Template:M intro repack application of proceeds: Difference between revisions
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[[Application of proceeds|There]] comes a time in a asset-backed [[Special purpose vehicle|espievie]]’s life when things go ''[[Germknödel in der Luft]]''. This can happen two ways: | [[Application of proceeds|There]] comes a time in a asset-backed [[Special purpose vehicle|espievie]]’s life when things go ''[[Germknödel in der Luft]]''. This can happen two ways: | ||
The expected way: because some part of the security package — an underlying asset, a swap counterparty or, heaven forbid, the [[paying agent]] has failed. These are regrettable externalities of ''la vie financière'' which no-one ''wants'', exactly, but exposure to these risks, and the compensation one earns for running them, is what motivates repackaging investors to come to the table in the first place: if none of these risks ever came about there would no risk premium either. | ''The expected way'': because some part of the security package — an underlying asset, a swap counterparty or, heaven forbid, the [[paying agent]] has failed. These are regrettable externalities of ''la vie financière'' which no-one ''wants'', exactly, but exposure to these risks, and the compensation one earns for running them, is what motivates repackaging investors to come to the table in the first place: if none of these risks ever came about there would no risk premium either. | ||
The unexpected way: because the [[espievie]] itself has failed. This is unexpected because from its socks and bloomers a [[repackaging vehicle]] is architected so that it ''cannot, even in theory, go bankrupt''. but [[espievie]]s can go bankrupt, in practice — at least in theory. If you see what I mean. But it involves — whisper it — ''someone screwing up''. For an SPV to go insolvent there much be a flaw of some kind in the [[Limited recourse|ring-fencing]]. | ''The unexpected way'': because the [[espievie]] itself has failed. This is unexpected because from its socks and bloomers a [[repackaging vehicle]] is architected so that it ''cannot, even in theory, go bankrupt''. but [[espievie]]s can go bankrupt, in practice — at least in theory. If you see what I mean. But it involves — whisper it — ''someone screwing up''. For an SPV to go insolvent there much be a flaw of some kind in the [[Limited recourse|ring-fencing]]. | ||
Depending on ''which way'' your [[espievie]] has gone ''[[seins en l’air]]'', there is a different method to unwinding the deal. Both involve liquidating everything; one (the expected way) takes place in the ordinary course and is carried out without fuss, by agents (disposal agents, calculation agents, collateral managers etc) appointed ''by the [[SPV]]'' for that exact purpose; the other (the unexpected way) takes place under the auspices of the [[Law of Property Act 1925]], and involves the Trustee appointing a receiver and all ''kinds'' of fear and loathing. For more on this, see [[enforcing security]]. | |||
In either case you need some provisions to guide whoever is wielding the chainsaw on how to divvy up the SPV’s resources one they have been terminated with extreme prejudice. This is the application of proceeds clause. | |||
Revision as of 12:46, 3 October 2023
There comes a time in a asset-backed espievie’s life when things go Germknödel in der Luft. This can happen two ways:
The expected way: because some part of the security package — an underlying asset, a swap counterparty or, heaven forbid, the paying agent has failed. These are regrettable externalities of la vie financière which no-one wants, exactly, but exposure to these risks, and the compensation one earns for running them, is what motivates repackaging investors to come to the table in the first place: if none of these risks ever came about there would no risk premium either.
The unexpected way: because the espievie itself has failed. This is unexpected because from its socks and bloomers a repackaging vehicle is architected so that it cannot, even in theory, go bankrupt. but espievies can go bankrupt, in practice — at least in theory. If you see what I mean. But it involves — whisper it — someone screwing up. For an SPV to go insolvent there much be a flaw of some kind in the ring-fencing.
Depending on which way your espievie has gone seins en l’air, there is a different method to unwinding the deal. Both involve liquidating everything; one (the expected way) takes place in the ordinary course and is carried out without fuss, by agents (disposal agents, calculation agents, collateral managers etc) appointed by the SPV for that exact purpose; the other (the unexpected way) takes place under the auspices of the Law of Property Act 1925, and involves the Trustee appointing a receiver and all kinds of fear and loathing. For more on this, see enforcing security.
In either case you need some provisions to guide whoever is wielding the chainsaw on how to divvy up the SPV’s resources one they have been terminated with extreme prejudice. This is the application of proceeds clause.