Epistemic priority

From The Jolly Contrarian
Revision as of 22:45, 8 November 2022 by Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) (Created page with "{{a|philosophy|}}A means of judging, when two competing competing models appear to explain, account for or manage some phenomenon equally well, which is the “proper” one....")
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Philosophy
The JC looks deep into the well. Or abyss.
Click ᐅ to expand:
Tell me more
Sign up for our newsletter — or just get in touch: for ½ a weekly 🍺 you get to consult JC. Ask about it here.

A means of judging, when two competing competing models appear to explain, account for or manage some phenomenon equally well, which is the “proper” one.

For example, the trajectory of a missile may be accounted equally well, in theory, for by special relativity, Newtonian mechanics, or the “gaze heuristic”.

Which, all other things being equal, should we prefer? Does one have, as a piece of credentialised technical knowledge about the world, “epistemic priority” over the others?

You may not be surprised to hear opinions tend to be divided with experts in competing magisteria trending to talk their own book. Some will appeal to Occam’s razor, but this is no rule of scientific discourse: it is a lazy fudge. It has no epistemic priority either.

So the pragmatist’s answer is “no.” Horses for courses. If your models works, use it.

(It is no little irony that the “gaze heuristic” works worst in theory — I just “kind of keep my eye on the ball and keep running” might struggle to get past peer review — but best in practice: there’s a reason not many astrophysicists play cricket for England.)

See also