Agency problem: Difference between revisions
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The [[agency problem]] addresses the intrinsic [[conflict of interest]] any [[agent]] working on a [[commission]] faces — any [[introducing broker]], [[broker/dealer]], [[asset manager]], [[architect]], building contractor — and that is that once it have received its [[commission]], it doesn’t really care a hill of beans what its [[principal]] gets, however much it much protest to the contrary. In a sense this is a basic articulation of the [[prisoner’s dilemma]] and so shouldn’t surprise anyone — and should be cured by repeat interactions — your clients have memories and will remember when you ripped them off. | The [[agency problem]] addresses the intrinsic [[conflict of interest]] any [[agent]] working on a [[commission]] faces — any [[introducing broker]], [[broker/dealer]], [[asset manager]], [[architect]], building contractor — and that is that once it have received its [[commission]], it doesn’t really care a hill of beans what its [[principal]] gets, however much it much protest to the contrary. In a sense this is a basic articulation of the [[prisoner’s dilemma]] and so shouldn’t surprise anyone — and should be cured by repeat interactions — your clients have memories and will remember when you ripped them off. | ||
But the [[iterated prisoner’s dilemma]] has a couple of natural limits. One is that it relies on repeated interactions with an indeterminate end. When the sky is falling on your head, it looks like a final interaction, and the calculus is utterly different. Second, it takes no account of convexity effects. I can build up my reputation incrementally with thousands of small transactions — I can look like a five star collaborator — only to bit on a big position and defect. This is what {{author|Nicholas | But the [[iterated prisoner’s dilemma]] has a couple of natural limits. One is that it relies on repeated interactions with an indeterminate end. When the sky is falling on your head, it looks like a final interaction, and the calculus is utterly different. Second, it takes no account of convexity effects. I can build up my reputation incrementally with thousands of small transactions — I can look like a five star collaborator — only to bit on a big position and defect. This is what {{author|Nassim Nicholas Taleb}} calls the “Rubin Trade”. | ||
Revision as of 14:36, 28 August 2019
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Risk Anatomy™
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The agency problem addresses the intrinsic conflict of interest any agent working on a commission faces — any introducing broker, broker/dealer, asset manager, architect, building contractor — and that is that once it have received its commission, it doesn’t really care a hill of beans what its principal gets, however much it much protest to the contrary. In a sense this is a basic articulation of the prisoner’s dilemma and so shouldn’t surprise anyone — and should be cured by repeat interactions — your clients have memories and will remember when you ripped them off.
But the iterated prisoner’s dilemma has a couple of natural limits. One is that it relies on repeated interactions with an indeterminate end. When the sky is falling on your head, it looks like a final interaction, and the calculus is utterly different. Second, it takes no account of convexity effects. I can build up my reputation incrementally with thousands of small transactions — I can look like a five star collaborator — only to bit on a big position and defect. This is what Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls the “Rubin Trade”.