Template:M summ GMSLA 11.5: Difference between revisions
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where this is a real Event of Default, it will be what it will be. | where this is a real Event of Default, it will be what it will be. | ||
==={{gmslaprov|Mini | ==={{gmslaprov|Mini close-out}}=== | ||
Where it is as a result of a {{gmslaprov| | Where it is as a result of a {{gmslaprov|mini close-out}}, there are there are two scenarios to consider: | ||
====The share issuer has blown up==== | |||
One is a [[Delisting - Equity Derivatives Provision|delisting]], nationalisation, or some event where liquidity in the borrowed share has dried up permanently, because the share issuer is down the Swanee, sans paddle, with no real prospect of returning — in which case we would expect common sense would put the {{gmslaprov|Default Market Value}} at somewhere near ''zero''. The Borrower will look for some excuse to make it more than absolutely zero, but will need to keep a straight face while doing so. | |||
====The share issuer is caught up in geopolitical aggro==== | |||
The other is geopolitical rinky-dinks whereby the share issuer is caught up in sanctions, embargos, and political action as a result of a situation not directly of its own making (or which is not in its gift to fix) but which does not ensure its imminent destruction, and which, if lifted, might see the return of an orderly market and juicier valuations. Here there is life in the old dog: its future, as we know, is an unknowable place, but is surely likely to be happier than the state we find it in today. | |||
The latter scenario is the kind of thing that looked likely to happen in February 2022 with the Russia/Ukraine crisis. In this case, the {{gmslaprov|Lender}} might see a {{gmslaprov|Default Market Value}} as being a lot closer to par — if it is a wilful optimist, as long investors in places like Russia tend to be, even ''more'' than par, of course. This is likely to wildly disappoint the {{gmslaprov|Borrower}}, who by disposition is short the share in question, but the {{gmslaprov|Lender}}’s response will be, “look: if you can deliver me back the stock you borrowed, everyone is happy. Even show me a tradable price at which I can {{gmslaprov|buy in}} that is lower than the value I’m proposing — then I’m listening. But you can’t, can you?” | The latter scenario is the kind of thing that looked likely to happen in February 2022 with the Russia/Ukraine crisis. In this case, the {{gmslaprov|Lender}} might see a {{gmslaprov|Default Market Value}} as being a lot closer to par — if it is a wilful optimist, as long investors in places like Russia tend to be, even ''more'' than par, of course. This is likely to wildly disappoint the {{gmslaprov|Borrower}}, who by disposition is short the share in question, but the {{gmslaprov|Lender}}’s response will be, “look: if you can deliver me back the stock you borrowed, everyone is happy. Even show me a tradable price at which I can {{gmslaprov|buy in}} that is lower than the value I’m proposing — then I’m listening. But you can’t, can you?” | ||
A patient {{gmslaprov|Lender}} might revert to its right to continue the Loan, pending lifting of the sanctions. This is what an Agent Lender is likely to do, since its principal will be unlikely to want to liquidate a holding in an asset ''right now'' when everyone thinks, when the madness blows over, it will recover. | A patient {{gmslaprov|Lender}} might revert to its right to continue the Loan, pending lifting of the sanctions. This is what an Agent Lender is likely to do, since its principal will be unlikely to want to liquidate a holding in an asset ''right now'' when everyone thinks, when the madness blows over, it will recover. | ||
Revision as of 11:14, 23 February 2022
If it can’t determine a Default Market Value under 11.2, 11.3 and 11.4, the Non Defaulting Party can just make one up.
Within reason, of course.
where this is a real Event of Default, it will be what it will be.
Mini close-out
Where it is as a result of a mini close-out, there are there are two scenarios to consider:
One is a delisting, nationalisation, or some event where liquidity in the borrowed share has dried up permanently, because the share issuer is down the Swanee, sans paddle, with no real prospect of returning — in which case we would expect common sense would put the Default Market Value at somewhere near zero. The Borrower will look for some excuse to make it more than absolutely zero, but will need to keep a straight face while doing so.
The other is geopolitical rinky-dinks whereby the share issuer is caught up in sanctions, embargos, and political action as a result of a situation not directly of its own making (or which is not in its gift to fix) but which does not ensure its imminent destruction, and which, if lifted, might see the return of an orderly market and juicier valuations. Here there is life in the old dog: its future, as we know, is an unknowable place, but is surely likely to be happier than the state we find it in today.
The latter scenario is the kind of thing that looked likely to happen in February 2022 with the Russia/Ukraine crisis. In this case, the Lender might see a Default Market Value as being a lot closer to par — if it is a wilful optimist, as long investors in places like Russia tend to be, even more than par, of course. This is likely to wildly disappoint the Borrower, who by disposition is short the share in question, but the Lender’s response will be, “look: if you can deliver me back the stock you borrowed, everyone is happy. Even show me a tradable price at which I can buy in that is lower than the value I’m proposing — then I’m listening. But you can’t, can you?”
A patient Lender might revert to its right to continue the Loan, pending lifting of the sanctions. This is what an Agent Lender is likely to do, since its principal will be unlikely to want to liquidate a holding in an asset right now when everyone thinks, when the madness blows over, it will recover.