Intention to create legal relations: Difference between revisions
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There is some debate on whether the [[intention to create legal relations]] is a separate ingredient in a legally binding contract, or really just an evaluative description of what all the other ingredients ([[offer]], [[acceptance]] and [[consideration]]) add up to. | There is some debate on whether the [[intention to create legal relations]] is a separate ingredient in a legally binding contract, or really just an evaluative description of what all the other ingredients ([[offer]], [[acceptance]] and [[consideration]]) add up to. | ||
Their worshipful honours have held<ref>{{cite|Edwards|Skyways|1964|1WLR|349}} that in an “express” contract or an “ordinary commercial transaction”, the burden of proof is on she who alleges the ''absence'' of an intention (but really? if, in actually signing a legal agreement, you did not intend to create legal relations, then what on earth did you think you ''were'' doing?) | ''Express contracts''': Their worshipful honours have held<ref>{{cite|Edwards|Skyways|1964|1WLR|349}}</ref> that in an “express” contract or an “ordinary commercial transaction”, the burden of proof is on she who alleges the ''absence'' of an intention (but really? if, in actually signing a legal agreement, you did not intend to create legal relations, then what on earth did you think you ''were'' doing?) | ||
'''Implied contracts''': Where offer and acceptance of a contract can only be implied from conduct, then there are authorities<ref>{{cite1|The Aramis|1989|1Lloyd’sRep|213}}</ref> that the person alleging the contract has the burden of proof. But this seems to be no more than a burden of proving [[offer and acceptance]] in the first place. | |||
so while there is some judicial authority that the [[intention to create legal relations]] is a separate thing, but dammit, that legal authority, however [[Doctrine of precedent|binding]] it might be, is wrong. | |||
As the maxim has it, ''[[anus matronae parvae malas leges faciunt]]''. | As the maxim has it, ''[[anus matronae parvae malas leges faciunt]]''. | ||
Revision as of 08:26, 11 April 2019
But I never thought it would come to this....
There is some debate on whether the intention to create legal relations is a separate ingredient in a legally binding contract, or really just an evaluative description of what all the other ingredients (offer, acceptance and consideration) add up to.
Express contracts': Their worshipful honours have held[1] that in an “express” contract or an “ordinary commercial transaction”, the burden of proof is on she who alleges the absence of an intention (but really? if, in actually signing a legal agreement, you did not intend to create legal relations, then what on earth did you think you were doing?)
Implied contracts: Where offer and acceptance of a contract can only be implied from conduct, then there are authorities[2] that the person alleging the contract has the burden of proof. But this seems to be no more than a burden of proving offer and acceptance in the first place.
so while there is some judicial authority that the intention to create legal relations is a separate thing, but dammit, that legal authority, however binding it might be, is wrong.
As the maxim has it, anus matronae parvae malas leges faciunt.
This is a contrarian view, by the way. The clue is in the url.
See also
References
- ↑ Edwards v Skyways [1964] 1WLR 349
- ↑ The Aramis [1989] 1Lloyd’sRep 213[1]