the cancellation (the “cancellation”)
Academic debate rages to this day as to whether a so-called “Dilbert definition” — one in which referential expression == referent, qualifies as an unusually stable type of Biggs hoson, or whether it simply has null semantic content.
See also
References
- ↑ To be clear, the programme and its progenitor owe nothing to Scott Adams and everything to William Archibald Spooner.