Template:M summ Equity Derivatives 1.46: Difference between revisions

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Eine kleine uberengineering from {{icds}} — for we [[delta-one]] [[synthetic equity swap]] simpletons, at any rate, it is hard to see why, if you are referencing an {{eqderivprov|Underlier}} A, that your {{eqderivprov|Knock-in/out Event}} might reference another share or index altogether — I mean, why would you? — but remember this document is a product of its time, and its time was the heady early noughties, where everyone (bar Warren Buffett) thought that [[derivatives]] had ''solved'' the problem of systemic risk in the financial markets, rather than aggravating it, and super complex packages teasing apart and allocating correlation risks were all the rage — mainly in the [[credit derivatives]] world, to be fair — but look, you never know.
[[Knock-ins and Knock-outs - Equity Derivatives Provision|Eine kleine uberengineering]] from {{icds}} — for we [[delta-one]] [[synthetic equity swap]] simpletons, at any rate, it is hard to see why, if you are referencing an {{eqderivprov|Underlier}} A, that your {{eqderivprov|Knock-in/out Event}} might reference another share or index altogether — I mean, why would you? — but remember this document is a product of its time, and its time was the heady early noughties, where everyone (bar Warren Buffett) thought that [[derivatives]] had ''solved'' the problem of systemic risk in the financial markets, rather than aggravating it, and super complex packages teasing apart and allocating correlation risks were all the rage — mainly in the [[credit derivatives]] world, to be fair — but look, you never know.

Latest revision as of 09:03, 19 May 2022

Eine kleine uberengineering from ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ — for we delta-one synthetic equity swap simpletons, at any rate, it is hard to see why, if you are referencing an Underlier A, that your Knock-in/out Event might reference another share or index altogether — I mean, why would you? — but remember this document is a product of its time, and its time was the heady early noughties, where everyone (bar Warren Buffett) thought that derivatives had solved the problem of systemic risk in the financial markets, rather than aggravating it, and super complex packages teasing apart and allocating correlation risks were all the rage — mainly in the credit derivatives world, to be fair — but look, you never know.