Risk retention rule: Difference between revisions
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{{a|repack|{{us disclaimer small}}}}The risk retention rule requires that those who sponsor | {{a|repack|{{us disclaimer small}}}}The risk retention rule requires that those who sponsor an [[asset-backed security]] to “retain an economic interest in a portion of the credit risk for any asset that the securitizer, through the issuance of an [[asset-backed security]], transfers, sells, or conveys to a third party”. | ||
The key question is whether the [[ABS]] is collateralised by any type of “[[self-liquidating financial asset]] (including a loan, a lease, a mortgage, or a | The key question is whether the [[ABS]] is collateralised by any type of “[[self-liquidating financial asset]] (including a loan, a lease, a mortgage, or a secured or unsecured receivable)” for which payments “depend primarily on cash flow from the asset”. | ||
secured or unsecured receivable)” for which payments “depend primarily on cash flow from the asset”. | |||
===Self-liquidating financial asset=== | ===Self-liquidating financial asset=== | ||
A “[[self-liquidating financial asset]]” is generally viewed as one that is capable, pursuant to its terms, of generating sufficient income by way of distributions and payment at maturity to return the ABS investment. | A “[[self-liquidating financial asset]]” is generally viewed as one that is capable, pursuant to its terms, of generating sufficient income by way of distributions and payment at maturity to return the ABS investment. | ||
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To be in scope for risk-retention, the sponsor needs to be offloading the assets in the first place. If it just originates them in the market (as is the case for certain CLO structures, for example) the requirement for there to be a “transfer” is not met. On February 9, 2018, the Circuit Court, reversing an earlier ruling, ruled<ref>See [https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/clo-risk-retention-ruling-analysis-from-the-trenches/ press release].</ref> that collateral managers in “open-market” CLO transactions are not subject to the risk retention rule or any related regulations. | To be in scope for risk-retention, the sponsor needs to be offloading the assets in the first place. If it just originates them in the market (as is the case for certain CLO structures, for example) the requirement for there to be a “transfer” is not met. On February 9, 2018, the Circuit Court, reversing an earlier ruling, ruled<ref>See [https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/clo-risk-retention-ruling-analysis-from-the-trenches/ press release].</ref> that collateral managers in “open-market” CLO transactions are not subject to the risk retention rule or any related regulations. | ||
===[[Loan]]s=== | ===[[Loan]]s=== | ||
If you do your repack in non-securities format — such as a loan — then the risk retention rules don’t seem to apply. Which — if true — is nice. We think it has something to do with the definition of asset-backed | If you do your repack in non-securities format — such as a loan — then the risk retention rules don’t seem to apply. Which — if true — is nice. We think it has something to do with the definition of “[[asset-backed security]]” which must be — you know — a ''security''. A bilateral, non-negotiable loan isn’t. Now it is not beyond the great wall of credibility that [[U.S. Attorney]]s and their regulators might confect a disposition that a loan ''is'' in fact a security — many of them seem to think of a [[swap]] as a security, so why not — so be extra careful, young fool, when galloping into this terrain, sparsely-troubled with angelic footsteps as it appears to be. | ||
{{sa}} | {{sa}} | ||
*[https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/part-246/subpart-B Cornell legislation resource] | *[https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/part-246/subpart-B Cornell legislation resource] | ||
{{ref}} | {{ref}} |
Revision as of 10:49, 25 July 2023
The Law and Lore of Repackaging
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The risk retention rule requires that those who sponsor an asset-backed security to “retain an economic interest in a portion of the credit risk for any asset that the securitizer, through the issuance of an asset-backed security, transfers, sells, or conveys to a third party”.
The key question is whether the ABS is collateralised by any type of “self-liquidating financial asset (including a loan, a lease, a mortgage, or a secured or unsecured receivable)” for which payments “depend primarily on cash flow from the asset”.
Self-liquidating financial asset
A “self-liquidating financial asset” is generally viewed as one that is capable, pursuant to its terms, of generating sufficient income by way of distributions and payment at maturity to return the ABS investment.
Transfer
To be in scope for risk-retention, the sponsor needs to be offloading the assets in the first place. If it just originates them in the market (as is the case for certain CLO structures, for example) the requirement for there to be a “transfer” is not met. On February 9, 2018, the Circuit Court, reversing an earlier ruling, ruled[1] that collateral managers in “open-market” CLO transactions are not subject to the risk retention rule or any related regulations.
Loans
If you do your repack in non-securities format — such as a loan — then the risk retention rules don’t seem to apply. Which — if true — is nice. We think it has something to do with the definition of “asset-backed security” which must be — you know — a security. A bilateral, non-negotiable loan isn’t. Now it is not beyond the great wall of credibility that U.S. Attorneys and their regulators might confect a disposition that a loan is in fact a security — many of them seem to think of a swap as a security, so why not — so be extra careful, young fool, when galloping into this terrain, sparsely-troubled with angelic footsteps as it appears to be.
See also
References
- ↑ See press release.